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ABSTRACT 
A Problem of Perception 
 An Analysis of the Formation, Reception, and Implementation  
of National Socialist Ideology in Germany, 1919 to 1939 
 
by 
 
Derrick Angermeier 
 
 
This thesis seeks to dispel the notion that Nazi ideology was merely an afterthought to numerous 
actions taken by the Nazis. The first chapter discusses how Nazism’s earliest adherents 
internalized notions from World War I into an ideology that would motivate the early Nazi 
Movement to launch the Beer Hall Putsch. The second chapter focuses on the Nazi Party’s 
electoral tactics and how those actions correlated with entrenched Nazi ideological notions of 
recognition and community. Finally, the third chapter will seek to demonstrate that the numerous 
repressive measures implemented by the Third Reich were part of a general plan to prepare a 
future generation of Nazi citizens for, the worldwide struggle for existence. This work exists as a 
counter to a considerable amount of literature in the historiography that, by maintaining Nazi 
ideology and Nazi actions were two separate entities, belittles the importance of Nazi ideology 
thereby fundamentally misunderstanding Nazism.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Burgfrieden: Notion of German Identity that Called for Germans to forget divisive elements like 
class, race, and religion in order to unite. A unified Germany could accomplish 
anything, including defeat the enemies of Germany. 
DAP: German Worker’s Party; Predecessor of the Nazi Party 
DNVP: German National People’s Party; Right Wing Nationalist Party 
DVP: German People’s Party; Leftist Nationalist Party 
KPD: Communist Party of Germany 
Mittelstand Thesis: Argument that Nazi voter support was primarily from the Lower Middle 
Class 
NSDAP: The Nazi Party 
SPD: Social Democratic Party 
The Nazi Movement: The Nazi Organization in existence before the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923 
The Nazi Party: The Political Party of the Nazi Organization in existence from 1924 to 1933 
The Reich Government: The Nazi Organization in Power after 1933 
Volksgemeinschaft: National Community 
Volkspartei: A People’s Party; Generally reference to a Party with a support base of multiple 
social backgrounds 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
What was Nazism? 
 
 This question exists as an exercise in mental exhaustion as numerous great minds have 
struggled with finding its answer. Eighty years after the 1933 rise of the Nazi Party historians 
still have no definitive answers about Nazism. The question is difficult because it asks many 
different things. “What was Nazism” begs for a definition of Nazi ideology which in and of itself 
is a complicated matter as Nazi ideology was buried underneath a great deal of captivating, 
caustic yet severely opportunistic rhetoric. Also, the prospect of defining Nazism runs into a 
timing difficulty as Nazi actions and intentions seemed to change as need and circumstance 
mandated. Nazi purpose and direction altered during the transitions from a political movement to 
political party to government to military-industrial machine. Depending on which time frame one 
chooses drastically varied answers would be produced which complicates defining Nazism. 
 Beyond definition, this question comes with the stark realities of the Holocaust that 
shadow any discussion of Nazism. Over seventy years after the beginning of the Third Reich's 
mass-execution programs it is still impossible to study any aspect of Nazi Germany without 
framing such discussions in terms of the Holocaust. Jews were not the only victims of Nazism as 
the Nazi movement claimed many lives in violent street fights and political assassinations. The 
initial purges of 1933 and 1934 witnessed the Nazis consolidate their power via a great deal of 
political murder. The Third Reich also waged a World War with deaths spanning the globe. 
Therefore, Nazism can be considered an entity responsible for a considerable amount of death, 
destruction, and anguish. As such any question pertaining to Nazism demands an answer with 
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respect to the many atrocities and acts of violence committed in its name. However, reverence to 
those affected by atrocity has placed a cloud over studying the logic and cohesion of Nazism. 
That is not to say that Nazism was in any way valid, but in treating it exclusively as madness 
bent on death and destruction makes objectively studying the foundations that motivated these 
actions impossible. Any attempt to study Nazism must balance the line between reverence for 
atrocity and objective analysis, a line not easily navigated.    
 To that end, “what was Nazism” can ask for more than a definition, but instead inquire 
about the impacts of Nazism. This question then becomes one of audience as Nazism exists as 
multiple things to multiple people. For a German, Nazism exists as a weight around their 
collective identity that constantly demands explanation. It has often been said that for most 
people German history only spans twelve years, 1933 to 1945. Every German is thus constantly 
reminded of these twelve years in their interactions with outsiders and one another. For the 
Jewish faith, Nazism is the dogmatic philosophy that eliminated perhaps six million of their 
community. For England, Nazism brought on a moment of national glory, but also the reality of 
decline, as the war finished off the British Empire. For the United States, Nazism led to a set of 
circumstances that established America as a superpower. Nazism thus means different things to 
different people and impacted multiple cultures in deeply profound manners, further 
complicating the task of determining an exact interpretation of Nazism.   
 Another difficulty in answering this question is one of scale. Is Nazism embodied within 
all of those who adhered to it, by the entire German citizenry, the Party members, or could 
Nazism be explained in the terms of one person?1 Many historians of great repute have attempted 
to explain Nazism in the terms of its leader Adolf Hitler. Disputing that Hitler was Nazism is 
difficult given his personal influence throughout the many stages of the Nazi Party's history. In 
                                                 
1Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004). 
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1920, Hitler helped develop the formal platform of the German Worker's Party, the organization 
that would evolve into the Nazi Party. Hitler became the Party's most dynamic speaker and 
eventually asserted his power to become the party leader. Hitler led the failed Putsch and 
reformed the Party after its ban was lifted. He was critical to the electoral victories that propelled 
the Nazis into office and directed the implementation of Nazism throughout Germany. 
Oftentimes historians take sections of Hitler's opus, Mein Kampf, to validate aspects of Nazi 
ideology.2All of this evidence lends a great deal of credence to the argument that Nazism was 
Hitlerism, but this definition is far too strict. For example, despite Hitler's presence throughout 
all of the Nazis critical actions, Nazism was more than sweeping leadership and caustic speeches. 
Nazism had a strong grassroots populism at its heart focused on the mass desire for an 
implementation of the utopian national community, known as the Volksgemeinschaft. To claim 
Nazism was solely what Hitler determined is to ignore the numerous everyday Nazis who held 
interpretations of Nazi ideology separate from the Führer. 
 One could simplify the query by answering that Nazism is simply a combination of 
Nationalism and Socialism, but what does that truly answer? Some would say National Socialism 
                                                 
2A great deal of literature exists pertaining to Hitler and his role with Nazism. Included here are pivotal works on 
Adolf Hitler anyone interested in the Führer should read. R Cecil, “Review of Hitler’s Mein Kampf: An Analysis 
By Maser, Werner; Hitler’s Weltanschauung: Entwurf Einer Herrschaft by Jackel, Eberhard,” International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 46, no. No. 4 (October 1970): 746–747.H. W. Gatzke, 
“Hitler and Psychohistory,” The American Historical Review 78, no. 2 (1973): 394–401.Brigitte Hamann, 
Hitler’s Vienna: A Dictator’s Apprenticeship, trans. Thomas Thorton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999).Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf, ed. Gerhard Weinberg, trans. 
Krista Smith (New York: Enigma Books, 2003).Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999).Eberhard Jackel, Hitler’s Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power, trans. 
Herbert Arnold (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1972).Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936 Hubris (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998).Ian Kershaw, Hitler:1936-1945 Nemesis (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2000).I. Kershaw, “Hitler and the Uniqueness of Nazism,” Journal of Contemporary History 39, no. 2 
(2004): 239–254.Richard A. Koenigsberg, Hitler’s Ideology: A Study in Psychoanalytic Sociology (New York: 
The Library of Social Science, 1975).Walter Langer, The Mind of Adolf Hitler: The Secret Wartime Report (New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972).John Luckas, The Hitler of History (New York: Random House, 1997).Werner 
Maser, Hitler: Legend, Myth & Reality, trans. Peter Ross and Betty Ross (New York: Penguin Books, 
1973).Hans Staudinger, The Inner Nazi: A Critical Analysis of Mein Kampf (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1981).R. G. L. Waite, “Adolf Hitler’s Guilt Feelings: A Problem in History and Psychology,” 
The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1, no. 2 (1971): 229–249. 
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is a specifically German fascist ideology, but arguably the first National Socialist was 1896 failed 
North Dakotan farmer and French aristocrat the Marquis de Mores, who “appealed with a 
mixture of anti-capitalism and anti-Semitic nationalism.”3 Mores's squads wore “cowboy garb 
and ten-gallon hats which thus predate black and brown shirts as the first fascist uniforms.”4 
Thus, if Nazism is National Socialism then it cannot be a specifically German historical object as 
even the term “national socialism” was coined by a French nationalist author.5 To take this 
interpretation forward, by scholar of fascism Robert Paxton's definition National Socialism 
stands as a critical part of fascism in general. Thus, in order to explain Nazism one would have to 
understand fascism in its entirety as experienced in Italy, Spain, France, Russia, and even the 
United States. Even Paxton is careful not to give Fascism, and by extension Nazism, a firm 
definition claiming that “fascism in action looks much more like a network of relationships than 
a fixed essence.”6 Therefore, in defining Nazism as National Socialism and therefore Fascism, 
the process of finding out exactly what Nazism was becomes impossible, lost in the myriad 
similar platforms like French nationalism, Ku Klux Klan rhetoric, and Spanish and Italian 
corporatism. 
 Perhaps Nazism cannot be explained in terms of the fascist ideologies that formed 
alongside it in the early twentieth century but should be looked at as a strictly German 
phenomenon. If so, what characteristics of Germany history and identity can be used to explain 
what Nazism truly was? Historians have pondered this question in numerous forms, the most 
notable expression of this idea being the Sonderweg thesis. Meaning the “Special Path,” the 
Sonderweg debate contends that Nazism can be explained as the result of Germany's failure to 
                                                 
3Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, 48. 
4Ibid., 48. 
5Ibid., 48. 
6Ibid.,207. 
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follow the “normal” path of development that resulted from English, French, and American 
bourgeois revolutions. Historian Jurgen Kocka thus interprets this position as claiming only that 
Germany suffered Nazism because conditions of the economy and class struggle prevalent in 
other nations were, in Germany, “aggravated and reinforced by challenged, but surviving, 
structures and traditions of a pre-modern kind.”7 Therefore, Sonderweg historians would claim 
Nazism was simply the inevitable result of stunted German development. 
 Sonderweg interpretations were largely held as valid until the mid 1980s when challenges 
to the thesis substantially undermined the line of thought. The first prominent protest against the 
Sonderweg thesis came from now established historians David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley in 
their work The Peculiarities of German History. In this work Blackbourn and Eley present 
multiple challenges to the Sonderweg thesis that fatally damaged the line of thought. Their 
strongest argument against the Sonderweg asked “what was it, in terms of content, that was said 
to mark an aberration in German history when judged by western norms?”8 In simpler terms, 
what was exactly “normal” about western Bourgeois revolutions? Blackbourn and Eley are quick 
to point out that although “the bourgeoisie characteristically became the dominant class in 
European countries” they did not become the ruling class as the dictatorships of Napoleon 
Bonaparte and Oliver Cromwell can attest.9 Nor, did the western bourgeoisie attain this power 
through “heroic means or open political action.”10 The bloodletting of the French Revolution, the 
decapitation of King Charles I, the Civil War, American slavery, and British-French colonialism 
stand as examples of flawed aspects of Western development that were held by Sonderweg 
                                                 
7J. Kocka, “Germán History Before Hitler: The Debate About the German Sonderweg,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 23, no. 1 (1988): 3–16. 
8David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in 
Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984)., 12-13. 
9Ibid., 16. 
10Ibid., 16. 
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adherents as normal. Additional flaws with the Sonderweg thesis will be discussed in subsequent 
portions of this work, but for now it is worthwhile to note that any analysis of Nazism that claims 
it was the direct result of flaws in German cultural or political development during the nineteenth 
century have numerous interpretive flaws. 
 It seems that identifying Nazism as the consequence of failed nineteenth century 
development has its weaknesses, but perhaps claiming Nazism was the result of developments in 
the twentieth century can be argued more persuasively. Historian George Mosse is a well-
established historian of German memory and identity who has made a name for himself 
analyzing the numerous ways the World Wars impacted German conceptions of identity. Mosse 
is perhaps the most influential historian to argue that World War I had tremendous impacts on 
Nazism and exists as a bedrock of Nazi ideology. Mosse is not alone in this assertion as multiple 
historians weigh in on the First World War's presence in Nazi ideology, literature which will be 
explored in the first chapter of this work. For the time being, it is important to note that World 
War I had several impacts on the Nazis from the militarism it fostered in multiple generations of 
Nazis, to the perceived class unity the war fostered and the calamitous effects the war's aftermath 
had on Germany. If one argues that the First World War could have an effect, then the devastation 
that followed during the Weimar Republic could also be countenanced as impactful on Nazism. 
However, historians often take one side or the other, either minimizing the influence of the war 
and blaming the rise of Nazism on the instability of the Weimar Republic or defending the 
Weimar system and pointing to the war as the main culprit. The prevalence of such a conflict 
leads the process of defining Nazism to yet another dead end. 
 Ultimately this question of defining Nazism is not the sole property of the historical 
profession, or even other professional intellectual environments. The question of “what was 
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Nazism” still resides very much in the public and therefore “entertainment” history has staked a 
seemingly permanent claim to this issue. Entertainment history is historical study presented to 
enthrall an unfamiliar public audience in many cases at the expense of thorough and factual 
research. Nazism has been a common thread of “entertainment” history as the public remains 
both captivated, mystified, and disgusted by numerous aspects of Third Reich history which 
entertainment outlets and journalists play up to generate revenue. Perhaps one of the most 
professionally condemned histories of Nazi Germany, William Shirer's international best-seller 
The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, recently marked its fiftieth anniversary with a release of a 
new edition.11 Thus, for fifty years Shirer's interpretation has been provided to the masses many 
of whom internalize Rise and Fall as historical fact. Shirer's work is biased, unprofessional, 
inadequately researched, and irresponsibly glosses over pivotal aspects of Third Reich history, 
but these are all missteps in the world of professional history.12 Shirer as a journalist was not 
bound to Historian codes and practices, but his word is just as valid in the public as Richard 
Evans's exhaustive three volume history of the Third Reich.13 Beyond Shirer other non 
historically trained authors and movie makers generate their own interpretations, largely based 
on scandal, atrocity, and myth, which become accepted into cultural thought. Thus Nazism has a 
character beyond historical interpretations that must be accounted for which makes coming to an 
all encompassing definition of Nazism that much more difficult. 
                                                 
11William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1959). 
12Klaus Epstein, “Shirer’s History of Nazi Germany,” The Review of Politics 23, no. 2 (April 1961): 230–245. 
13Richard Evans wrote three copious books laying out an in-depth narrative of Nazi history from the days of 
Imperial Germany to the collapse of the Third Reich. His first work studies Imperial and Weimar Germany 
chronicling the Nazi rise to power. The second work picks up after the Nazis seized power following the purges 
of 1933. The final work studies the Third Reich through the entirety of the Second World War. Anybody just 
beginning to scratch the surface or looking for a continuous narrative on the entirety of Nazi history should look 
at Evans' works. Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004).Richard 
J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005).Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich at 
War (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008). 
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 Is Nazism a top-down progression of the Party and the Reich government dictating its 
whims to the citizenry or is Nazism built from the bottom guiding the Nazis in a certain direction? 
Paxton and other supporters of Nazism as fascist ideology would contend that the Nazis dictated 
their own practices on the German people. This line of reasoning becomes particularly evident in 
literature on the collapse of the Third Reich where German citizens are portrayed as victims of 
Nazi manipulation and tyranny; driven to a hopeless situation by a power-hungry dictatorship.14 
Although validity exists for the top down theory of Nazism, a school of thought fostered by 
historians like Peter Fritzche and Joe Perry argues compellingly that the German citizens were 
equally culpable in the fostering of Nazism throughout the Third Reich.15 Fritzche uses the 
phrase “forcibly volunteered” to demonstrate that “consent as well as compliance structured the 
practices of everyday life in Nazi Germany.”16 Perry agrees with the idea that the German 
citizenry actively participated in Nazism as evidenced by their involvement in Nazi themed 
holiday festivities. The Reich Government provided the major impetus for such celebration as 
“state orchestration met with an active and enthusiastic popular response because participation in 
Nazi political rituals...offered Germans attractive material and symbolic rewards and a privileged 
place in an exclusionary social system.”17 The role of the German citizenry as shapers versus 
receivers will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter of this work. For the purposes of 
the present discussion, the complexities of the German people's ties to Nazism further complicate 
the task of finding a catch-all definition of Nazism. 
 Focusing on one area of Nazi Germany with the expectation of defining Nazism will 
                                                 
14Jörg Friedrich, The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945, trans. Allison Brown (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006). 
15Joe Perry, “Nazifying Christmas: Political Culture and Popular Celebration in the Third Reich,” Central European 
History 38, no. 4 (2005): 572–605. 
16Peter Fritzche, Life and Death in the Third Reich (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 
55. 
17Perry, “Nazifying Christmas: Political Culture and Popular Celebration in the Third Reich,” 574 
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result in resounding failure as Nazism encompasses a wide area of intellectual discourse. As such, 
this is not a work that has the goal of coming to a catch-all definition of Nazism. Rather, in 
demonstrating the above complexity of Nazism one aspect is often kept just underneath the 
surface of all of these debates that receives indirect or cursory attention in most of the 
historiography. This aspect is the ideology of Nazism. Often referred to as National Socialism, 
discussions of Nazi ideology feature in most works but are almost exclusively discussed in terms 
of another topic. For example, George Mosse refers to Nazi ideology, but in reference to how 
World War I's glorification informed that ideology.18  Thomas Childers and Richard Hamilton 
argue that Nazi ideology was twisted and many times abandoned by the Nazis to appeal to 
multiple electorates in order to form a Volkspartei that would usher the Nazi Party into power.19 
Peter Fritzche would advocate that Nazi ideology was the expression of German disillusion with 
the status quo of Weimar Germany and their desire for the formation of the Volksgemeinschaft.20 
Nazi ideology exists throughout almost every historical work on the Third Reich as historians 
                                                 
18G. L. Mosse, “Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience,” Journal of Contemporary History 21, no. 4 
(1986): 491–513.G. L. Mosse, “National Cemeteries and National Revival: The Cult of the Fallen Soldiers in 
Germany,” Journal of Contemporary History 14, no. 1 (1979): 1–20.G. L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the 
Memory of the World Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).George L. Mosse, “Friendship and 
Nationhood: About the Promise and Failure of German Nationalism,” Journal of Contemporary History 17, no. 2 
(1982): 351–367. 
19Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voters: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1983).Thomas Childers, “The Social Language of Politics in Germany: The 
Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic,” The American Historical Review 95, no. 2 (April 
1990): 331–358.T. Childers, “The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote,” Journal of Contemporary History 
11, no. 4 (1976): 17–42.Thomas Childers, “Who, Indeed, Did Vote for Hitler?,” Central European History 17, no. 
1 (March 1984): 45–53.Thomas Childers and Eugene Weiss, “Voters and Violence: Political Violence and the 
Limits of National Socialist Mass Mobilization,” German Studies Review 13, no. 3 (October 1990): 481–
498.Richard Hamilton, Who Voted For Hitler? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).Richard Hamilton, 
“The Rise of Nazism: A Case Study and Review of Interpretations: Kiel, 1928-1933,” German Studies Review 26, 
no. 1 (February 2003): 43–62.R. F. Hamilton, “Braunschweig 1932: Further Evidence on the Support for 
National Socialism,” Central European History 17, no. 01 (1984): 3–36.Rudy Koshar, “Political Gangsters and 
Nazism: Some Comments on Richard Hamilton’s Theory of Fascism. A Review Article,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 28, no. 4 (October 1986): 785–793. 
20Peter Fritzche, Germans into Nazis (Campbridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).Peter Fritzche, Rehearsals for 
Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany(New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990).Peter Fritzche, “Weimar Populism and National Socialism in Local Perspective,” in Elections, Mass 
Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany: New Perspectives, ed. L. E. Jones and James Retallack (New 
York: Campbridge University Press, 1992).Peter Fritzche, “Presidential Victory and Popular Festivity in Weimar 
Germany: Hindeburg’s 1925 Election,” Central European History 23, no. 2/3 (September 1990): 205–224. 
18 
 
contend that ideology justified many of the actions carried out, but seldom is ideology ever 
focused on as the impetus for Nazi action. 
 Few works exist that focus meaningfully on Nazi ideology as a guide to action and many 
of those that do are not specifically historical works. For example, psychological and 
sociological arguments are often presented to attempt to explain Nazi ideology. Although non-
historical, the discussions that arise from these fields have valuable insights on the historical 
importance of Nazi ideology. For example, Emil Fackenheim explained the Nazi 
weltanschauung, or worldview, was separate from religion and metaphysics. Per Fackenheim, 
this worldview was “put forward not as being true but only capable of being made true” through 
conflict and victory over differing weltanschauung.21This narrative certainly rings true as Nazi 
ideology never admitted to its work being accomplished. Political psychologist Donald Dietrich 
stressed that there were four pillars of Nazi ideology. To sum these pillars up briefly, Nazi 
ideology centered on the idea the past was not only to be restored, but elevated, rhetoric of 
struggle against opposition, “affective characteristics” defined as “instinct, will, blood, etc.” were 
valued over rationality, and finally, the hierarchical social order was to be reestablished.22 One 
piece in the journal Critical Inquiry investigated Nazi use of myth, but when it came time to 
analyze ideology and myth this piece stated that Nazi ideology sought to be “a total explanation” 
of history that is “specifically German” and “a racist ideology.”23 The authors are quick to shun 
the sonderweg implications of their argument, claiming that Nazism in and of itself was a 
German reaction to specifically German problems, not applicable to other nations or peoples. 
                                                 
21Emil Fackenheim, “Nazi ‘Ethic,’ Nazi Weltanschauung, and the Holocaust. Morality After Auschwitz: The Radical 
Challenge of the Nazi Ethic,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 83, no. 1/2 (October 1992):171. 
22Donald Dietrich, “National Renewal, Anti-Semitism, and Political Continuity: A Psychological Assessment,” 
Political Psychology 9, no. 3 (September 1988):  404. 
23Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Brian Holmes, “The Nazi Myth,” Critical Inquiry 16, no. 2 (1990): 
294,295. 
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Even film analysts have taken the efforts to focus on Nazi ideology as Stephen Lowry in his 
analysis of The Golden City stepped beyond the parameters of this film arguing that the 
“ideological function of Nazi films abides less in the overt political 'contents' than in diffuse 
emotional effects and the symbolic transformations of socially relevant issues.”24 Thus analysis 
of Nazi ideology, this work has found, can be ascertained and understood independent of 
prevalent opportunistic actions by the Nazis. As such, one of the primary goals of this work will 
involve tying down abstract notions of Nazi ideology to specific events to demonstrate the 
importance of ideology as an impetus for Nazism. 
 Many of the presented issues with defining Nazism and the role of ideology in the actions 
of the Nazi Party and Reich government are not original to this work. Rather in 1974 historian 
Barbara Miller Lane penned an article “Nazi Ideology: Some Unfinished Business” in which she 
protested the lack of a “satisfactory interpretation of Nazi ideology.”25 Even more surprising to 
Lane was that many of her contemporaries believed “that political thought played a relatively 
unimportant part in the rise (and fall) of the Third Reich.”26 Lane goes on to analyze Nazi 
ideology not in terms of Adolf Hitler, but other prominent Nazi ideologues like Dietrich Eckart, 
Alfred Rosenberg, Gottfried Feder, and the Strasser brothers (Otto and Gregor), but her analysis 
thus only focuses on pre-1933 Nazi ideology, a self-imposed barrier. Lane concludes her work 
calling for “a fresh look at Nazi institutions against the background of a thorough study of Nazi 
thought.”27 As such this work strives to address Lane's concerns by centering on critical Nazi 
events, such as the Beer Hall Putsch, Nazi electoral activity during the Weimar Republic, and the 
                                                 
24Stephen Lowry, “Ideology and Excess in Nazi Melodrama: The Golden City,” New German Critique 74, no. 
Special Issue on Nazi Cinema (Spring-Summer 1998):  148. 
25Barbara Miller-Lane, “Nazi Ideology: Some Unfinished Business,” Central European History 7, no. 1 (March 
1974): 3. 
26Ibid, 3. 
27Ibid, 29. 
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implementation of the Volksgemeinschaft, in terms of Nazi ideology. It is the expressed goal of 
this work to add to the historiography's efforts to define Nazism by understanding the nature of 
Nazi ideology, not as a concept that provided post-hoc justifications for Nazi actions, but rather 
as the impetus for the actions of Nazi Germany.   
 Similar to previously mentioned efforts to define Nazism, this effort to understand Nazi 
ideology needs to qualify a time period or run the risk of losing focus and clarity. As such this 
work will focus on three distinct time periods of Nazi history that have profound importance on 
understanding their ideology. Understanding this pattern before reading the following chapters 
will go a long way towards understanding the continuity of this narrative as it stretches across 
Germany from 1914 to 1938. First, this work will attempt to understand the foundation of Nazi 
ideology as only in understanding the beginning of Nazi ideology can we come closer to 
comprehending this complex institution. As such, this foundational period of Nazism will follow 
the Nazi Movement through the end of the First World War, the formation of the Weimar 
Republic and culminate in the Beer Hall Putsch. At this stage it is important to make reference to 
this work's terminology. The Nazis of the foundational period will be referred to multiple times 
as members of the Nazi Movement. To refer to this small Bavarian assemblage of political 
amateurs as the Nazi Party is woefully inadequate and misleading. Political parties enter the 
political arena in a socially acceptable manner and until after the disaster of the Beer Hall Putsch 
the Nazis were no such organization. Therefore, the Nazis of 1918 to 1923 will be referenced as 
part of the Nazi Movement, a loose, but rabid organization of Bavarians with the intentions of 
seeing the Weimar Republic toppled. Only in understanding this movement's efforts can Nazi 
ideological foundation truly be understood. 
 After exploring the foundational period, this work will focus on the period of Nazi history 
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which begins with Hitler's imprisonment following the Beer Hall Putsch, the Party's failures and 
successes in Weimar politics which culminated in Hitler becoming Chancellor. The Nazis had 
created an ideology that strove to use activism and struggle rhetoric to topple the despised 
Weimar Republic. When that plan failed the Nazis, Hitler and many of his supporters changed 
tactics and accepted the reality that armed confrontation would not win the day, but rather 
political manipulation would help the Nazis realize their goals. Although initial efforts to follow 
the path of legality would result in electoral failures, the Nazis would eventually radicalize their 
message, expanding its popularity amongst the citizenry of multiple social groupings. The 
subsequent electoral bump would allow the Nazis to negotiate their way into the second most 
powerful office in Weimar Germany. This period is largely seen as an aberration in Nazi 
ideological continuity because the Nazis opportunistically promised the world to every 
population, often resulting in multiple contradictions. However, this time is fundamentally 
important for any study of Nazi ideology as these perceived discontinuities tied in with Nazi 
ideology in fundamental ways. Thus, whereas the Nazis were perceived as the master political 
liars, the adage that one should “be careful what you wish for” seems apt as Nazi ideology not 
only motivated Nazis into an electoral frenzied but matched multiple desires of a disparate group 
of alienated German citizenry. 
 The third chapter of this work begins in 1933 after the Nazis have come into power and 
began the transfer of the various labor, professional, and social institutions of Germany into 
equivalent organizations formed and based in Nazi ideology. This chapter will explore the 
various interpretations of the Volksgemeinschaft and through such analysis come to an 
understanding of not only the nature of the Nazi national community but the Reich government's 
purpose for such an institution. The establishment of a national community stands as a highly 
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contested historical topic as this creation would pacify the German people under the Nazis and 
allow the Third Reich to wage a destructive World War. This work contends that the changes 
witnessed between 1933 and the beginning of Hitler's expansionary wars were motivated and 
directed by entrenched aspects of Nazi ideology.   
 Any effort that attempts to come to a definitive understanding of Nazi Germany is 
doomed at its outset. Many of the reasons for this predetermined failure stem from arguments 
presented above. However, historian William Sheridan Allen best stated the ultimate difficulty in 
coming to an understanding on Nazi Germany when he wrote “the problem of Nazism was 
primarily a problem of perception.”28 No truer words have ever been written as the totality of 
Nazism is imperceptible through only one viewpoint or one interpretation. The only way to come 
to a total understanding of Nazi Germany is to study the Third Reich from every possible angle 
and address every hole in the historiography. Therefore, this work does not intend to come to a 
catch-all interpretation of the entirety of Nazism but rather address the nearly forty year old 
request of Barbara Lane to tie Nazi ideology to the actions of not only the Nazi Movement and 
Party, but to the Reich Government in an effort to demonstrate that National Socialist thought 
had a profound impact on German history.   
 
  
                                                 
28William Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922 -1945 (New York: 
Franklin Watts, 1984), 281. 
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CHAPTER 2 
KÄMPFEN: 19TH CENTURY TO 192329 
 
 The adage that a picture is worth a thousand words falls short when it comes to one photo 
taken in August 1914. Taken by eventual chief photographer for Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Hoffmann, 
long before his tenure with the Third Reich, this photo depicts an enthusiastic crowd gathered at 
the Odeonsplatz in the heart of Munich swept up in “the Spirit of 1914,” the name generally 
given to the nationalistic optimism felt throughout Europe on the eve of the First World War.30 
The crowd itself provides a compelling visual for the elation evoked by the German people at the 
opportunity to prove their superiority in Europe. However, many photographs exist that 
demonstrate the nationalistic fervor that swept through Germany. This particular photo is 
noteworthy in that after having formed a professional relationship with Hitler, Hoffmann studied 
all of his photos from that day and after various enlargements found an elated Adolf Hitler 
celebrating shortly before he joined the war effort.31 This photo has been discussed ad nauseum, 
but it exists for most historians as proof that the First World War had a profoud impact on the 
future Fuhrer. The contrast between the elated Hitler of 1914 and the embittered demagogue of 
the 1920s leaves little room to dispute the impact the Great War had on this man.  Historians 
have taken this photo, along with its implications, and argued that the First World War, if for no 
other reason than its impact on the future Führer, led directly to the rise of Nazism. 
 Historians have conjectured that the First and Second World Wars should be considered 
one long and contiguous event. However, arguments of this nature are the holdovers from early 
arguments that claimed the seeds for the Second World War were sown in the ashes of the First. 
                                                 
29
 German for “Struggle” 
30Peter Fritzche, Germans into Nazis (Campbridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 3-9. 
31Ibid, 3-9. 
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However, both of these claims exist on a pattern of determinism where as soon as World War I 
ended the Nazi Party and World War II were the inevitable result. The argument in favor of 
World War I causing the Nazi rise can be found in numerous forms but perhaps is best illustrated 
within Niall Freguson's Pity of War. Ferguson analyzes the First World War asking numerous 
questions in terms of counter-factual arguments that help “recapture the uncertainty of decision-
makers in the past, to whom the future was merely a set of possibilities; and to assess whether 
the optimal choices were made.”32 In doing so Ferguson presents many valuable arguments about 
the nature of the war, some of which will be explored shortly, but he also demonstrated with 
clarity the simple thread tying the First World War to the Nazis. Per Ferguson, “with the Kaiser 
triumphant, Adolf Hitler could have eked out his life as a mediocre postcard painter.”33 
Furthermore, the army allowed Hitler the opportunity to join the Nazi cause cementing the idea 
that the loss of World War I led to an event causality that pushed Hitler to the Nazis setting the 
stage for later significant events.34 
 Arguments that the loss of the First World War caused the rise of Nazi Germany are 
certainly compelling and logically cohesive, however in recent years historians have made 
arguments demonstrating that even after Germany's defeat the Third Reich was not inevitable. 
William Keylor argued that those who lived during this time were disillusioned and formed the 
mythology of defeat that informed such arguments.35 Thus, more information on the depth of 
German defeat and less hostility to the conventions of the peace settlement could have gone a 
long way towards mending the post-war fences and therein prevent the Nazis from gaining a 
voice. Beyond such optimism, John Morrow's in-depth analysis of World War I works to dispel 
                                                 
32Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1999), XLIII. 
33Ibid, 460 
34Ibid, 460 
35John H. Morrow, Jr., The Great War: An Imperial History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 292. 
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the determinist aspects of World War I's conclusion on the Nazi rise. By Morrow's argument, the 
Nazis were able to rise to power not because of World War I and the much condemned Treaty of 
Versailles. Rather, Morrow contends that because the United States retreated to relative isolation 
and the British worked to keep its empire intact, a decimated France was left responsible for 
enforcing the treaty on a temporarily wounded, but angry Germany.36 France could only 
accomplish so much and had little to no power to back up its authority, leaving German politics 
in disarray and ripe for some fashion of takeover. Morrow further acknowledges that the rise of 
the Nazi Party was multifarious as he also forcefully contends that “Adolf Hitler and the Nazi 
rose to power as a result of the depression in Germany.”37 As Morrow and many others contend, 
countless events took place between the end of World War I and the Third Reich which had they 
happened in even the slightest different manner the history of the world would be drastically 
different. Thus, the impact of World War I on the Nazi rise to power is a contested and complex 
topic. 
 Summarizing the arguments on the Nazi rise appear out of place in a work on Nazi 
ideology, but this work is determined to tie Nazi ideology to the actions of the Nazis to gain 
some understanding of Nazi intentionality and  by extension identity. As such, tying the Nazi rise 
to power, an action that is largely considered opportunistic and devoid of coherence and 
consistency, to Nazi ideology would be inadequate without addressing the foundations of that 
ideology. Before that synthesis can be demonstrated it is important to note that while the First 
World War may not have directly caused the Third Reich, World War I and its aftermath were 
instrumental to the foundations of Nazi ideology. Therefore, studying the influences of World 
                                                 
36Ibid, 319. 
37Additionally, Morrow goes beyond the Nazi rise to address the “Thirty Years War” thesis of the continuity of the 
First World War and the Second. Although Morrow believes the Nazi rise and disorder were not direct results of 
the First World War, a global perspective backs the notion of a continuous period of war as “conflict continued in 
Eastern Europe at least until 1921, and certainly began at the latest in Asia by 1931.” Ibid, 321. 
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War I on the early Nazi movement will be profoundly important for demonstrating that Nazi 
actions both of this foundational period and beyond were largely ideologically driven. 
   
The First World War and the Nazi Movement 
 
 Before proceeding it is important to explain that the early Nazi Party could hardly be 
labeled as a party. After the formal declaration of a platform in 1920 the German Worker's Party, 
the predecessor of the National Socialist German Workers Party, would take three years to gain 
55,000 members.38 Thus, in the early 1920s the idea of a dominating Nazi Party could only be 
entertained by the delusional as the Nazis could only call on a very limited, fairly localized 
support base. While the Nazi organization carried the label of a party, the Nazis that existed 
before 1924 should be considered more or less a movement. Before 1924 the Nazis expressed 
little interest in participating within the political and electoral frameworks of the Weimar 
Republic.39 Rhetoric throughout their platform and speeches demonstrated that the Nazis of this 
time intended to fade once Germany was restored.40 While later events indicate otherwise, the 
Nazis of 1933 and the Nazis of 1923 were very different creatures. 
 Hitler himself admitted in a 1922 memorandum that the Nazis were to become a different 
                                                 
38The German Worker's Party (DAP) Platform, referenced on multiple occasions within this work remained a 
fundamental party document and was cited in Nazi Periodical’s beyond 1933. Statistic comes from Jeremy 
Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, Nazism: 1919-1945 A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, [New 
York: Schocken Books, 1983], 33. 
39The idea of a primitive and disinterested Nazi movement before 1924 is not without justification in the field. 
Dietrich Orlow's history of the Nazi Party references Hitler's accusation that the DAP was more of a “tea party” 
than political organization. Orlow also argues that the Nazis briefly considered participating in elections, but 
ultimately Hitler “rejected electoral activity for the NSDAP.” Even the appropriately condemned Shirer agrees 
with such a assertion as he claimed the Nazi movement “was far from being even the most important political 
movement in Bavaria, and outside the state it was unknown.” Thus the argument of a primitive, non-electorally 
driven Nazi movement has long been an established aspect of Nazi history. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall 
of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959),63. Dietrich Orlow, The 
History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969), 15,40. 
40Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, “The Program of the NSDAP, 24 February 1920. [Doc 1708-PS],” 
in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. IV (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1946). 
 27 
 
kind of party. Per Hitler, the DAP and all previous nationalist parties “lacked the warm breath of 
the nation's youthful vigor” and therefore was “no longer a movement of the people” but rather 
“there reappeared in the new movement the distressing characteristics of our bourgeois parties, 
lacking any uniform discipline or form.”41 Hitler believed that previous iterations of the Nazis 
had failed because they became too much like political parties and thus he vowed that the Nazis 
would become “a new movement aimed at providing what the others did not.”42 Hitler's Nazi 
movement would be “a racialist movement with a firm social base, a hold over the broad masses, 
welded together in an iron-hard organization, instilled with blind obedience and inspired by a 
brutal will.”43 Perhaps most importantly, Hitler's new Nazi movement would be “a party of 
struggle and action.”44 The Nazis had no intention of playing the electoral game at this stage, but 
intended, through action, to reach a broad mass of people and have their vision of a superior 
Germany restored. 
Before asserting the impact of World War I upon Nazi ideology, it is necessary to 
demonstrate the various ways the Nazis internalized German memory of the Great War. In order 
to fully understand the relationship between World War I, the Nazi Party and the German 
citizenry the numerous ways in which the First World War affected the German citizenry must be 
understood in detail. Of equal importance will be demonstrations of the ways that the Nazis 
matched, internalized, and manipulated these aspects in their early efforts to become a force to be 
reckoned with during the early 1920s. Only once these relationships are understood can analysis 
begin on the full extent of World War I's impact on the Nazi ideology. 
                                                 
41Adolf Hitler, “A Different Kind of Party, January 7, 1922,” in Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, ed. Jeremy 
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  At the onset of war in 1914 Germans were swept up into an uproar of nationalistic fervor 
that few could resist. Germany was preparing itself to meet the armies of Europe in a clash that 
would determine which nation would become the dominant European power. The Germans had 
numerous reasons to be optimistic thanks to their rise to world power status during the early 20th 
century. Although many would look back on this time as the German people being hypnotized or 
caught in a “wave of drunkenness” many others looked back and admitted to being overjoyed by 
this Spirit of 1914.45 Historian Friedrich Meinecke reflected on the optimism swirling throughout 
Germany in his post World War II reflections, The German Catastrophe, claiming that “the 
exaltation of spirit experienced during the August days of 1914, in spite of its ephemeral 
character, is one of the more precious, unforgettable memories of the highest sort.”46 Even 
members of the upper echelon in the Imperial government were beyond optimistic, bordering on 
the fanciful about what they could accomplish with this war. Beyond the severe optimism of the 
Schlieffen Plan, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg posited that Germany could take large parcels of 
territory from France and Belgium, make Luxembourg a German federal state, and create an 
African colonial empire.47 With emotions high throughout all levels of Germany significant 
events were afoot that would leave impressions on the German people that would last beyond the 
Great War. 
 The importance of the Spirit of 1914 is a contested topic within the historiography of the 
Nazi rise. Many historians do not believe that the Spirit of 1914 had a tremendous impact on 
German identity claiming such emotions were largely a myth fostered after the war. Ferguson 
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would certainly argue along these lines as he claimed that “crowds there may have been, but to 
describe their mood as simply one of 'enthusiasm' or 'euphoria' is misleading.”48 Ferguson's 
smoking gun against the Spirit of 1914 exists in the form of a multi-thousand worker protest that 
in “overfilled meetings and on the street demonstrated against the war and for peace.”49 The fact 
that this protest was on July 29th, only a few days before World War I erupted, lends itself to the 
idea that the Spirit of 1914 was not universal by any means. John Morrow seconds the arguments 
of the mythological Spirit of 1914 by claiming the enthusiasm was “primarily an urban-middle 
class phenomenon.”50 Going further, Morrow contends that the rural populations were 
preoccupied with harvests.51 Per Morrow, even the Nazi's home turf, Bavaria “reacted with worry 
and fear, anxiety and uncertainty.”52 Thus, the existence of a universal German enthusiasm is 
certainly debunked. 
 However, even if the Spirit of 1914 was not a universal phenomenon amongst Germans in 
1914, the outbreak of war did motivate a large number of young, virile men to volunteer and 
fight for Germany.  The enthusiasm for war experienced by these young men and their tragic 
sacrifices cemented themselves on the minds of Germans. After the war collapsed in German 
defeat the vision of the volunteers became an entrenched aspect of German identity. Historian 
George Mosse certainly agrees with the importance of volunteerism to German identity going 
back to the French Revolution and establishing itself in German youth following the collapse of 
World War I.53 Per Mosse, the Spirit of 1914 was picked up after the war by those disillusioned 
with German defeat who “wanted to repeat this heady experience in the midst of the confusion 
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and compromises of post-war politics.”54 Wars waged in between the First and Second World 
War that saw German men volunteering to repeat this sweep of soldiers to the front exist as 
further evidence of the enduring importance of the Spirit of 1914.55 Thus, stepping up to stand up 
for Germany was indeed a powerful motivator for Germany's youth. Perhaps the Spirit of 1914 
was not universal to all Germans, but by that same token the German people were not universal 
supporters of the Nazis at any time. 
 Where the early Nazi Movement did gain appeal was with those who generally 
entrenched the spirit of volunteerism in their own personality. Much of the early membership 
encompassed former soldiers of the First World War and young enthusiasts whose age forced 
them to miss fighting in the First World War. The Nazis were an ardently nationalistic 
organization that took their cues from that nationalistic volunteerism that originated from World 
War I. Hitler's earliest speeches provide considerable insight into the extent that nationalistic 
optimism and a belief in the invincibility of the German people permeated the early message the 
Nazis put forward. Hitler, attempting to get a rise out of his audience, used the same optimistic 
nationalist rhetoric that was used in 1914 to motivate the German people. In a 1923 speech Hitler 
stated, “we have both the hope and the faith that the day will come on which Germany shall 
stretch from Konigsberg to Strassburg, and from Hamburg to Vienna.”56 This speech, coming 
from a time when Germany was arguably at its lowest, evoked the same frenzied optimism that 
those enthusiasts of 1914 evoked. In another 1923 speech Hitler duplicated the belief in the 
invincibility of German youth claiming, “in the end the fire of German youth will conquer.”57 In 
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speaking of Germany as an invincible juggernaut the Nazis were able to tap into the optimism of 
1914 and were rewarded with valuable initial attention. 
 Beyond even the nationalistic optimism surrounding the start of the Great War there was 
an aspect of the Spirit of 1914 that had a profound and lasting impact on the German people. As 
the armies of Europe were being mobilized, Kaiser Wilhelm II, ruler of Germany, made a speech 
in which he stated “I no longer recognize any parties or any confessions; today we are all 
German brothers and only German brothers.”58 Wilhelm was announcing a sentiment known as 
the Burgfrieden which called for the dissolution of those aspects that divided the German people, 
such as class and religion, in a universal effort to glorify Germany. Meinecke verified this 
optimism resulting from the Spirit of 1914 amplified by the Burgfrieden stating that “all the rifts 
which had hitherto existed in the German people, both within the bourgeoisie and between the 
bourgeoisie and the working classes, were suddenly closed in the face of the common 
danger.”59The outbreak of the war cemented in the German psyche for multiple generations the 
belief that as long as class conflict and other divisive statuses were disposed of there would be 
nothing that could stop the German people, a belief that many would internalize to such an extent 
that they would actually alter their memories of the war to maintain this belief. 
 Throughout the war the Burgfrieden was exploited to encourage German citizens to 
remain productive for and enthusiastic of the war effort. In a 1917 Easter message Kaiser 
Wilhelm proclaimed that “behind the front, the settlement of differences of opinion must be 
postponed in the highest patriotic interest until our warriors have returned home.”60 Later in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
April 1922-August 1939, ed. Norman H. Baynes (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), 72. 
58Kaiser Friedrich Wilhelm Viktor Albert, “The Kaiser Speaks from the Balcony of the Royal Palace,” August 1, 
1914, German Historical Institute, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=815. 
59Meinecke, “The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections, 1946.” 
60Kaiser Friedrich Wilhel  Viktor Albert, “Wilhelm II’s Easter Message,” April 7, 1917, German Historical Institute, 
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=1808. 
 32 
 
same year the German Fatherland Party issued a proclamation which demonstrated a firm belief 
in the Burgfrieden as the party tried to stir voters to not only support them but not allow the 
divisions at home to result in “the collapse of German strength.”61The outbreak of the war 
cemented in the German psyche for multiple generations the belief that as long as class conflict 
and other divisive statuses were sublimated nothing could stop the German people. Throughout 
the span of the war pleas would be made to remain united if only for the sake of the soldiers on 
the front sacrificing their lives for Germany.62 Despite a waning optimism the desire to remain 
united in the name of Germany would not diminish to any significant extent until the end of the 
Great War and the defeat of the Imperial army. 
 When looking at the World War I notion of the Burgfrieden in terms of Nazi history, 
George Mosse is again of paramount importance. Mosse contends that an important aspect of 
German identity was the “Myth of the War Experience” that glorified the struggle and sacrifice 
of combat.63 An important part of the Myth that ran central to the Burgfrieden was camaraderie. 
Camaraderie, by Mosse’s argument, references the relationship experienced between soldiers of 
the front lines that became romanticized during and after World War I.64 Camaraderie was seen 
as an extension of manliness where soldiers entered an experience that lifted them out of the 
confines of normal life. The camaraderie of the soldier superseded all other relationships, even 
operating “outside the family structure,” constituting a glorification of German identity.65 The 
family, government, and other relationships could not provide the sense of fulfillment felt by 
most soldiers experiencing the hardships and accompanying glory of warfare. Historian Andrew 
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Donson assents to Mosse’s argument contending that glorification of such camaraderie led many 
to seek participation in future conflicts. Per Donson, war brought the promise of “schoolboys 
who were arch nemeses before the war [to become] great friends while on the front. War let two 
brothers resolve their years-long acrimony. Combat brought together friends whose petty parents 
had severed their close ties in childhood.”66 Thus, camaraderie on the front superseded every 
previous obligation and barrier, further enforcing the unity of the Burgfrieden leaving a desire in 
the future Nazi supporters to join together to vanquish a common evil; ends that Nazi ideology 
matched via the fundamental concept of the National Community, or Volksgemeinschaft. 
 After World War I, Weimar politics split into many different political factions making 
unity similar to the “Spirit of 1914” nearly impossible. Both Mosse and Donson contend that the 
political fragmentation following the Treaty of Versailles left elements of the German citizenry 
craving some remnant of the unity and euphoria that camaraderie promised to provide. Historian 
David Welch contends that the Nazis made use of the Volksgemeinschaft to gain support by 
appealing to notions of the superseding effects of camaraderie.67 Welch argues that the notions of 
Volksgemeinschaft did not originate with the Nazis because for propaganda to be effective it 
must “preach to those who are already partially converted.”68 Therefore, the Nazi 
Volksgemeinschaft correlated to the internalized desires by certain “partially converted” 
enthusiasts of the camaraderie spawning from the volunteerism of the Spirit of 1914. 
 Nazi ideology evoked the emotions of the Burgfrieden that were still internalized by 
many Germans, even if those emotions were somewhat quelled by the difficulties of life in the 
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Weimar Republic. Again the speeches of Hitler provide insight into Nazi interpretations of the 
Burgfrieden that meant to unite like-minded Germans under the Nazi banner. In 1923, Hitler 
condemned the delays and inefficiencies of the divided Reichstag contending that “if today in 
Germany one and a half millions could be united on a single platform, all prepared if necessary, 
to sacrifice themselves for their fatherland, then Germany would be saved.”69 Hitler would later 
that year state along the same lines “when the whole German people knows one will and one will 
only-to be free- in that hour we shall have the instrument with which to win our freedom.”70 
However, despite all of this appeal to Burgfrieden rhetoric the Nazis used their own idea of the 
Volksgemeinschaft, the National Community, as an idyllic world where a united Germany could, 
as Hitler said in April 1923 “rescue Germany (and achieve) the greatest deed in the world!”71 
Hence, the Nazis hoped that by touting their conception of the Volksgemeinschaft in terms of the 
Burgfrieden that they could raise an army of Germans that would one day topple the ailing and 
despised Weimar Republic. 
 Young volunteers of the First World War, for the most part students, were vulnerable to 
the ideas and emotions of both the Spirit of 1914 and the Burgfrieden to such an extent that they 
willingly risked their lives for those beliefs. Within these soldiers existed an extension of the 
emotional upsurge felt throughout much of Germany. For soldiers who were laying their lives on 
the line there came with these notions of unity, an idea of self-sacrifice in which a wound 
suffered or even death was an honorable and worthwhile sacrifice in the population wide effort to 
bring victory, power, and superiority to Germany. The best way to observe this self-sacrifice 
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comes from reviewing the writings of those who were on the front lines. As early as August 23, 
1914 twenty-four year old volunteer Eduard Schmieder wrote “After each battle, one thanks God 
that one is still alive; one values life so much. But we would all sacrifice our lives gladly for our 
beautiful Fatherland.”72 In November Eduard would write “There is blissful joy in every victory 
won for the sake of this beautiful German soil.”73 Another volunteer twenty-one year old student 
of philosophy Sophus Lange wrote, “I am rather happy. This 'rush to the flag' especially among 
intellectuals is not only based on the love of Germanness.”74 In January 1915 Sophus still saw 
value in risking his life for Germany claiming, “I can't be any different-at the moment, all I want 
to be is a soldier.”75 The early volunteers demonstrated not only a romantic notion of war and the 
superiority of their task but believed in that task to such an extent that they willing and excitedly 
sacrificed their lives for Germany. 
 Sadly, Eduard and Solphus would suffer the ultimate price for their service to Germany. 
Eduard died on May 8, 1916, and Solphus died just four months later on September 6, 1916.76 As 
the war progressed, what was initially a romantic ideal of self-sacrifice turned into a solemn and 
obligatory duty towards Germany. Eduard in 1915 wrote that he had “an insatiable longing for a 
life lived to the fullest which I can never achieve.”77 Eduard was slowly coming to the realization 
that he would likely have to die for Germany. However, such pessimism making it back to the 
home front was rare.78 Army censors prevented disturbing news of the front from reaching loved 
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ones who held onto the romantic notions of volunteers willfully making the ultimate sacrifice for 
Germany. A November 1914 letter that was sent from a volunteer had the following removed by 
censors, “because of the cold, which in spite of three shirts and waistbands shakes our bodies, 
because of the forced marches, because of the bacon and bread that stands in for warm meals, 
because of long sentries at night, in which the ice cold wind brings tears to our eyes, we are 
being forced to think about ourselves and to be candid about our situation and our burdens.”79 
The only parts that made it back home mentioned “friendly and encouraging looks” from old 
reserves and an artillery barrage.80 Bulletins from the front were also thoroughly optimistic, 
depicting sweeping German victories while the young regiments sang 'Deutschland, Deutschland 
über alles.”81 The Imperial government did not want pessimism to reach those back home and 
although it was impossible to hide everything from the German public, the censors managed to 
maintain many of the romantic notions of self-sacrifice which provided short-term benefits for 
the war effort, but in the long run provided the Nazis with valuable foundations for their ideology. 
 The effect of the deaths of the First World War on those who remained cannot be 
overstated. World War I claimed the lives of 1.6 million Germans who died at the time, while 
over another two million would die later from injuries suffered during the war.82 These deaths 
impacted the lives of Germans in profound ways. Families lost their chief bread winners, their 
confidants, their tension breakers, some families lost their very souls. Bereavement on this scale 
could only be resolved by holding onto the belief that their loved one's death was somehow 
justified. A great deal of material falls into the category of justification of World War I deaths, 
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but for now a prominent justification came from the idea that the death of a loved one was the 
result of a noble sacrifice for Germany and the German community.83 Holding onto these notions 
helped many Germans cope, including many Nazi supporters. The Nazis, through use of struggle 
and activism rhetoric, often asserted their willingness to match these brave sacrifices as part of 
an effort to see Germany not only restored to its previous glory, but improved beyond what the 
Kaiser had failed to accomplish. 
 Thanks to the censorship and propaganda efforts of the Imperial government most 
Germans managed to hold onto romantic notions of the First World War that endured into the 
early Weimar Republic. Mosse contends that a particularly troublesome remnant of this 
glorification permeated German consciousness in the form of the “Cult of the Fallen Soldier.” 
Mosse’s Cult embodies the manifestation of glorified justifications for the many deaths 
experienced during World War I. Per Mosse, youth was “symbolic of manhood, virility, and 
energy, and death as not death at all but sacrifice and resurrection.”84 Inherent in the Cult of the 
Fallen Soldier was the belief that the death of so many youths had meaning, a difficult premise to 
establish in Germany following defeat. To compensate for the seemingly meaningless destruction, 
the fallen would be re-appropriated to symbolize many different ideals that were meant to 
strengthen Germans in the face of the difficulties of Weimar Germany and “regenerate a defeated 
nation.”85 
 Jay Baird argues that the Nazis incorporated a great deal of the Cult of the Fallen Soldier 
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into their own rhetoric. Baird contends that the Nazis were able to make the Cult of the Fallen 
Soldier their own through the use of “the Blood Myth.”86 Per Baird, the Nazi Blood Myth 
“featured the death of a noble warrior, his resurrection, and ultimately his spiritual return to the 
fighting columns of the Brown Shirts.”87 The Nazis believed that any death, be it from World 
War I or from street violence in the name of Germany was a death that further strengthened the 
Volksgemeinschaft. Including members of the SA in the category of martyrdom alongside the 
dead of World War I entailed a large logical leap, but its success is documented in the death of 
Horst Wessel. Horst Wessel was a promising SA officer who died under less than dignified 
circumstances. Nonetheless, Nazi propaganda turned Vessel into a national hero. According to 
Baird, Wessel “became the source of myth and legend…a fighting Germanic troubadour who 
died that the nation might live.”88 Thus, Nazi ideology asserted that its followers belonged 
alongside the veterans of World War I as the masters of German identity. 
 Numerous examples exist that demonstrate the Nazi Movement's willingness to take on 
the mantle of the volunteers of 1914. However, the most provocative demonstration involved the 
Nazis efforts to stir activism and excitement amongst the German people just as the young 
volunteers had in 1914. Using phrases that correlated the difficulties of Weimar Germans with 
the same problems of the Imperial army, Hitler was able to sweep crowds into a fervor 
resembling the mass excitement resulting from the Spirit of 1914. In 1923 Hitler exclaimed, “you 
must learn to recognize that no one gives you freedom save only your own sword.'89 Trying to 
stir people into a state of activism, Hitler argued the citizens of the Weimar Republic were 
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coerced into giving up their engagement and desire for action. The individual was suffering from 
an “excess of culture” brought on by the Weimar Republic.90 Using this rhetoric of struggle, 
Hitler intended to wake up Germans and return them to the state of supreme power they evoked 
in 1914. 
 Nothing served to better illustrate the Nazis’ desire for a renewed activism than the 1920 
publishing of their political program. The DAP program is filled with very interesting and critical 
aspects that require in depth investigation, but at this stage the critical item of the program that 
demonstrates the activism and struggle aspects of Nazi ideology involves two words that feature 
prominently within the program. Most of the program's points begin with the phrase “we 
demand,” a seemingly inconsequential phrase that in all actuality was pivotal to demonstrating 
Nazi intentions.91 The Nazis did not ask for circumstances to be restored to their prewar 
equivalents. They did not ask for votes to enter the political arena and slowly change the 
government within the realm of legality.92 The Nazis demanded change, insisting that Germany 
needed to change. This type of activism, this all or nothing forcefulness, reminded Germans of 
Imperial Germany that rolled the dice in 1914 completely opposite of the Weimar Republic that 
made compromise after comprise in the Treaty of Versailles. 
 In order for the Nazi Party to convince the German people to wake up and fight against 
the despised democracy they needed to correlate those who chose to take up the Nazi banner 
with the highly respected 1914 volunteer. To accomplish this tie in the Nazis went beyond 
struggle and activism and tapped into memories of masculinity that the triumphs and travails of 
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the Great War helped entrench within the German psyche. For many Germans, democracy was 
viewed as effeminate and lacking any distinct masculine features that made imperial Germany 
powerful.93 Hitler once stated “man is truly man only if he defends and protects himself” a 
statement that called Germans to action to defend themselves in the same fashion the volunteers 
stepped up to defend the Second Reich.94 It was a man's duty to defend Germany and by 
extension himself, his livelihood, and the livelihood of the community. To fully understand the 
ways the Nazis would internalize the masculine memories of the 1914 volunteers one needs to go 
no further than the early SA. 
The Sturm Abteilung was the initial paramilitary arm of the Nazi Movement. In 1921, the 
SA was setup to protect various party meetings and disrupt in any way possible the meetings of 
opponents. However, the important aspect of the SA's formation is best summed up in the Nazi 
periodical the Völkischer Boebachter. According to the V.B., the SA was “intended to develop in 
the hearts of young supporters a tremendous desire for action, to drive home to them and burn 
into them the fact that history does not make men, but men history.”95 The SA as an organization 
of young men volunteering to fight for Germany, through the Nazi Movement, evoked the 
notions of the masculine volunteers of 1914 flying to their death in the Great War with the sole 
hope of bringing victory to Germany. This type of activism appealed to other Germans within the 
range of the Nazis support base, helping the initial Movement expand to the size of a burgeoning 
political force. All SA members were “to give absolute military obedience to my military 
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superiors and leaders; to bear (themselves) honorably in and out of service; to always be 
companionable towards other comrades.”96 In joining the SA a member had to take a pledge 
which demonstrated the Nazis' willingness to live up to the sacrifices needed. Per the pledge an 
SA member would need to be “always ready to stake life and limb in the struggle of the 
movement.”97 The SA was not only to match the 1914 volunteers in activism, but they needed to 
be willing to lay their lives down for the cause of the movement, in other words the restoration of 
a powerful Germany. Thus, the SA was setup to demonstrate that the Nazis intended to pick up 
where Imperial Germany and the Volunteers of 1914, some of which were members, left off and 
through their masculine activism free Germany from the difficulties of a despicable Weimar 
existence. 
 Historians are correct in their assertions that World War I impacted Nazism in a 
fundamental way. The nationalism of 1914 entrenched feelings of German superiority with many 
Germans, future Nazis included, which permeated German consciousness allowing for a base of 
supporters for the early Nazi ardent nationalistic agenda. The Burgfrieden that arose out of the 
Spirit of 1914 directly correlated to the later Nazi pillar, the Volksgemeinschaft. The 
Volksgemeinschaft allowed the Nazis to welcome new supporters into a community that intended 
to work hard and make sacrifices to better each and every member. Glorification of masculine 
activism in the name of Germany done by the Imperial Government provided the Nazi 
Movement with a rhetorical framework that had proven successful in mobilizing the masses. The 
sacrifices made by troops during the Great War left profound impressions on those whom they 
left behind. Thus, the idea of sacrificing everything in the name of nation and community existed 
as noble justifications for the losses many Germans felt. In light of the reverence given to 
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sacrifice, the Nazis were able to tie their struggle into this idea of noble sacrifice and gain the 
positive support of those still grieving for their critical losses. World War I helped the Nazis gain 
an initial support base, but as critical as the war was to initial membership, support, and ideology, 
it would be the after math of the war that had most significant impacts on Nazi ideology. 
 
The Treaty of Versailles and Nazism’s Earliest Enemies 
 
 As impactful as World War I was to the early Nazi Party's buildup, the event that truly 
established the Nazi Movement's ideology was the end of the Great War. The devastating defeat, 
armistice, and Treaty of Versailles placed the responsibility for the war on Germany and because 
of this war guilt, the Allied powers demanded reparations, secession of territories, restrictions of 
military and naval power, and foreign occupation.98 Versailles humiliated the German people 
previously filled with nationalistic pride. Believing they were superior to the other nations, 
losing the war and then suffering to such an extent called those nationalistic feelings from 1914 
and beyond into question. How could a nation destined for greatness now be cast to such a low 
station? 
 The disparity between the imagined power of the German nation and its actual power 
following the Treaty of Versailles alienated Germans bringing on a nationwide crisis of identity. 
German artist George Grosz eloquently captured the identity crisis of postwar Germany within 
his own autobiography. According to Grosz, “there were many who could not get over the defeat. 
Others were unable to find their way back into the working world they had left. That world had 
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disappeared or was disappearing.”99 There existed a large number of Germans who could not 
understand how a Germany destined for domination could fail so utterly. Thus, as Grosz states, 
“Germany seemed to be splitting into two parts that hated each other,” one part that accepted the 
outcome of the war and the other that could never do the same.100 This dissolution of unity and 
loss of a common cause refracted the German people to such an extent that there would be little 
unity amongst the majority of Germans tragically until 1933. This haphazard discontinuity 
amongst the Germans was exactly the emotional devastation that the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft 
would exploit to staggering success. However, the German identity crisis provided the Nazis 
with the building blocks to piece together a firm foundation to a dynamic ideology. 
 Following the end of the war those who could not accept that Germany had been defeated 
looked for a scapegoat to blame the loss of the war on. Very early after German defeat General 
Field Marshall, and future Weimar President, Paul von Hindenburg argued “the German army 
was stabbed in the back.”101 Hindenburg argued that the Germany’s failure was not the German 
Army’s fault, but rather revolutionaries at home had undermined the war effort.102 Thus, 
according to Hindenburg, “our operations necessarily miscarr(ied); the collapse was inevitable; 
the revolution only provided the keystone.”103 A statement coming from a prestigious general in 
high command at the end of the war lent credibility to the revisionist-conspiracy theories that 
other events had led to German loss, not actual military defeat. The citizens of Germany 
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experiencing difficulty accepting the defeat no doubt would have taken notice of and 
remembered the numerous leaflets and speeches made calling for an end to the war. Most notable, 
Communist leader Rosa Luxemburg protested the war not from a standpoint of peace versus the 
destruction of war. Rather, Luxemburg opposed the war because the global conflict would divide 
and destroy the Communist agenda. Per the Communist leader, “the socialist proletariat cannot 
dispense with class struggle and international solidarity, either in war or peace, without 
destroying itself.”104 Therefore, in 1916, one of the chief Communists stated that they were not 
part of the Burgfrieden and thus had interests separate from the German people. As Ferguson 
asserts in Pity of War, Luxemburg was just one of many advocating an end to the war, thus when 
Hindenburg lent his notoriety to the so called “Stab in the Back Legend” the Germans who had 
seen these resistance and protest efforts found the justification they needed to refuse to accept the 
outcome of the war.105 
 The Stab in the Back legend would become further cemented into the minds of those who 
denied German defeat when the Treaty of Versailles became finalized. As previously stated, the 
Versailles Treaty was designed to humiliate Germany and dissuade Germans from ever again 
trying to become a relevant world power. Germany had to cede valuable coal mines to France 
and had to abandon military occupation of the Rhineland.106 The treaty also mandated that 
Germany recognize the independence of Austria, Poland, and the Czechoslovak state and 
renounce all of its overseas possessions.107 To add to the diminished land power, the military was 
severely reduced, criminal tribunals were setup, and Germany was made responsible for paying a 
reparations bill of more than twenty billion Gold Marks, a staggeringly impossible compensation 
                                                 
104Rosa Luxemburg, “War and the Working Class, January 1916,” German Historical Institute, accessed July 26, 
2012, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=1835. 
105Ferguson, The Pity of War, 174-197 
106Stackelberg and Winkle, “The Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919,” 54. 
107Ibid., 54-55. 
 45 
 
mark.108 Germany was not only defeated, it was ruined as the result of an international conflict 
that, many historians would agree, it was not solely responsible for starting. Many Germans 
found these terms unfair as Germany had willing agreed to an armistice before Allied troops had 
ever fought in German lands. The shock at how harsh the peace turned out to be caused Germans 
to treat the Versailles Treaty with a general disdain if not visceral hatred. 
 The terms of this treaty and the subsequent hardships the German people would be forced 
to endure because of it fueled the fires of anger amongst those who denied Germany's defeat. 
This blinding hate would be directed against multiple parties both internationally and 
domestically. Thus, the German citizenry became filled with rage fueled by confusion, 
uncertainty, bitterness, and denial. This state of affairs correlated with the Nazi Movement's 
foundation as the Nazis themselves were filled with the same denial and identity crises as the 
German citizenry, but the Nazis were anything but unfocused and had a plethora of targets for 
their unbounded hate. 
 The popular target of criticism following the end of the war was the party responsible for 
the negotiation of peace and the formation of the Weimar Republic, the Social Democratic Party. 
As the driving force behind the revolution, the Social Democratic Party, known as the SPD, 
existed as a prime target for those who denied German defeat. The SPD initially supported the 
war, but as time dragged on they began to beg for peace thus separating themselves from 
Burgfrieden, albeit less aggressively than the Communists separated. In August 1915 the SPD 
responded to opposition by calling for peace and criticizing the waste of life that was the Great 
War.109 Criticism of this point would not raise the ire of too many because most Germans had 
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lost someone they knew to the War, but what did raise concern was the SPD's call at that time for 
“the creation of a permanent international court of arbitration, to which all future international 
conflicts are to be submitted.”110 Even before the war was over the SPD was willing to work with 
Germany’s enemies. Thus, although the results of the Treaty of Versailles were themselves 
shocking, the fact that the SPD had gained the most from it, in the way of international 
agreements and the installation of the Republic, surprised no one and allowed the Nazi 
Movement a prime target for their scorn. 
 The Nazi Movement was particularly adept at turning people against the SPD and others 
believed to be behind the Stab in the Back. The most common way for the Nazis to demonstrate 
that they shared, or exceeded, the citizens’ scorn of the responsible parties was through the use of 
insulting names and buzzwords meant to condemn the SPD and the Weimar government it 
established. The most common label placed on the SPD was that of the “November Criminals” 
which alluded to the November 1918 signing of the armistice that removed the German army 
from the war.111  Seemingly, even just the mention of November was enough as “November 
scoundrels” and “November-republic” were also used by Hitler in his early speeches.112 In 
addition using the word “international” usually condemned the targeted enemy as separate from 
Germany and subsequently an enemy likely responsible for the Treaty of Versailles.113 Finally, 
calling the enemies “Marxists” was equally effective at identifying and marginalizing those 
outside of the Volksgemeinschaft as the Marxist agenda was denounced as an adversary to and 
                                                 
110Ibid. 
111Adolf Hitler, “Some Fundamental Demands of the Party, September 18, 1922,” in The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, 
April 1922-August 1939, ed. Norman H. Baynes (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), 107. 
112Adolf Hitler, “Munich Speech,  April 13, 1923,” in The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, ed. 
Norman H. Baynes (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969).Adolf Hitler, “Munich Speech, September 12, 1923,” in 
The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, ed. Norman H. Baynes (New York: Howard Fertig, 
1969). 
113Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, “A Nazi Handbill Advertising a Hitler Speech, February 1920,” in 
Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, ed. Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974),  
41. 
 47 
 
destroyer of the National Community. Thus, the Nazis used simple phrases to remind the public 
that the SPD was an enemy to everything they considered German, but their antagonism of the 
SPD did not stop at simple name calling. 
 As previously stated, the Nazis made extensive use of struggle rhetoric to gain the 
support of aspects of the German public. The Nazis glorified their struggle against the SPD in 
hopes of being viewed as the primary vehicle for change in Germany. The DAP platform begins 
with a hidden jab to this effect, “the programme of the German Workers' Party is designed to be 
of limited duration. The leaders have no intention, once the aims announced in it have been 
achieved, of establishing fresh ones, merely in order to increase, artificially, the discontent of the 
masses and so ensure the continued existence of the Party.”114 Although the eventual hypocrisy 
of this statement cannot be missed considering the Nazis eventual flagrant manufacturing of 
enemies, this statement sets the Nazis as a dynamic, active organization with the goal of toppling 
the stagnating, SPD led Weimar Republic. Thus, Germans were left with choosing an 
organization that wanted to improve on the days of the powerful Imperial Germany or a group 
that the Nazis would have people believe stabbed the German army in the back, bringing on the 
devastation of Versailles. 
 The decision framed in these terms is leading enough, but the Nazis refused to halt their 
criticism of the SPD there. The Nazis chose instead to further cement their struggle with the SPD 
by tying their plight into the sacrifices made by the 1914 volunteers. Many who mourned for the 
volunteers questioned the value of their loved ones’ sacrifice, especially given the results of the 
war. To answer this need, the Nazis set themselves up as the organization that would pick up the 
banner of German superiority that fell from the hands of these young soldiers. In an April 1923 
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speech Hitler proclaimed, “two millions have remained on the field of battle. They, too, have 
their rights and not we, the survivors, alone. There are millions of orphans, of cripples, of 
widows in our midst. They too have rights. For the Germany of to-day not one of them died, not 
one of them became a cripple, an orphan, or a widow. We owe it to these millions that we build a 
new Germany.”115 Hitler tied the Nazi struggle with the Weimar into the sacrifice and grief 
endured by countless Germans. The Nazis worked hard to set themselves up as the enemies of 
the SPD and Weimar and in doing so managed to gain the allegiance of many disillusioned from 
Germany's fall from power. 
 Another party, partially blamed for the end of the war, was targeted by the Nazis with an 
unprecedented visceral rage. Following defeat and the Treaty of Versailles, many Germans 
turned their anger and confusion towards a group of people who Europeans often made into 
scapegoats, the Jews. Anti-Semitism following the collapse of the German war effort was rabid 
throughout Germany. People across Germany screamed “The Jews are to blame!”116 In 1920, 
German journalist and poet Adolf Bartels wrote, “Jewish disfigurement, it elevates the puny 
individual to the measure of all things.”117 Any argument backed by anti-Semitism contains 
critical flaws, but the accusations that would be leveled against the Jews would at best be labeled 
as convoluted conspiracy theories, at worst the delusional ravings of the truly lost. Those 
Germans who subscribed to such stories and accusations were prime targets for recruitment into 
the Nazi Movement. 
 The Nazi Movement was an inherently nationalist organization and as such had a clear 
hatred of all things not German. Thus, Nazis considered Germany's large Jewish population 
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outsiders, as shown in the party program, despite the fact that many Jews had fought in the Great 
War for Germany. The Nazi Movement's hatred for the Jews stemmed from similar arguments 
that other anti-Semites in Germany internalized. The Nazis believed that the Jews were not 
bound to spatial boundaries.118 The Jews were allowed to setup a state within multiple racial 
communities by classifying themselves, not as a race, but rather as a religion.119 By presenting 
themselves as a religion and not a competing race the Jew was assured of religious 
tolerance.120Afforded time, the Jews would soften the stern militarism of the Germans via 
catchwords such as “Democracy, Majority, Conscience of the World, World-solidarity, World-
peace, Internationality of Art” and numerous other terms that cultivated internationalism.121 Jews 
were thus able to hide themselves in every nation claiming to be citizens of another race while 
secretly fostering the survival of their own race. Thus, as far as the Nazis were concerned, the 
Jews were the prime enemy of the German people, and the Nazis intended to use whatever 
means available to them to communicate that fact to the German public. 
 The Nazis had many ways to demonstrate that they were the group that would truly wage 
an all or nothing battle with the perpetrators of the supposed Jewish conspiracy against Germany. 
In their platform, the Nazis clearly stated, “no Jew may be a member of the nation” and that “all 
non-German immigration must be prevented.”122 Going further, and perhaps more to the point, 
the platform stated that the Party “combats Jewish-materialist spirit within and without us.”123 
Thus, from the beginning the Nazis made it clear they were a serious enemy of the Jews. Beyond 
such aggression using buzzwords and catchphrases allowed the Nazis to tie any topic they 
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protested to their anti-Semitism. In condemning the free market, which, according to the Nazis, 
was negatively impacting the German economy and by extension the livelihood of its citizens, a 
Nazi handbill referred to bankers as “agents of the Jewish international stock exchange.”124 
Various Nazis would become quite adept at blaming the Jews for all of Germany's ills, but no 
one was more of a skillful anti-Semite than Adolf Hitler. Hitler's anti-Semitism came from a 
place of intense emotions too copious to cover at this time. Needless to say, most of Hitler's anti-
Semitic statements at the time equated Jews with division, collapse, and responsibility for the 
failure of the German people in 1918. In 1923, Hitler argued that the Jew “is the demon of the 
disintegration of peoples, he is the symbol of the unceasing destruction of their life.”125 
Responding to economic concerns, Hitler blamed the Jews for the depersonalizing free market, 
or as he also called it “Judaized,” business.126 According to Hitler, “business lost the character of 
work; it became an object of speculation. Master and man were torn asunder.”127 Through 
Hitler's numerous speeches and the various other efforts of the Movement, the Nazis managed to 
tie all of the woes of Weimar Germany to the already despised Jews while simultaneously setting 
themselves in the role of the enemy of the Jews. 
 The emotions of World War I provided critical pathways into the German psyche that the 
Nazis incorporated into their ideology, but that alone could not have helped the Nazis gain much 
of an initial power base. What truly motivates people into action is having an enemy for 
everyone to rally against. In the fallout of German defeat and the Treaty of Versailles, the 
Germans gained a plethora of enemies to target their confusion and grief towards, but this anger 
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was diffuse, split as it was amongst many parties. The Nazis managed to focus this anger and 
mistrust towards specific enemies they deemed dangerous to the German way of life. Using 
ancient racism and calling on powerful emotions the Nazis assembled around themselves a small, 
yet significant group of supporters and readied themselves to make a move against the ailing 
Weimar Republic. As many historians have asserted, without the First World War and all of the 
emotions, anger, hatred, disillusionment, grief, sacrifices, and suffering that it brought to the 
German people there would never have been a Nazi Party. However, before accepting the 
argument presented here it is important to evaluate German identity before World War I in order 
to determine whether Nazi ideology could have existed independent of the Great War. 
 
The Second Reich and the Not-So-Sonderweg 
 
 A school of thought amongst historians argues that the German mindset before World War 
I, as opposed to the results of World War I, allowed the Nazis their initial voice. Known as the 
Sonderweg, or special path, this thesis claims that the German people suffered from a failed 
Bourgeois revolution that sent them astray from the “normal” western path of development. The 
bedrock of such an argument claims that anti-liberal sentiments from the days of Bismarck 
managed to survive beyond the First World War allowing the Nazis room to rise.128 While there 
is a logical consistency to such a claim, the Sonderweg argument has numerous flaws and is 
largely becoming phased out of present day work on German history. The central contention 
against this argument is embodied by the work of David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley who argue 
that comparing Germany's development alongside Western developments of England, France, 
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and the United States demonstrates an unfair bias by deeming these nations' development as the 
standard of normality.129 Normal stands as a stretch as England and France endured a revolution 
followed by dictatorship and the United States suffered a devastating Civil War. Following the 
Wars of German unification Germans were thoroughly optimistic and anxious to demonstrate 
their power in international competition, not tearing one another apart.130 Jürgen Kocka 
demonstrates another flaw in the Sonderweg by making the simple claim that there is more to 
German history than 1933 and historians need to focus on more than this era when they seek to 
explain the entirety of German history.131 However, the concerns of Sonderweg historians are 
still relevant in terms of Nazi ideology as numerous strains from before the First World War can 
be found in Nazi ideology. Before determining World War I was foundational to Nazi ideology, 
these pre-war aspects of German identity must be evaluated. 
 The Germans steadily built up an economy rivaling the powerhouse industrial nations of 
Great Britain and the United States. Germany also put a great deal of money into a sophisticated 
military and a navy that hoped to rival the British monopoly on the high seas. Thanks to some of 
Bismarck's actions the Germans enjoyed peace and one of the most sophisticated welfare 
systems in the world. Germany was at the precipice of becoming a world power and these 
victories caused the Germans to internalize an ardent nationalism that would exist beyond the 
days of the Second Reich. This environment of German optimism is critical to understanding the 
Nazi Party's eventual popularity because it is this optimism that the Nazis would evoke during 
the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
 The Nazis were able to appeal to the German citizenry because they evoked a masculine 
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activism that hearkened back to the volunteers in the trenches. However, masculinity was a facet 
of German culture long before World War I. The German people worshiped the powerful men of 
their history believing that their masculinity, military prowess, and ability to rule helped the 
German people stand on a superior plain above the rest of the world. In a letter written by Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, the Germanic ruler praised his father and grandfather for the role their military 
victories played in uniting the German Reich.132 Beyond worship and praise of masculine leaders, 
German masculinity was tied into nature and physicality. In a 1906 German magazine, an article 
proclaimed that Germans strove “towards a balanced physical vigor” while elevating “physical 
culture to the status of one of the most authentic demands.”133 The idea that a man was meant to 
be virile and strong in the name of “individual and communal life” existed with German citizens 
well before World War I ever erupted. Therefore, an obstacle exits in claiming the Nazis 
manipulated notions of masculinity from the First World War as those notions were internalized 
in previous decades. 
 Notions of self-sacrifice in the name of the greater German community arose out of 
trench warfare and the harsh life on the home front during the First World War.  Subsequently, 
the Nazi Party used these notions of self-sacrifice as part of the Volksgemeinschaft. While most 
of this argument is correct, notions of self-sacrifice existed before the First World War ever broke 
out. In a 1901 letter directed to Kaiser Wilhelm II, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, a German 
conservative elitist, demonstrated some extreme nationalism when he contended that God 
planned for the German people to advance science, philosophy, and other aspects of society. 134 
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However, Chamberlain goes on to state that the German people “must submerge themselves 
completely in the pursuance of this God-given duty.”135 Chamberlain also discusses the ways in 
which he has made personal sacrifices in the name of bettering Germany and by extension the 
world.136 Evidently notions of self-sacrifice and unification existed before World War I, but to 
argue that the opinions of one German elitist in 1901 were pervasive in the German mindset 
would indeed be irresponsible. 
 Notions of self-sacrifice seem to have existed, endured, and expanded beyond what 
Chamberlain argued on the eve of the First World War. In 1912, the head of the Pan-German 
League, a nationalist organization that existed before World War I, Heinrich Class wrote a 
pamphlet If I Were Kaiser in which he argued that the key to mastering the success Germany was 
experiencing in the early 20th Century resided in the ability of the German people to forget their 
differences and unite in “the struggle for the soul of the people.”137 Class called for people to 
enter “such honorable service” to “smooth out the divisions of that through ill will have escalated 
into implacable enmity.”138 Hence, by 1912 notions of putting aside one's individual problems 
and helping the German nation existed in ample form. Therefore, the Burgfrieden and by 
extension the Volksgemeinschaft cannot said to be entirely unique to the First World War and 
certainly not to Nazi ideology. 
 Anti-Semitism has existed for time immemorial, long before even the Kaiser came to 
power. Proof of its presence within Germany is not hard to find whatsoever. In 1850, famous 
German composer Richard Wagner demonstrated a belief in a Jewish conspiracy stating that the 
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Jew “rules and will rule as long as money remains the power as a result of which all our 
activities and doings lose their force.”139 Returning to Heinrich Class, the notions that Jewish 
money interfered with the masculine culture predated the First World War as the head of the Pan-
German League accused the Jews of being “the carriers and teachers of the materialism that 
today is dominant.”140 Class, as if he was taking a page from Adolf Hitler's future manuscripts 
stated that the Jews' “German-born supporters are dupes seduced and alienated from their inborn 
instincts.”141 Before the Great War, anti-Semitism was used to place the failures of modern 
society squarely on the shoulders of the Jewish people. Thus, as some would argue, the Nazis’ 
anti-Semitic messages already met a sympathetic and receptive audience independent of the First 
World War. 
 What is to be made then of World War I's influence on Nazi ideology if so many of its 
foundations were actually notions internalized by German's before the war ever began? Even 
though notions of masculinity, self-sacrifice, community, and anti-Semitism existed before the 
war, the Great War amplified the notions to an immeasurable scale. Sure, masculinity was very 
important to the German mindset before the Great War, but to that same token “atom” vacuum 
cleaners and trips to the cinema were highly valued before the war.142 Self-sacrifice and 
community may have existed, but factory owners still exploited workers at every opportunity 
that was presented to them.143Even anti-Semitism remained a very conservative reaction to the 
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woes of the world, and was not anywhere near as combative as it was following the war. Thus, 
such aspects that would go on to form foundations of Nazi ideology were tepid and isolated at 
best before World War I brought these aspects to the surface. 
 Perhaps most troubling to the Sonderweg idea that aspects of German identity were 
unique to Germany is the fact that many of these notions were not unique to Germany.144 To 
demonstrate how obvious the lack of uniqueness of aspects of Germany's pre-war identity were 
one needs go no further than one of the United States most recognizable figures, Theodore 
Roosevelt. President at the start of the twentieth century, Teddy Roosevelt has been held by 
numerous historians as the embodiment of turn of the century American identity. Even if such a 
bold claim is not to be accepted, Roosevelt's views are remarkably indicative of the previously 
mentioned German notions of identity. In his inaugural speech of March 1904 Teddy Roosevelt 
stated, “we [Americans] are the heirs of the ages...yet our life has called for the vigor and effort 
without which the manlier and hardier virtues wither away.”145 Thus, TR demonstrated the 
presence of a masculine nationalism in the United States before the World War. Continuing in 
this speech, TR was effusive in his call for a sense of community and sacrifice amongst 
Americans stating, “it is our own fault if we failed...the success which we confidently believe the 
future will bring should cause...a deep and abiding realization of all which life has offered us.”146 
Therefore, it becomes increasingly difficult for Sonderweg historians to undermine the value of 
the First World War via pre-war interpretations of identity as those aspects were far from unique 
to Germany. 
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 World War I intensified all aspects of German identity that the citizenry had internalized 
for generations. With the outbreak of war, physical, virile masculinity was required by both those 
on the front lines and those at home. Everyone needed to make sacrifices to help the greater 
community and when all of this failed, when Germany at its peak could not bring victory, 
unjustified and intensified hate was directed towards all enemies of Germany. Even though many 
aspects of Nazi ideology existed before the World War, the importance that the Great War placed 
on these notions endured beyond the failure of the war allowing the Nazis to form an amplified 
emotional foundation to their belief system 
 
Ideology’s Influence on the Beer Hall Putsch 
 
 Taking a brief moment to recap, the First World War amplified previously held notions of 
German identity and when those notions failed to achieve victory, the German people suffered an 
identity crisis. Those who would support and join the early Nazi Movement perhaps suffered 
disproportionately from the disconnect between identity and reality in comparison with other 
Germans. Nazi supporters and thinkers took on these notions of German identity and focused 
them into a political agenda of overthrow that appealed to a very select support base during the 
early inter-war years. This support base would continue to be limited as long as Nazism 
remained on the political periphery of Bavaria. These circumstances being the case, historians 
are correct in their assertions that the Nazis needed much more than notions of World War I to 
become a political force. Thus, as this work argues for Nazi ideology as a driving force of Nazi 
action more than amplified senses of identity are needed to justify how the Nazis began their 
path to power. If, as this work suggests, the identity crisis that occurred following the loss of 
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World War I was the pivotal foundation to Nazi ideology as opposed to a convenient context, 
then it has to be demonstrated that the crisis-motivated ideology of the Nazi Movement led to a 
watershed moment that without said moment the Nazi Party could never have risen to dominance. 
That watershed moment would come in November 1923 when the Nazis decided to act upon 
their overthrow ideology. 
 In November 1923, the Nazi Movement growing in popularity would be afforded a 
chance to accomplish exactly what they set out for, a grand action that would seize broad, 
national attention. By November 1923 the Nazi Movement feeling very confident with their hard 
earned support base and the weaknesses within Munich and the surrounding area, launched a 
coup known famously as the Beer Hall Putsch. The Hitler-led Putsch was the pinnacle of the 
early Nazi Movement's achievement. Hitler and the Nazis had called for an end to the ineffectual 
Weimar Republic, an event that would only occur in the wake of unity of action. In attempting to 
overthrow the republic the Nazis were living up to everything they stood for. Brave, virile SA 
men united despite their individual differences and rose up against the enemies of a potentially 
restored Germany. However, the Putsch was a failure. Many of those responsible, Hitler included, 
were arrested and put on trial for high treason. The Nazis, at that time a largely regional 
organization 55,000 strong, would be outlawed albeit temporarily. With the leaders of the 
movement facing possible execution, many members scattered by the outcome of the Putsch, and 
the remainder not allowed to unify under the Nazi banner, the Putsch, a moment that the Nazis 
had previously exclaimed as Germany's liberation, seemingly extinguished the torch of the Nazi 
Movement. However, news of the failed Putsch spread like wildfire across Weimar Germany 
receiving condemnation and compliments as all of Germany began to pay attention to the Nazi 
Movement. Hitler's trial itself was highly publicized offering him the unique opportunity of 
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having a nationwide audience to sermonize; an event the future Führer knew how to take full 
advantage of. 
 In a speech Hitler made at the trial in his defense he spread critical aspects of the Nazi 
ideology to the masses. Hitler began his defense by exclaiming “I have resolved to be the 
destroyer of Marxism.”147 Hitler would go on to claim that despite the differing political 
backgrounds and goals of those involved in the Putsch, they put aside their differences because 
“the fate of Germany does not lie in the choice between a republic or a Monarchy, but in the 
content.”148 Hitler then asserted that “We wanted to create in Germany the precondition which 
alone will make it possible for the iron grip of our enemies to be removed”'149 Hitler took the 
opportunity to insult the “international stock exchange slavery,” “trusts,” and “the politicizing of 
unions.”150 During a trial where he could face execution, Hitler spread Nazi ideology's fostering 
of activism, disdain, self-sacrifice, unity, and labeling the enemies of Germany. The trial allowed 
Hitler his first national audience and he used that opportunity to attempt to sway people across 
Germany to the Nazi way of thinking, just as he had been doing since the formation of the Nazi 
Movement. Although the Nazis would be disbanded, Hitler's speech left a significant impression 
on the minds of many more Germans than the 55,000 who followed the Movement in revolt. 
 Hitler had one last matter to discuss at his trial. As powerful as his words could be, Hitler 
knew that with the Movement disbanded it could very well dissolve forever. Therefore, Hitler 
took advantage of having a national audience to mythologize the remaining shadow organization 
of the Nazi Movement. Per Hitler, “the army which we have formed grows from day to day; it 
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grows more rapidly from hour to hour.”151 Hitler awaited the time “when these untrained bands 
(would) grow to battalions, the battalions to regiments and the regiments to divisions.”152 Hitler 
passed on to the German public the image of a Nazi Movement waiting in the shadows all the 
while biding its time as it would grow to unthinkable size. That idea would help keep the Nazi 
Movement in existence until its re-founding in February 1925. 
 Hitler ended his speech with a diatribe that shook many Germans right to their 
nationalistic core. Hitler, calling into question the validity of the court trying him stated “For 
gentlemen it is not you who pronounce judgment upon us.”153 He then claimed that “the Court of 
History” would judge the leaders of the Putsch “as Germans who wanted the best for their people 
and their fatherland, who wished to fight and to die. You may pronounce us guilty a thousand 
times, but the Goddess who presides over the Eternal Court of History...she acquits us.”154 Hitler 
in closing his speech cemented one aspect of Nazi ideology permanently in the minds of 
supporters and enemies alike; the Nazis intended to carry on the torch of the 1914 volunteers by 
fighting and if necessary dying in the name of a nationalist Germany. There would be no 
sacrifice too high, no maneuver too risky. The Nazis intended to return to prominence and would 
try again to destroy the Weimar Republic. The only difference between the Putsch and the future 
strike of the Nazi Movement would be the fact that now many more than 55,000 people knew to 
what extent the Nazis were willing to go to see their vision of the future realized. 
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Closing Thoughts 
 
 Hitler would receive a light sentence and spend very little time in jail, most of which was 
spent compiling his political testament Mein Kampf. When Hitler emerged he returned to a fairly 
stable operation and began to turn a rabid Nazi Movement, enduring in his absence, into an 
actual Nazi Party with the goal of winning elections and destroying the Weimar Republic within 
the framework of legality. As previously stated, if World War I is to be considered an ideological 
foundation for the Third Reich as opposed to simply the initial context, then it has to be 
demonstrated that the amplified sense of identity from World War I led to a watershed moment 
for the Nazi Movement that without said moment the Nazi Party could never have risen to 
dominance. That watershed moment for the Nazis on which everything that would subsequently 
follow was Hitler's speech in his defense. 
 Historians always attempt to find moments that they can point to as critical to everything 
else that follows afterwards because those moments are truly rare and are incredibly informative. 
Hitler's defense speech contained ideas of masculinity, a willingness to make sacrifices and unify 
in the name of the community, clearly identified enemies of Germany, and most importantly 
demonstrated the willingness of the Nazi Movement to sacrifice themselves to achieve victory. 
All of these goals are indiscernible from the goals of the young volunteers setting out for the 
trenches filled with the Spirit of 1914 and the Burgfrieden. In tying the struggle of the Nazi 
Movement to the emotional memories of the First World War, Hitler established the Nazi ideals 
within the psyche of the German people. Presumably, Hitler's speech allowed for the Nazi 
Movement to endure during his absence and provided a national stage for the Nazis upon Hitler's 
return. This work contends that this speech should be the critical moment of evaluation for the 
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entirety of the Nazi rise afterward because although much remained to be determined, none of 
the political and electoral intrigue over the next eight years would have happened without the 
notoriety and significance of this speech and its assertion of the Putsch as an ideologically driven 
action.
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CHAPTER 3 
ERKENNUNG: 1924 TO 1933155 
 
A 1930 letter to the Oldenburg Ministry of Churches and Schools complained about the 
violence meted out towards children by National Socialist students. According to the letter, “the 
son of a Republican was beaten up during the break...so badly that he had to stay home for over a 
week.”156 The letter goes on to state that the National Socialist students had formed a “Pupils’ 
Association” and quickly took a majority within the school.157 It did not take long for “their 
satchels [to be] smeared with swastikas” or for them to “join together and sing National Socialist 
combat songs.”158 Children who did not join the Pupils’ Association became distraught from the 
situation, which negatively impacted their studies.159 Such a decline resulted in punishments 
from teachers despite their knowledge of the underlying situation.160 According to the letter, 
“some headmasters have already declared that they are not in a position to deal with these 
incidents.”161 Thus, the students who refused to join the Pupils' Association were left with the 
choice of fending for themselves, a thoroughly risky option, or joining the National Socialist 
agenda. 
This letter is remarkably indicative of the generally accepted interpretation of the Nazi 
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Party rise during the Weimar Republic. Similar to the school environment, Weimar Germany 
should have been a safe environment that cultivated individual expression and personal liberty. 
However, like the school, the Republic became a living hell where those trying to make it to the 
next day were under the constant harassment of National Socialist violence. In the same manner 
that the students were left to fend for themselves, those in charge of the Weimar Republic 
seemed powerless to stop the Nazi terror machine. Thus, by this interpretation, the citizenry, left 
with the choice between continued suffering or submission to National Socialism, chose to 
submit and gain some peace. These types of arguments have entrenched the image of the Nazis 
as fanatical bullies whose war of terror allowed them to coerce support from the unwilling 
masses; an identity cemented by their actions during the Second World War. 
The idea of the violent Nazi opportunists is not necessarily incorrect as Nazi SA  
members often committed violent acts for no other reason than they could. However, to argue 
that such violent opportunism explained their rise to political dominance is a severe mistake.   
Thomas Childers has argued that by 1932 the Nazis actually lost support from the SA's “embrace 
of political terrorism.”162 Violence did have a beneficial impact on Nazi success but not in a 
sense of intimidating the unwilling public into support. Rather, violence stood as a pillar of the 
Nazi ideological command for activism and struggle against the enemies of Germany. Per 
historian Eric Weitz, Nazi violence “demonstrate[d] vividly the Nazis' commitment and 
determination, and that, of course was the point.”163 Such activism afforded Nazis support from 
various social groups looking for action in a time of helplessness and impotence. Therefore, 
violent, opportunistic activity existed, but violence of this petty nature did not result in 
significant support. Violence that matched Nazi ideology instilled a sense of activism in various 
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citizens, thus gaining support in that fashion. 
Another flaw with the Nazi oppression and opportunism argument is that under this 
interpretation the Nazis would have to have been universally accepted as the majority party of 
the Weimar Republic. However, as historians know, the highest percentage of votes the Nazi 
Party attained in fair Reichstag elections was 37.8 percent.164 Such an argument of Nazi 
universality was popularized by journalist William Shirer who stated “to all the millions of 
discontented Hitler in a whirlwind campaign offered...some measure of hope.”165 Earlier Shirer 
also lent credence to the Sonderweg thesis by claiming that “acceptance of autocracy, of blind 
obedience to the petty tyrant who ruled as princes, became ingrained in the German mind.”166 
Thus, Shirer and to a certain extent Sonderweg historians, set into the public mindset the idea of 
a universally popular Nazi Party which was far from the case. After Shirer, historians rejected the 
idea of a universal Nazi appeal and began postulating the Mittelstand Thesis in which the Nazis 
gained their support almost exclusively from the lower middle class.167 However, beginning in 
the late 1970s various historians began to criticize this thesis arguing in favor of the notion of the 
Nazis as a Volkspartei, a party spanning various social groupings. The Volkspartei thesis will be 
explored throughout this chapter as it encompasses the work of numerous historians most 
notably Thomas Childers, Richard Hamilton, and William Sheridan Allen.168 For the time being 
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it is important to note that Nazi appeal was in no way universal to all of Germany, but did attract 
a disparate following across Germany. 
Most historians offer multiple explanations for why the Nazis were able to attain a 
diverse constituency, but these explanations almost always boil down to one of two points. Either 
the mass-support for Nazism came as a result of the multiple failures of the Weimar Republic or 
they were the result of the Nazi Party's shameless pandering from 1928 to 1933. John Morrow 
certainly advocates the former claiming “Adolf Hitler and the Nazis rose to power as a result of 
the depression in Germany.”169 Despite the copious credit he gives to the Nazi Party, historian 
Detlev Peukert argues the centrality of the economic strife but is careful to note that “rejection of 
Weimar clearly antedated the surge of support for Hitler.”170 Peukert contends that a considerable 
amount of voter disaffection was already rampant across Germany and these voters eventually 
voted for the Nazis as a means of protest. J.W. Falter and R. Zintl's analysis of Weimar crisis 
voting agrees with Peukert making the claim that their research indicated “the NSDAP became 
simply another protest outlet for SPD voters after 1928.”171 Falter and Zintl also conclude the 
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dissolution of previous middle class protest parties, the German People's Party and German 
National People's Party, led to substantial increases in Nazi support, an assertion seconded by 
Larry Jones who argues that single-interest middle class parties also dissolved and supported the 
Nazis.172 
These arguments making Weimar protest and defections critical to the rise of the Nazi 
Party put forward a passive argument in which the Nazis just happened to be in the right place at 
the wrong time. Peter Fritzche warns against such a passive argument postulating that even if the 
economic struggles of the Weimar Republic had not occurred Germany may not have “been 
spared the pugilism of radical nationalists or the pitiless uncertainty of political terrorism and 
civil strife.”173 Thus, the Weimar environment argument for mass appeal is inadequate as these 
arguments ignore critical aspects of the Nazi rise. By this line of thought any party could 
possibly have seized political control of the disaffected German citizenry, which, as this work 
will demonstrate, was far from true. 
Could any other party have really taken control of Germany in the same fashion as the 
Nazis? Per Fritzche, protest support existed before the Nazis dominance as evidenced by the 
disparate voter populations that elected staunchly conservative Paul von Hindenburg Republic 
President in 1925 despite SPD domination of the Reichstag.174  If mass-disaffection existed, 
which this work asserts, then the remaining question asks how did members of this group know 
or deem the Nazi Party as the appropriate vehicle for their disgruntled support? Many historians 
have chosen to argue that the Nazis opportunistically presented themselves as the end all be all to 
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every part of the electorate, which certainly is valid, to a point. Jill Stephenson acknowledges 
such assertions stating that “the Nazis were relentless in utilizing [reaction against modernism's] 
facilities for their own heinous and often bizarre purposes.”175 However, if the only reason the 
Nazis came to power was opportunistic pandering, why could no other party duplicate such 
pandering to take or maintain control of the volatile Weimar Republic? 
The other Weimar political parties had numerous marks against them that hindered their 
goal of political dominance. The most powerful party of the time, the Social Democratic Party, 
was tied to the Weimar Republic and as such could not distance itself from the problems thought 
to have been brought onto Germany by that same democratic system.176 Another prominent 
political party, the Communist Party of Germany, preached the Communist message of downfall 
to the capitalist, democratic system and, due to their belief that Capitalism was in its dying throes, 
were uninterested in seizing control of the Weimar Republic.177 Therefore, if these political 
powerhouses, perfectly capable of pandering and making their own empty promises, could not 
maintain their dominance, the question becomes why were the Nazis ultimately able to rise to 
power? What made the Nazis unique from other political organizations in Weimar Germany that 
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allowed them to take a path that ultimately led to the Third Reich? 
Fritzche, while not asserting Nazi opportunism, certainly agrees that campaigning helped 
them secure the support necessary to come to power. Per Fritzche, the Nazis, as opposed to being 
the passive inheritors of the dissolving bourgeois political environment, “were successful insofar 
as they adhered strictly to the changing requirements of bourgeois politics.”178 Thus, the Nazis 
used the tools of an evolving German populism to reach the masses and demonstrate that they 
existed as a true protest group. Slowly, Fritzche contends, “burghers recognized in the Nazis 
what they believed to be the strategic advantages of the socialists, namely organization, 
determination, and fanaticism, without having to purchase proletarian economics.”179 Thus, the 
Nazis attained popular support by setting themselves up as a viable alternative to the stymied 
Weimar parties. 
The overarching argument of this work seeks to tie Nazi ideology to Nazi action. The 
previous chapter analyzed how the First World War informed Nazi ideology and motivated the 
Nazis to take up the banner of the 1914 volunteers and to topple the Weimar Republic. However, 
with the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch, the Nazis were pushed into near irrelevance. The 
turnaround from obscurity in 1925 to dominance in 1933 is remarkable and the subject of 
investigation for countless historians. A 1992 Symposium held on “Weimar, the Working Classes, 
and the Rise of National Socialism” that featured prominent historians such Jürgen Falter, Detlef 
Mühlberger, and Jill Stephenson discussing the rise of National Socialism via Weimar elections. 
After numerous presentations, a critique was made by many in attendance to the effect that “the 
speakers came under fire from some quarters for neglecting fundamental questions of 
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ideology.”180 Thus, the critical topic this work must now address centers on the often neglected 
role of ideology in the Nazi rise. 
As previously discussed, historical work on the Nazi rise generally follows a progression 
that claims the actions, or inactions, of the Republic alienated a mass group of voters leading 
them to become a block of protest voters. The Nazis then pandered to these voters in an effort to 
get their support which allowed them the slim electoral presence to get Hitler to the Chancellery. 
This work does not challenge the basic logic of this progression but seeks to build onto this 
narrative the understanding that the bridge between Nazi pandering and German acceptance of 
the Nazi agenda was not simply a passive protest outlet. Rather, Nazi actions to make themselves 
more appealing to the masses ensured the citizenry knew the Nazis were the appropriate outlet. 
While this work acknowledges that opportunism and contradictory promises certainly existed, 
the Nazis efforts to get their message out to the German public were genuinely forwarded by 
Nazi ideological considerations centering on the all driving mission of the activist masculine and 
nationalist struggle to topple the Weimar Republic and replace the failing institution with a 
dynamic and all-encompassing Volksgemeinschaft. 
 
Non-Nazi Aversion to the Weimar Republic 
 
 Arguing the primacy of Nazi ideologically motivated action in the Nazi Party's rise to 
power does not discount the Weimar Republic's tremendous impact on such events. The claim 
that without the disaster that was Weimar Germany the Nazi Party would never have risen to 
prominence is certainly a valid argument. Weimar Germany generated stress amongst the 
German people and alienated various groups creating significant civil unrest. Arguing that the 
                                                 
180Matthew Jeffries, “Weimar, the Working Classes, and the Rise of National Socialism,” 1992, 74. 
 71 
 
Weimar Republic was the primary cause of the Nazi rise however inadvertently presents the Nazi 
Party as the sole opposition to the Weimar Republic. The Nazis had no such monopoly on protest 
as numerous individuals and organizations protested various aspects of the Weimar Republic. 
Therefore, before proceeding to explain the numerous ways Nazi ideology informed the 
citizenry's choices to vote for the Nazis, it is important to demonstrate the numerous avenues of 
disaffection within the Republic that would eventually filter into a mass protest vote.   
  The Weimar Republic brought on numerous changes across multiple planes that 
received mixed reactions amongst the German people. The Republic brought to Germany 
modernism, liberalism, and consumerism that many Germans endorsed, but these new concepts 
also received equal condemnation within the German community. Intellectuals in particular 
worried that “Americanism” was slowly taking over and diminishing German culture.181 
Americanism went beyond “trusts, high rises, traffic officers, film, technical wonders, jazz bands, 
boxing, magazines, and management,” but rather existed as the embodiment of the fear that 
German culture would disappear within the Republic.182 Artist George Grosz, living in Weimar 
Germany, characterized the changes within the Republic as evoking amongst people “ghastly 
materialism and boredom.”183 Others expressed ardent fears “of the conquest of Europe by 
America” and that “individual peoples are being worn away...becoming international.”184 Such 
men did not endorse the ardent nationalism that would dominate the Nazi Party, but artists and 
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intellectuals were concerned by the degradation of the German mind that the internationalism the 
Weimar Republic invited. Thus, although many intellectuals voiced praise for the Weimar 
Republic, some did express hesitations with some of modernism's side effects swirling 
throughout Germany. 
The Weimar Republic increased materialism and internationalism in Germany, but 
perhaps a more contested result of the Weimar system was a sharp revision in women's role 
within German society. The Great War eliminated a great deal of Germany’s young male 
population which forced the nation's gender roles to alter. Women needed to work to provide for 
themselves and their families deprived of their original breadwinners. Many Germans of both 
genders expressed concerns over women entering prominence in the professional sphere. One 
chief concern centered on the belief that the independent woman would not want to give birth to 
the children desperately needed to replenish the German population following World War I. 
Alfred Polgar expressed this fear within his work The Defenseless in which a father and son 
exchanged beliefs about the rise of women. The father, representing the older generation, argued 
that “the pelvis of a woman is still broader and heavier than our own; they still bear the 
children.”185 Despite the rise of women and the gains they did make, those gains were not 
appreciated as many politicians and intellectuals called a woman's right of employment into 
question.186 A more condemnatory opinion within the Republic comes from the testimonies 
gathered from various female textile workers in 1930. One woman stated “my view is that if a 
housewife and mother could be at home, then the household and children would be better served. 
In France, Alsace, and Saxony the women do not work in the factory and their life is easier than 
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in Bavaria.”187 Another woman criticized the lack of sustainable wages despite backbreaking 
labor stating “I would be happy if I could properly provide for my household and children.”188 
She went on to say that she does not “know a Sunday and holiday.”189 Thus, not only were men 
unhappy with women’s presence in the work force, but many women themselves expressed a 
great deal of frustration at their current position brought on by the needs of the Weimar Republic. 
As women became more prominent in areas previously unfamiliar to them, Germans 
began to notice that the youth were also drastically changing in many uncomfortable ways. The 
previously mentioned Polgar conversation between father and son began only after the son had 
refused to give his seat on the train to a woman forced to stand.190 The father, stunned at his son’s 
disregard for women, fears he has lost the ability to love and show respect, symbolic of the fear 
that Germany’s men were becoming more effeminate and weak.191 The youth themselves did not 
help ease the older generation’s concerns as historian Felix Gilbert fondly related that in his 
Weimar era youth he and his friends “enjoyed shocking our elders by not wearing hats in the 
summer, by not wearing tuxedos when we went out in the evenings....we liked to live our own 
lives, not bound to firm, tight schedules.”192 Beyond abandoning the conventions of the past, 
sexuality began to feature prominently within public discourse, but not just sexuality concerning 
a married man and woman, but between single people, sometimes of the same gender. In 1929, 
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the League for Human Rights called for homosexual women to “show that you are not merely to 
be tolerated, but are also prepared to fight for your freedom.”193 Many individuals began to argue 
that sex was no longer a woman’s “duty” to her man and her nation but rather could be had for 
the enjoyment of life.194 Some even condemned the institution of marriage for failing to help 
people reach the fullest extent of happiness possible.195 Many more traditional people still stood 
up for sex between a married man and woman, such as the German Association for the 
Protection of Mothers which in 1922 asserted that they strove “to unmask the offensive social 
conditions and ethical views which tolerate and promote prostitution and venereal diseases.”196 
However, the damage to public discourse had been done as even this association recognized 
“human sexuality as a powerful instrument, not only for the propagation but also for the 
progressive development of joy in living.”197 The Weimar Republic allowed a seemingly 
uncontrollable generation the freedom to not only defy valued social conventions but also to 
bring sexuality into public discourse.198 As the youth became less amenable, the older generation 
increasingly grew to blame the Weimar Republic that appeared to endorse such expressions of 
personal freedom. 
Beyond the loss of culture, the changes in masculine domination, and the pervasiveness 
                                                 
193League For Human Rights, “Appeal to All Homosexual Women, 18 September 1929,” in The Weimar Republic 
Sourcebook, ed. Anton Kaes and Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 704. 
194Grete Ujhely, “A Call for Sexual Tolerance, 1930,” in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, ed. Anton Kaes, Jay 
Martin, and Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 710. 
195Helene Stöcker, “Marriage as a Psychological Problem, 1930,” in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, ed. Anton 
Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 705-708. 
196German Association for the Protection of Mothers, “Guidelines of the German Association for the Protection of 
Mothers, November-December 1922,” in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, ed. Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and 
Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 697. 
197
 Ibid, 697. 
198For those interested in learning about the sexual revolution that occurred in Weimar Germany a valuable resource 
is Eric Weitz's Weimar Germany that features a chapter devoted to the topic in addition to analysis of the 
numerous cultural changes occurring in Germany at this time Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy. 
 75 
 
of the youth, the Weimar Republic witnessed one of the worst economic collapses Germany ever 
experienced. As Germans faced massive unemployment, inflation, and hyper-inflation the 
Weimar Republic generated a considerable amount of opposition. Heinrich Hauser described the 
migration of desperate Germans along the Hamburg-Berlin highway. From his account, the 
homeless of Germany “walked separately or in small groups with their eyes on the ground. And 
they had the queer, stumbling gait of barefoot people...as they plodded forward in dumb 
despair.”199 From a closer perspective the economic difficulties of the Weimar era presented 
Germans with obstacles they were wholly unprepared for. Betty Scholem, a woman of Weimar 
Germany, categorized the conditions she was enduring as “catastrophic.”200 While relaying the 
events of the day to her daughter via multiple letters, Betty described the staggering difficulties 
of existing in a Germany where bread cost between 900 million and 5.5 billion Reichsmarks.201 
The exchange rates that Betty described would resemble the humorous musings of an economic 
satirist gone mad if only they were not true. Numerous pictures exist of people carrying 
wheelbarrows full of cash to buy a single loaf of bread and others depict children using bundled 
Reichsmarks valued in the billions as building blocks. Thus, the Weimar Republic lost a great 
deal of its original shine in the light of such tragic economic circumstances. The economic crisis 
ensured that the Weimar Republic would lose many of its initial supporters. 
Perhaps the most significant condemnation leveled against the Weimar Republic involved 
the fact that this new form of government considerably altered politics within Germany. The new 
parliamentary system received condemnation amongst Germans used to the direct rule and 
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immediate results of Imperial Germany. German intellectual Carl Schmitt condemned 
parliamentary democracy because in the presence of mass democracy the individual had no place 
for true freedom but was instead oppressed by the majority.202 As far as Schmitt was concerned 
even if Fascism and Communism disappeared from German political discourse, “the crisis of 
contemporary parliamentarism would not be overcome” as there existed a fundamental and 
“inescapable contradiction of liberal individualism and democratic homogeneity.”203 
Conservative Ernst Niekisch condemned the Weimar Republic for bowing to the conventions of 
the Treaty of Versailles blaming social democracy for concealing “from the worker the social 
effects of the policy of acceding to the treaty demands.”204 Communist Ernst Thalmann would 
accuse the SPD and its government of duplicating the supposed Nazi efforts to defend “the 
capitalist system against the revolutionary proletariat.”205 Thus, the Weimar Republic created 
many enemies of differing political backgrounds who, like the Nazis, despised the institution for 
many different reasons, but mostly because the institution existed in the first place. 
Returning to the overall argument of this chapter, it becomes evident that as Fritzche 
among others asserted a mass protest vote was rising throughout the Republic before the Nazis 
became a factor. Many opposed the changes seen within Germany’s cultural priorities and the 
steady Americanization of Germany. Others opposed the rising prominence of women and 
women protested the despicable conditions they faced in their expanding role. The older 
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generation grew to despise the pervasive perceived perversion of the young generation fostered 
by the liberalism of the Weimar Republic. Others condemned the Republic as it failed in a 
government’s sacred task to maintain economic stability for its citizenry. Finally, the 
parliamentary system that operated as the foundation of the Weimar Republic found enemies 
amongst Germans of various political affiliations. Arguments that the Weimar Republic’s 
environment negatively impacted the German citizenry and opened the doors for the Nazi rise to 
power certainly embody a valid historical interpretation. However, all the Weimar Republic 
accomplished was opening the door for the Nazis, but this metaphorical door was theoretically 
open to any organization. Historians of the disaffection thesis are effusive in demonstrating that 
opposition to the Weimar Republic was extensive and was embodied within many individuals. 
Therefore, if, as argued, the Weimar Republic simply provided the opportunity the question 
becomes why were the Nazis the political organization that would use the woes of Weimar 
Germany to start the Third Reich? 
 
The Failures of the DVP and DNVP 
 
Returning to a previous assertion, the political rivals of the Nazi Party, the KPD and SPD, 
had their own problems that would prohibit them from maintaining political dominance of 
Germany. The SPD’s political power ran central to the maintenance of the Weimar Republic 
making efforts to distance themselves from that institution’s failures detrimental to their political 
authority. The KPD, believing in the revolutionary paradigm of Communism, did not ardently 
participate in mass-electoral politics, sticking to their worker support base, as any such efforts to 
promote stability would hinder the progress of the ultimate Communist goal, the fall of capitalist 
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Germany. One of the hardest obstacles for these organizations to overcome was their disregard 
for nationalist concepts. Historian William Gutsman has made the argument that the SPD was 
caught between a rock and a hard place and could not come to any compromise with the 
increasingly radical nationalists without alienating its own worker base.206 Also, historian 
Richard Bodeck made an argument to the effect that the KPD had no interest in concepts of 
German nationalism, nor cooperation with the SPD. Rather, the KPD focused on “defeating 
Hitler, building a new world, protecting the Soviet Union, and planting the Soviet flag.”207 Thus, 
Germany's left-wing was unwilling to effect the change demanded by the disillusioned voting 
public. However, as Fritzche has argued, this radicalization and rise of nationalist politics 
predated the Nazi's rise to prominence in the 1930s. Subsequently, as opposed to focusing on 
why the SPD and KPD could not captivate the growing disaffection, it will be valuable to 
analyze the two prominent nationalist political organizations that predated the Nazi rise. Before 
Nazi ideology and the actions that enabled their eventual rise can be tied together, it is important 
to discuss why alternate nationalist ideologies failed to seize opportunity and rise to prominence 
within political discourse. 
 The German People's Party is a seldom discussed entity amongst non-academic historians, 
but its existence within the narrative of the Nazi rise adds a tragic tint of “what could have been.” 
Known as the DVP, this party advocated a nationalist ideology that while claiming “Marxism 
ha[d] been breeding a sickly international and pacifist romanticism in the place of a resolute will 
devoted to the fatherland” still advocated the maintaining of various parts of the Weimar 
constitution. The DVP further intended to add a separate chamber to the Reichstag modeled on 
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the English House of Lords in which members would be appointed by “churches and institution 
of higher learning.”208 However, despite this sharp departure, a great deal of the DVP's ideology 
matched aspects of Nazi ideology. The DVP, although advocating a new system, still held 
reverence for the German past claiming their faith and “view of life [was] rooted in the spiritual 
soil created in the times of Bismark and Bennigsen and before them the great minds of German 
idealism.”209 They also shared a disdain for the resolution of the First World War claiming the 
German people's “lebensraum [was] brutally cut down” and their freedom to live “cast into 
chains through senseless treaties.”210 The DVP demonstrated a penchant for struggle rhetoric 
calling for the citizenry to “wrestle its way back up through the strength of its love for the 
fatherland and national solidarity.”211 Finally, the DVP stressed the primacy of the 
Volksgemeinschaft as the “supreme law of the German people.”212 Therefore, the DVP stood as a 
party fully capable of matching the rising tide of nationalist dissatisfaction. 
 The question then becomes, why did the DVP fail to see its vision of Germany's future 
implemented? The strictly electoral argument places the DVP at a disadvantage to the rising tide 
of new voters as the DVP demanded “that the franchise be restricted once again to those 25 years 
of age or older.”213 The impact of new voters on the Weimar elections when the voting age was 
lowered to eighteen is a highly contested aspect of electoral historical interpretations of the Nazi 
rise as no one researcher has been able to find an effective and conclusive means of measuring 
the exact numbers of these new voters or how they voted. Abraham Miller and James Robbins 
take early electoral historians to task on their arguments for the disaffection thesis claiming the 
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numbers do not add up.214 The disaffection thesis contends that a mass group of voters became 
alienated by the failures of the SPD and DVP to maintain a stable Republic and eventually 
migrated to the Nazi Party. Through their research Miller and Robbins argue that, as opposed to 
disaffection, the previous non-voters were the major contributors to the Nazi rise, a claim this 
work certainly agrees with in part and will explore later.215 For the time being, the massively 
important swing of new voters certainly had a negative impact on the uninterested DVP. 
 More pragmatically, the major pitfall for the DVP was the death of its fundamentally 
important leader Gustav Stresemann in 1929. Historian Stephen Fritz has a great deal to discuss 
on the Stresemann front claiming that the leader was the backbone of the DVP's popular appeal. 
Per Fritz, Stresemann sought to turn the DVP into a centrist party with mass appeal by 
advocating his belief that the party “should form a positive link to the past, act as a harmonizer 
between left and right in the present, and promote the future growth of the national 
community.”216 Stresemann was instrumental in the formation and maintenance of the Grand 
Coalition of the SPD and DVP that allowed the DVP to wield more power than its numbers 
provided. This coalition existed until a few months after Stresemann's death when the DVP 
leaned towards the industrialist and conservative members of the party who broke with the Grand 
Coalition. However, Fritz is careful not to place too much importance on the death of Stresemann 
claiming that he “for all his personal prestige and talents could take cultural-liberalism [and 
Volksgemeinschaft focus] only so far.”217 The DVP suffered from “its rather elitist nature, loose 
organization, and ideological split between those who favored cooperation with all elements in 
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society and the industrial-big business wing of the party.”218 These flaws would certainly have 
limited mass-support for the DVP, but Stresemann's death did signal the end of any chance for a 
liberal nationalist ideology succeeding in Germany. 
 Beyond Miller’s and Fritz's argument for the failure of the DVP to implement its vision of 
Germany's future, the disparity of their ideology in comparison with Nazi ideology offers a few 
solutions for the DVP's failure to gain mass-support. The DVP's wish to see the continuation of 
the Reichstag was particularly damning for the prospects of nationalist support. Also, the idea of 
a second chamber not electable by the people demonstrated the DVP's elitist nature and further 
hindered its prospects. For all the potential of their agenda, ignoring the masses and seeking to 
limit their impact on the government made the DVP stick out like a sore thumb against the 
backdrop of the Nazis who advocated “equality of rights for the German people” and asserted 
that “administration and law belongs only to the citizen.”219 Therefore, in addition to the loss of 
the youth vote and the fractures that resulted after Stresemann's death, the DVP could never have 
risen to prominence as it would never be able to represent a true Volkspartei. 
Perhaps the most prominent right wing party beyond the Nazis was the German National 
People's Party, otherwise known as the DNVP. If an opening presented itself for the nationalist 
wing of Germany to return to prominence, the party most likely to accomplish this task initially 
seemed to be the DNVP. Following the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch the Nazi Movement was 
for all intents and purposes outlawed which left the cause of German nationalism with the 
already well-established DNVP. In the May 1924 elections the DNVP received 20.1 percent of 
the vote, shy one percent of the SPD and over thirteen percent ahead of the National Socialist 
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Freedom Party, the organization formed to stand in for the illegal Nazi Party.220 In December of 
the same year elections would again be held in which the DNVP would increase by eight seats 
while the National Socialist Freedom Party lost eighteen.221 The DNVP had more support than 
the Nazis following the failed Putsch, the Nazi Movement's highest early fame, and would 
continue to endure in the 1928 elections despite a loss of thirty seats.222 If any party besides the 
Nazis could have taken advantage of the disaffection within the Republic, it would have been the 
German National People's Party. 
As nationalists, the DNVP’s views were not all that different from the Nazi Party’s 
beliefs. In their program the DNVP advocated “the liberation of the German people from foreign 
domination.”223 They also supported Austrian self-determination, which would likely have led to 
unification with Germany.224 Additionally the Burgfrieden existed as a foundation to their own 
ideology as their program argued “a solidly unified German nation provides the most important 
foundation for German greatness.”225 They also shared with the Nazis a rejection of certain 
aspects of modernity, in particular art which the DNVP argued existed not in modernism, but 
“grows in the soil of a vital nationalism” thus condemning modernist art that rose from 
individual expression.226 Thus, some of the pillars that the Nazis held as critical to their vision of 
a future Germany were featured prominently in the DNVP ideology, but because the DNVP 
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ultimately failed to dominate Germany the question becomes why did they fail? 
From an electoral perspective, Jürgen  Falter and Detlef Mühlberger  contend that the 
DNVP alienated the rural support they had relied on through the twenties which first led to the 
formation of splinter rural parties.227 By the 1932 elections, the Nazis had converted these 
splinter parties to their cause eliminating pivotal DNVP support. Thomas Childers showed that 
DNVP loss to the Nazis went beyond the rural populations claiming “the primary victim of Nazi 
success within the urban old middle class in handicrafts after 1920 appears to have been the 
DNVP.”228 Additionally, Childers demonstrated that the DNVP also suffered white collar 
defections to the DVP.229 These splits indicate that the DNVP itself was fracturing between the 
nationalist liberalism of the DVP and the radical right wing nationalism eventually embodied 
within the Nazi Party before the Nazis became a true factor. 
The DNVP could not withstand the pressures of representing the right wing, failing to 
ensure even the unity of its own electorate. Despite similarities in ideology and electoral 
opportunity, the DNVP would eventually suffer in part because of its differences from the Nazi 
Party. The DNVP called for the implementation of a constitutional monarchy that would 
cooperate with a parliament elected by popular representation, a sharp departure from the Nazis 
advocating an abolition of any popular representation which they claimed was inherently corrupt 
and inefficient.230 Additionally, the DNVP called for equal political representation, participation 
for women, and religious toleration, aspects the Nazis would ardently oppose particularly as their 
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ideology resided in masculinity and anti-Semitism.231 A reading of both the platform the Nazi 
Party was founded upon and the DNVP platform will demonstrate that the Nazis were much 
more aggressive in their demands than the DNVP. The DNVP advocated a “revision” of the 
Treaty of Versailles, whereas the Nazis wanted the despised treaty canceled in its entirety.232 
Thus, the Nazis and the DNVP did have sharp differences that provide an opening for justifying 
why the DNVP did not seize Germany, but these differences do not fully explain the decline of 
the DNVP that allowed the Nazis the room to rise to prominence. 
The DNVP was the second most powerful party in the Reichstag through most of the 
1920s and therefore was only slightly less culpable in the course of the calamitous Weimar 
Republic than the SPD. The DNVP could claim the SPD was responsible for many failures, but 
nonetheless the stench of failure and the taint of the Republic attached itself to every member 
and action of the DNVP. Thus, as the Republic declined further, proving less and less able to 
support the people, the DNVP became less and less appealing to the voting public. Meanwhile 
the Nazi Party stood in contradistinction to all political parties of the Weimar Republic with its 
rhetoric of activism and struggle. The Nazi Party significantly differed from the rest of the 
political spectrum because it was free of the failures of the Republic. The Nazis had never had 
any prominent role in the Reichstag but more importantly had taken early action against the 
Weimar Republic. As times got worse, the Nazis’ Putsch attempt seemed more justified, making 
the Nazis more attractive as a political party. 
Returning to the overall argument of this chapter, it has been argued that the difficulties 
of the Weimar Republic opened the door for a nationalist party to rise to prominence. The 
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German People's Party could not maintain unity amongst its ranks nor field a message that had 
mass appeal to the growing electorate. The German National People's Party also failed to 
maintain unity amongst its own electorate nor could the organization unify right wing 
nationalism.233 Both the DVP and DNVP expressed little activist struggle going as far as 
supporting various tenets of Social Democracy even as the situation across the republic worsened. 
Only a party capable of touting an ideology appealing to the masses would succeed in unifying 
the mass of disaffected voters across Germany. Unfortunately for Germany, that party would rise 
from the ashes of the Beer Hall Putsch and eventually take the German electorate by storm. 
 
Ideology and the Path of Legality 
 
The Weimar Republic provided an opportunity for a party unassociated with the 
Republic’s failures to seize the moment and rise to prominence. Previously powerful nationalist 
ideologies of the DVP and DNVP failed to elicit mass-support from the citizenry leaving room 
for a new ideology to establish itself. However, in 1924, the Nazis were hardly the organization 
capable of winning over anywhere near the thirty-seven percent of the German electorate they 
would in 1932.234 The Nazi movement had just attempted the fateful Beer Hall Putsch that led to 
the death of many members, wounded others, landed its leader in jail, and most importantly 
forced the Republic to outlaw the movement.235 The Nazis seemed to be all but discounted from 
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the political sphere after losing their revolutionary gamble. The remarkable turnaround 
experienced after 1925 therefore raises many questions, some beyond the scope of this work. In 
order to assert that the Nazis were not only actively responsible for their own successes, but that 
ideology had a tremendous impact on those successes, the activities of Hitler and the Nazi 
remnant following Hitler's release is critical as shortly thereafter the Nazis changed themselves 
from a rabidly anti-Republican movement into the beginnings of a sophisticated political party. 
Most know that Hitler put together his political testament Mein Kampf while he was 
imprisoned in Landsberg. Mein Kampf is fascinating for ideological study after 1933 in that it 
helps clarify many of the actions the Nazis would eventually take once they seized power, 
including the foundations to Hitler’s eventual decisions to start World War II. However, Mein 
Kampf should not be regarded as a warning that everyone missed foretelling impending atrocities. 
People knew about Mein Kampf, but, to put it bluntly, nobody was going to lend much credence 
to a poorly written book penned by the jailed revolutionary of an outlawed party. Nonetheless, 
Hitler’s stay in prison afforded him the time for a great deal of reflection and summarily he came 
to a conclusion that would prove fateful for the future of Germany. 
During the process of putting together Mein Kampf Hitler received a friend and loyal 
supporter Kurt Ludecke for a visit. According to Ludecke, Hitler was beside himself with 
optimism about his release claiming he would be out in months and as opposed to years and 
subsequently the party would be re-organized shortly thereafter.236 Of particular importance to 
this work however, is a statement Hitler made in prison describing a critical change in Nazi 
direction. Per Hitler, “Instead of working to achieve power by armed conspiracy, we shall have to 
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hold our noses and enter the Reichstag.”237 Hitler went on to argue that “if outvoting them takes 
longer than outshooting them, at least the results will be guaranteed by their own 
Constitution!”238 Hitler was laying out his famous path of legality in which the Nazis would 
become a legitimate political party, attempt to seize control of the government via the confines of 
the electoral system, and then change the government into something much more fitting Nazi 
ideology. As proof of this plan's durability, the Führer would later give testimony at a 1930 trial 
of three army lieutenants who supposedly worked with the Nazi Party. Per Hitler, “The National 
Socialist movement will try to achieve its aim with constitutional means in the state...we shall try 
to gain decisive majorities in the legislative bodies so that the moment we succeed we can give 
the state the form that correspond to our ideas.”239 Thus, in 1925 Hitler laid out a political plan 
that would endure as a core Nazi strategy through 1930 and into the Third Reich. 
The significance of the path of legality cannot be stressed enough because it represents 
not only a change in political strategy but is often viewed as a fundamental change in Nazi 
ideological identity. Since their beginnings, the Nazis had preached overthrowing the Weimar 
Republic but more importantly had refused to participate in the mechanics of the Weimar 
Republic. By presenting themselves as a movement above the petty politics of the time, the 
Nazis could garner vague pockets of support and maintain somewhat popular appeal. The 6.8 
percent support in the May 1924 election demonstrated that the idea of a Nazi Movement had a 
certain appeal but ultimately would fail to attain any meaningful political presence as seen in 
their four percent drop just six months later.240 
When faced with decline in the attractiveness and viability of their political strategy, the 
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Nazis fundamentally altered the frameworks of their organization and prepared themselves to 
take advantage of the opportunity presented by the Weimar Republic. The path of legality 
certainly stands as a radical change considering violent removal of the Republic was discarded. 
Such a dramatic change simultaneously casts doubt on the sincerity of the activism and struggle 
foundations of Nazi ideology. Despite the changes, masculine activism was continued and in 
many ways intensified as political violence still allowed the Nazis to maintain their identity as 
the heirs to the Volunteers of the 1914. Such a scale back of the violent means to their goals may 
seem like a cop out, but the basic function of Nazi violence did not change. The SA of the Nazi 
Movement acted often independently of the organization and the SA would continue to do so 
while on the path of legality. Regardless of what part of the 1920s one picks, the SA can be 
witnessed spreading Nazi ideology to the public with fists directed towards the enemies of 
Germany. Thus, the path of legality did not put a significant dent into the activism and struggle 
aspect of Nazi ideology. 
With the path of legality as the new directive, Hitler upon his release attempted to unify 
the former members of the Nazi movement under his flag. This task was easier said than done as 
various members split themselves into numerous organizations. The unifying rhetoric of the 
national community Hitler used to unify the Nazis would be exemplary of the future political 
campaigning to be undertaken by the party and as such requires a momentary analysis. Hitler 
claimed it his task as leader of the Party “to direct the various temperaments, talents and qualities 
of character in the movement into those channels...[so that] they benefit everybody.”241 Hitler 
thus used the same Burgfrieden beliefs in unity, in spite of differences, to bring the various 
factions back under his leadership. Additionally, Hitler chose not to bury the failure of the Beer 
                                                 
241Adolf Hitler, “On the Revival of Our Movement, 26 February 1925,” in Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, ed. 
Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), 69. 
 89 
 
Hall Putsch but rather embraced it as an event fundamental to the future of Germany and an 
event that should unify the divided factions of the Nazi movement into a miniature National 
Community, the Nazi Party. Per Hitler, “we do not only want to remember again those who in 
November 1923 became blood witnesses of our political beliefs and aims; we also want to thank 
all those who in this past year did not despair of the movement and what it stands for but labored 
in its service regardless of whatever camp they felt drawn to.”242 In the same fashion that the 
Nazi Movement called back to World War I as a glorious moment of unity, power, and sacrifice 
Hitler would ensure the Beer Hall Putsch was put on an equivalent platform, a tool that would 
not only be helpful in the impending campaigns but maintain an ideological continuity between 
the Movement and the Party. 
Perhaps most important to unifying fractured fragments of the movement into the Nazi 
Party, and most exemplary of the Nazis eventual campaign strategy was Hitler’s staunch 
assertion that although the Nazis would enter the ailing Republic, their ultimate goal of toppling 
said institution would not be abandoned. According to Hitler once the party was again unified, “it 
must be turned against that power to which above all we owe the collapse of our fatherland and 
the destruction of our people,” the Weimar Republic.243 Further, “this does not mean an alteration 
in or a ‘postponement’ of the old and main aim of our struggle, but simply its reassertion.”244 The 
Nazis would therefore enter the Reichstag elections but would not abandon their initial goals the 
success of which would be measured, as they had been in the days of the Movement, by “the 
extent to which Marxism is destroyed and by the degree of enlightenment about its originator, 
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the Jews.”245 
Thus, after February 1925 the Nazis were entering new territory. They would abandon 
their previous status above the petty politics and risk tainting their ideology with democratic 
participation. However, despite a fundamental change in their method of attack, the Nazis would 
not change their ideology. They would still preach destruction of the Republic and struggle 
against the alleged Jewish Marxist influences that had brought about the devastating Treaty of 
Versailles. The only thing that changed was the arena in which the Nazis chose to make their 
fight for their vision of Germany's future. If anything, as opposed to representing a break from 
their ideology, the new path offered the Nazis an opportunity to reconcile their actions with a 
fundamental aspect of their ideology, the Volksgemeinschaft. By seeking a more diffuse popular 
support base, the Nazis would strengthen the validity of an all-encompassing German national 
community. Thus, contrary to popular belief, the Nazi change to the path of legality, although 
opportunistic in nature, still existed as an action rooted in and motivated by Nazi ideology. 
 
The NSDAP, the KPD, and Working Class Voters 
 
As asserted, the Nazis would enter politics with a relatively unchanged political ideology. 
This ideology, as the name National Socialist German Workers’ Party would indicate, centered 
largely on the workers of Germany. Therefore, all initial efforts of the Nazi Party to enter the 
electoral arena focused on gaining this voter population, which provided the Nazis with various 
advantages but also an equal amount of obstacles. The worker populations of Germany were 
rather disappointed by the Weimar Republic's economic instability and massive unemployment 
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rates. With high unemployment workers and their unions had relatively little leverage in 
negotiations and could be taken advantage of with little protest. Thus, any organization that 
could provide a way for workers to escape this situation would receive considerable support 
when it came time to vote for Reichstag seats. The Nazi rhetoric of unification in a struggle to 
topple the Weimar Republic appealed to certain pockets of workers, but, pardoning the labor pun, 
the working electorate was not a closed shop. The Communist KPD preached a message of 
downfall for the capitalist Weimar that was allegedly oppressing the workers. Therefore, the 
successes and failures of this first political battle, the Nazi Party versus the KPD over worker 
populations, in particular the ways the Nazis tried to steal workers from the Communist fold, 
must be analyzed as a valuable step towards the Nazis eventual electoral and ideological 
successes. 
The Nazi Movement always expressed considerable anti-Marxist rhetoric, claiming that 
Marxism existed at the center of the Jewish International Conspiracy.246 Of considerable success 
to the Nazis was an older political tool that blended anti-Semitism with the assertion that the 
KPD’s message of overthrow of the capitalist system would duplicate on German soil the terrors 
occurring in Communist Russia on German soil. In 1919, prominent Nazi Alfred Rosenberg, who 
Hitler had tried to leave in power during his imprisonment, claimed “Lenin is the only non-Jew 
among the people’s commissars; he is, so to speak, the Russian storefront of a Jewish 
business.”247 Thus, by Nazi insinuations, the German KPD would be the storefront of a 
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Communist upheaval that would bring chaos into Germany. Vague anti-Marxist rhetoric stirred 
the anger of a crowd, but in order to turn such anti-Marxism into votes, Nazi efforts would have 
to take stronger, more tangible forms. 
Many of Hitler’s speeches featured fear tactics meant to dissuade potential KPD voters. 
In 1922, Hitler asserted “so now Germany is reaching that stage which Russia has.”248 Even 
earlier, Hitler asserted that “while now in Soviet Russia millions are ruined and dying....the 400 
Soviet commissars of Jewish nationality do not suffer.”249 Hitler went on to criticize those who 
believed that the Communist revolution would eventually end after the realization of an 
enlightened world. Hitler claimed that the Communists “do not wish the end of the revolution, 
for they do not need it. For them the Revolution is milk and honey.”250 The KPD campaigns 
seemed to back this point as their own election strategy preached a downfall that would 
necessitate violent insurrection. One 1919 KPD poster depicted a stalwart Communist fighting a 
three headed hydra whose heads represented New Militarism, Capitalism, and Junkers, the 
perceived pillars of Imperial and the burgeoning Weimar Germany.251 A 1924 poster depicted 
another stalwart Communist holding a torch above his head with the message “The flame of 
revolution must not be extinguished.”252 The call for revolutionary tumult remained in 1932 
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when one poster, featuring a gigantic, threatening worker towering over a  round table featuring 
capitalists, soldiers, and Hitler, exclaimed “Conclude with this system” threatening the end of the 
Weimar Republic.253The Nazis would make every effort to assert that the KPD was a crazed 
organization bent on seeing the suffering and destruction of everything the German people held 
dear. Thus, the Nazis built a foundation of fear to use against the KPD as they attempted to gain 
votes from workers. 
Instigating fear alone does not easily convert itself into electoral support. Rather, if a 
political organization is going to rely on scare tactics to elicit votes that same organization must 
demonstrate beyond reasonable doubts that they will provide the security necessary to counter 
the fears they have made known. Thus, the burden fell to the Nazis to demonstrate that they 
would save Germany from the Communist collapse. Hitler had gone on record in his trial for the 
Beer Hall Putsch as being an enemy of Communism claiming forcefully that he was determined 
to become “the destroyer of Marxism.”254 However, words are one thing, actions an entirely 
different matter. The Nazis, who had already demonstrated through the Putsch that they would 
resort to violent overthrow if necessary, chose to carry on this tradition and incorporate political 
violence into their electoral strategy.255 The Nazis would continue their politically violent tactics 
from their pre-Putsch days and demonstrate through action that they were truly capable of 
                                                 
253Translated from “Schluss mit diesem System.” Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, Schluss Mit Diesem System, 
1932, Women in European History, accessed November 11, 2011, 
http://womenineuropeanhistory.org/index.php?title=File:KPD.jpg. 
254Albrecht Tyrell, “Führer Befiehl,” in Nazism: 1919-1945 A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, ed. 
Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle (New York: Schocken Books, 1983), 34. 
255Criticism has been leveled on the claim that political violence existed as a pivotal electoral strategy that the Nazis 
used to very successful results. At this time it is necessary to state that this work does not endorse political 
violence as a tool for conventional political times. Rather, this work simply acknowledges that Nazi violence 
demonstrated to the voters an activism that other parties could not duplicate, thus giving the Nazi electoral 
strategy a distinct advantage. A pragmatic analysis of violence's impact on electoral campaigns is not a unique 
methodology taken by this work. Thomas Childers and Eugene Weiss have also taken pragmatic looks at Nazi 
political violence. Childers and Weiss, “Voters and Violence: Political Violence and the Limits of National 
Socialist Mass Mobilization.” 
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providing protection against the Communist threat. 
Political violence took many forms that have been discussed in numerous historical 
works and as such the reader will be spared the numerous graphic tales of the violence meted 
towards numerous Communists.256 For the purposes of this work, it is more important to study 
how this violence was portrayed and conveyed to the voting public. In February 1927, 
Communists attempted to disrupt a speech by Joseph Goebbels and violence broke out. 
Unfortunately for the KPD, “the Communists were gradually pushed under the gallery which 
[Nazis] had taken care to occupy.”257 The whole event was portrayed the next day as a Nazi trap 
set to defeat “Marxist Terrorism.”258 Thus, the Nazis spun a spontaneous brawl into a 
premeditated strike not against political rivals, but terrorists, further equating Communism with 
insurrection. Additionally, even those against the Nazi Party acknowledged the compelling 
activism behind the political violence the Nazis used. Emil Julius Gumbel, a seldom referenced 
anti-Nazi from the Weimar era wrote two substantial works on a specific aspect of Nazi political 
violence, assassination. Gumbel argued that the left’s penchant for and foundations in workers’ 
unions enforced the belief that “mass action is the sole effective means of struggle,” but the right 
“adheres to the heroic conception of history, according to which the hero ‘makes’ history.”259 As 
such, even despicable assassinations helped in their own way to convince the voters that the Nazi 
Party was committed to protecting the German people from suffering the atrocities occurring in 
Soviet Russia.260 
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Although fear, one of the most ancient political tools, and activism through violence 
certainly had their uses in Weimar Germany, the Nazis used anti-Marxist rhetoric outside of fear 
and violence that they hoped would help them gain necessary electoral support from the KPD 
electoral base. A particularly intriguing argument that left wing Nazis posed to KPD supporters 
was that the KPD was an extension of the overall Communist International and by extension had 
very little interest in German causes. In 1925, Joseph Goebbels exemplified this tactic in a letter 
directed to Bolsheviks following a debate the previous day. In the letter, Goebbels told 
Communist supporters that they and the Nazis were not all that different. Their main difference, 
Goebbels maintained, was that Nazism embodied a truer form of German Socialism than what 
Communism offered.261 Goebbels's most powerful statement to this effect, that “Lenin sacrificed 
Marx and instead gave Russia freedom. You want to sacrifice German freedom for Marx,” 
effectively struck at the heart of Nazism versus Communism.262 Thus, Goebbels contended that 
the KPD supporters wanted to eliminate the Volksgemeinschaft and the personal freedom of its 
utopian unity in favor of accord with the terrifying Soviet Union. Therefore, the German people 
would be lost in the shuffle of a greater Communist ideology, but if workers wanted to be loyal 
to German causes they should join the Volksgemeinschaft and unify under the Nazi Party that 
had their interests at heart. 
Nazi effort to win the working class vote is a highly contested topic within the 
historiography. Present work in the field seeks to undo two egregious errors in work postulated 
over the years by Marxist historians. The first error contends that leftist leaning Nazis, such as 
                                                                                                                                                             
1918-1922. That disparity alone would demonstrate the degree to which the Nazis would go to see their vision 
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Gregor and Otto Strasser, were kicked out of the party when Hitler broke with them in 1926. 
Otto definitely broke with Hitler early, but Gregor remained in prominence until the end of 1932.  
However, a great deal of literature exists to prove that the Strassers and other left-leaning Nazis 
still featured in Nazi campaign efforts and publications up to the seizure of power. Richard 
Hamilton agrees that leftist Nazis still existed in some capacities but cautions that what they 
brought to the table was negligible. Per Hamilton, few “convinced Marxists” were convinced by 
this rhetoric and those workers who did join the Nazi Party “were not likely to have done so 
because of leftist themes.”263 However, in making such a claim Hamilton seems to ignore Joseph 
Goebbels, one of the most noteworthy left-leaning Nazi Party members, and his importance to 
Nazi electoral efforts. The standard interpretation of Goebbels and his leftist origins claims that 
his 1926 promotion from Gregor Strasser's private secretary to Gauleiter of Berlin represented 
his break from the leftist camp.264 However, arguing that Goebbels's completely broke with the 
left is difficult to assert when arguments like the previously mentioned “National Socialism or 
Bolshevism” demonstrate his desire to reconcile the Nazi Party with the workers.265  Thus, 
Marxist historians are wrong in their claims that leftist Nazis had no say or role in the Party as 
not only did Gregor Strasser and other left-leaning Nazis maintain a role in the Party throughout 
the electoral period, but Joseph Goebbels, himself a leftist, attained one of the Third Reich's 
highest positions.   
The second error committed by Marxist historians fostered the Mittelstand thesis by 
postulating that workers never tainted themselves by supporting the Nazis.  Historian Peter 
Stachura is particularly effusive in his criticism of this point contending that “the image of a 
powerful, self-conscious and ideologically committed German working class valiantly resisting 
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the Third Reich...has no basis in reality. It is an unadulterated myth.”266 Historians have 
demonstrated that even though workers did not universally support the Nazis there were pockets 
of support amongst that population. Jürgen Falter contends that while unemployed workers 
supported the KPD, areas with small employment numbers typically supported the Nazi Party.267 
This claim is particularly telling about the reception of Nazi arguments of the Volksgemeinschaft 
versus the Soviet Union. The unemployed resented Nazi arguments for protection of property, 
but those who held property feared losing their property to the collectivist terror in place in 
Russia. Gary King and his associates would certainly agree with this contention as they argue 
that those beyond the workers, Nazi ideology had an inherent appeal to those with means who 
were afraid to lose their hard fought property.268 Falter also critically argues that working class 
households by 1932 made up nearly forty percent of the Nazi electorate, a number that was tiny 
compared to the total population of workers, but significant to the Nazis.269 Richard Hamilton 
also acknowledges Nazi support from a conservative worker base he compares to English Tory 
workers citing their disillusion with the leftist worker parties, the SPD and KPD.270 Beyond the 
disaffected, Mühlberger argues that “the Nazis were successful in attracting a section of the large 
number of workers not politically engaged elsewhere.”271 Thus, from all appearances Nazi 
support from the working class was a diffuse but not universal grouping of disaffected workers. 
During February 1927 a political debate between the KPD and Nazi Party ended in 
violence which a later Nazi report indicated “visibly [demonstrated] that National Socialism is 
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determined to reach the workers.”272 From the reformation of the party in February 1925 to two 
years later the Nazis fought an electoral battle with the single goal of winning the working-class 
electorate. However, the gains experienced by 1932 were far from a reality in 1928. In the May 
1928 election, the Nazis lost two seats while the KPD gained nine.273 The results were fairly 
discouraging as many Nazis had hoped to rob the KPD of their electorate and take the world by 
surprise, but those in control of the reins had tempered their expectations long before election 
day. Sensing that the Nazis would experience an electoral embarrassment the Party leaders, led 
by Adolf Hitler, would make another change to their plan of attack that this time would lead to 
significant electoral gains.   
 
Nazi Recognition of German Disaffection  
 
 In December 1927 the Nazis would make perhaps their most important political decision 
without which this work would likely never have been written. In a conference of party leaders 
Hitler asserted that the Nazis “shall not yet succeed in winning much ground from the Marxists 
in the coming elections.”274 Accepting that the Nazis had reached as much ground amongst 
workers as they were going to at the moment, the conference agreed that the Nazis would need 
support from both small businessmen and white collar workers.275 Thus, the Nazi Party decided 
to diversify its efforts and expand the Nazi electoral base.276 The Nazis yet again recognized a 
fundamental flaw in their strategy and adapted in a pivotal and, as to be seen, effective manner. 
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The decision to expand their electoral base, abandoning their position as a solely worker political 
organization put the Nazis on the path to power. 
 From 1928 until Hitler's appointment to the Chancellery the Nazis would conduct an all 
or nothing campaign in which they made numerous promises to various social groups in order to 
gain electoral support. Many of these promises were absolutely hollow if not outright false. 
Empty promises are typical of every political campaign in history and it is impossible to tie 
ideology to every promise. However, ideology ran central to the electoral campaign in a very 
subtle but sophisticated and compelling fashion. Already demonstrated earlier in this chapter, a 
strong disaffection vote existed in Germany that the Nazis recognized as valuable to their cause. 
However, based on previous elections the Nazi message was of a limited appeal. Every political 
party made promises to fix the ills of Germany and disillusion with such parties was becoming 
evident. Thus, utopian, opportunistic promises would not have carried a cynical electorate. 
Professor William Brustein has made the argument that Nazi votes were not merely negative 
protest votes, but positive votes made after weighing the pros of the Nazi Party against the cons 
of previous voter affiliations.277 In the scope of this discussion, this work agrees with Brustein's 
argument in that it asserts that the mass-protest vote did not by default fall to the Nazi Party, but 
the ways in which the Nazis actively demonstrated themselves as an outlet for protest propelled 
them to power. This work departs from Brustein in that he claimed economic factors led to voter 
endorsement. Nazi stances on the economy were often contradictory depending on where and 
who in the Party was providing information. This work contends that Nazi ideology, as opposed 
to economic stances, would prove compelling and establish a depth to Nazi support that no other 
party was able to maintain. The best way to demonstrate Nazi ideology's compelling influence on 
the Nazis' electoral actions and the voting public is to take a look at specific Nazi efforts to win 
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over specific electoral groups. 
 Small-business owners for a long time belonged to the SPD, but the Nazis took extensive 
efforts to secure their loyalties. In April 1932, the Nazis published a pamphlet directed at middle 
class small business owners criticizing the department store Woolworth’s as a foreign entity sent 
to destroy the small business owner.278 Department stores were becoming more prevalent 
through the Weimar Republic and, although they helped create jobs and the semblance of 
marketplace stability, these one stop shops were putting many small business owners out of 
business. The Nazis recognized this problem and, in line with their general disdain for individual 
materialism fostered by the stores, accused the department stores of being tools of the Marxist 
International Conspiracy.279 Although blatantly false, the Nazi attack not only took action against 
a direct concern of small business but also changed the issue into a nationalist one, thereby tying 
the plight of the small business owner with the Nazi Party cause. Before 1930, only 26,563 of 
Germany’s self-employed were members of the Nazi Party.280 However between 1930 and 
January 1933 the Nazi Party had 124,579 self-employed members, a significant increase and 
conversely a substantial loss for the SPD.281 By commiserating with this electoral population and 
presenting themselves as an entity capable of stopping the decline of the small-business, the 
Nazis received a satisfying membership bump from this previous SPD voter population. 
White collar workers and big business were also electoral populations the Nazis wanted 
to infiltrate in order to increase their support base. One such attempt featured Hitler address the 
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Industry Club, a collection of white collar workers and business owners, in January 1932. In this 
speech, Hitler lashed out against welfare and internationalism, issues which were of considerable 
importance to big business.282 In particular Hitler argued that despite the considerable industrial 
productivity and demand for industrial goods, “if bolshevism as a world idea tears the Asiatic 
continent out of the human economic community, then the condition for the employment of these 
industries” would be unable to sustain itself.283 Thus, Hitler conveyed to this audience, and many 
like it, that if the SPD and KPD had their way, many white collar jobs would be lost and profits 
would take sharp dives.284 Per Hitler, “there can be no economic life unless behind this economic 
life there stands the determined political will of the nation absolutely ready to strike and to strike 
hard.”285 As far as the Nazis were concerned, the Weimar Republic had already proven its 
inability to strike, and the sooner people realized that, the sooner they could cast their vote for 
the Nazi Party. Therefore, supporting the Nazi Party, who demonstrated their willingness to 
combat leftist menaces in the streets, would topple the Republic and secure a stable economic 
future for Germany. Before 1930 31,067 white-collar workers were members of the Nazi Party, 
but between then and 1933 they numbered 147,855.286 Despite the contradicting needs of the 
small-business owner and Big business, percentages of both populations found Nazi arguments 
of struggle and change compatible to their general disdain for the other political parties. 
Once the Nazis made inroads into these organizations, they began to look for other 
avenues of support and one group presented itself, the rural populations. The Nazi Party craved 
the rural electorate in particular because of its support of the similarly minded DNVP. One Nazi 
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directive of 1932 laid out the procedure by which party members needed to elicit support from 
rural populations. Party representatives needed to know the answers to any local questions that 
might be asked, personally send out invitations to Nazi functions to each and every farmer, and 
gain collections at said functions.287 The Nazis intended to duplicate this process all across rural 
regions, culminating in a “big German Evening…the primary task [of which would be] making 
the audience enthusiastic for our cause.”288 The Nazis also went on the attack against rival 
political parties that held pockets of support in the rural lands. The Nazis released a leaflet 
entitled German Farmer You Belong to Hitler! Why? in which the Nazis demonstrated the ways 
by which the state capitalism of the SPD and the Marxism of the KPD would bring about the end 
of the farmer’s success.289 Once again, the Nazis presented themselves as a unified front capable 
of not only honoring the local interests of various rural areas, but strong enough to prevent leftist 
sabotage of those interests. Nazi Party membership increased considerably within this group as 
well. Before 1930, peasants numbered 17,181, but by January 1933 there were 89,800 peasants 
in the Nazi Party.290 By extolling their message through the lens of various social groups' 
problems and desires, the Nazis secured the large disaffection vote and thus called on a 
significantly diverse electorate by the time the 1932 elections rolled around. 
One of the aspects of Nazi ideology that has not been discussed in-depth in this work 
centers on Nazi ideology's firm belief in a Jewish conspiracy undermining the frameworks of 
German society. This complicated aspect takes full works to summarize and understand in depth. 
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For the purposes of tying Nazi ideology to Nazi action though, the Nazi Party's views on solving 
the “Jewish Problem” help explain in part why Nazi ideology as a whole was so captivating to 
the disaffected citizens of Germany. In line with the solution to many problems, the Nazi solution 
to the “Jewish Problem” during the 1920s and 1930s involved ensuring that the German people 
admitted that they had a Jewish problem.291 Hitler argued that the major reason that races 
suffered under the manipulations of the Jews was that people refused to acknowledge that the 
Jews actively manipulated multiple facets of society.292 According to Hitler, “only a knowledge 
of the Jews provides the key with which to comprehend the inner, and consequently real, aims of 
Social Democracy.”293 Before proceeding it is important to stress that the anti-Semitism of Nazi 
ideology did not drive people into mass-support of the party, but rather Nazi recognition of the 
numerous problems of Social Democracy, although through a flawed lens, captivated Nazi voters, 
who then tended to become more anti-Semitic. 
The DVP and DNVP acknowledged certain problems with the Weimar Republic, but left 
many of its institutions untouched if not stronger. The Nazis entered the political arena prepared 
to demonstrate that almost every population in Germany suffered in some way under the 
Republic. Although many of these accusations carried duplicitous promises and anti-Semitic 
rhetoric, what appealed to the masses was the simple fact that the Nazis acknowledged the 
totality of the Weimar Republic's failure. Furthermore, the Nazis backed this recognition with 
aggressive pushes to see the institution replaced with something brand new. Thus, Nazi 
ideology's desire for recognition and removal of Germany's problems informed the party's 
electoral efforts in that those efforts universally worked to make the ills of the Weimar Republic 
universally known.    
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Closing Thoughts 
 
 In the quest to marry Nazi ideology to action, this chapter has explored the ways that 
ideology impacted and directed two critical Nazi actions. The first such action, the switch to the 
path of legality, has often been seen as a compromising of Nazi ideology for the sake of attaining 
political power. However, numerous continuities existed between the Nazi Movement and the 
Nazi Party, such as the image of the Nazis as heirs to the 1914 volunteers and the methods of 
street violence, that dispel the idea of a split from ideology. If anything, the legality tactic 
matched Nazi ideology more firmly by allowing the Nazis to expand the membership of the 
Volksgemeinschaft thus unifying Germans in opposition to the Weimar Republic. Independent of 
these continuities, the primary goal of the Nazi movement involved toppling the Weimar 
Republic, a goal maintained in the legality tactic. The critical difference would be destroying the 
institution from within as opposed to previously failed attempts at external action. Therefore, 
Nazi ideology did not change with the implementation of legality but in actuality informed that 
pivotal change.   
The second action, gaining disparate support from the electorate, is much more difficult 
to marry to ideology, but once argued fundamentally proves Nazi ideology's significant impact 
on the Nazi rise. The Weimar Republic alienated numerous select populations of Germany from 
the status quo of left-wing politics. This burgeoning protest vote lent its support to various 
nationalist parties, most notably the DNVP and the DVP, and elected World War I hero Paul von 
Hindenburg to the Presidency. Hindenburg, as a symbol of the past disrespected by Social 
Democracy, managed to maintain popular support despite the ups and downs of the Republic 
until his death. However, the nationalist parties lost support as time went passed. The DVP’s and 
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DNVP's failures to eliminate the woes of Social Democracy on top of their cooperation with 
those institutions led to a fracturing of support at the end of the 1920s which would be 
compounded by the influx of equally disaffected youth voters. These circumstances led to the 
formation of a mass-protest voting bloc that would look for outlets to express their frustration. 
Despite all appearances this protest block did not flock entirely to the Nazi Party. 
Childers points out that SPD defection to the Nazi Party was limited which King and associates 
second claiming that “the July 1932 election witnessed a swing to the Far Left.”294 While a swing 
of SPD supporters to the KPD existed, the results of such a defection was not on a massive scale, 
but nonetheless demonstrate that the disaffection vote did not deterministically swing towards 
the Nazi Party.295 However, those adherents who did choose the Nazi Party did so for various 
reasons, but all boiled down to one core concept of Nazi ideology. The Nazis, like other parties, 
offered solutions to the woes of the citizenry, but what stood the Nazis apart from other parties 
was the completeness with which they assaulted the problems of the Weimar Republic. Although 
promises were sometimes duplicitous, these promises demonstrated Nazi recognition of how 
woefully inadequate the Republic addressed various pockets of the German population. For these 
voters, hearing such an encompassing criticism meant a great deal.     
Stephen Fritz sums up the above voter interpretation of Nazi ideology rather completely. 
Per Fritz, “Nazism, then, was a curious mixture of fear, anxiety, and idealism- with a sense of 
creating a new Germany, but in order to rectify past injustices or prevent something worse.”296 
The voters looked to the Nazis who not only recognized their problems, but offered the simplest 
                                                 
294Childers, “The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote,” 26; King et al., “Ordinary Economic Voting Behavior 
in the Extraordinary Election of Adolf Hitler,” 982. 
295Per King, the KPD increased by five percentage points, most of which came from blue-collar workers and the 
unemployed. King et al., “Ordinary Economic Voting Behavior in the Extraordinary Election of Adolf Hitler,” 
982. 
296Stephen Fritz, “The NSDAP as a Volkspartei? A Look at the Social Basis of the Nazi Voter,” The History Teacher 
20, no. 3 (May 1987): 379–399. 
 106 
 
solution to their problems, one that no other politicians could convincingly call for, the 
destruction of the Weimar Republic. The destruction of the Weimar Republic would not only fix 
the wrongs of Social Democracy but prevent the KPD from turning Germany into a second 
Soviet Union. The Nazi Movement had already demonstrated their willingness to act against the 
Republic and the Party's continued street fighting against Communists further proved that the 
Nazis could back their belief system with action. Simultaneously, the Nazis, as inheritors of the 
volunteers of 1914 would in similar fashion to the presidency of Hindenburg offer a valuable 
connection to the prized German past even as something brand new would be implemented. All 
of these ideological aspects were captivating on top of Nazi advocacy of the reestablishment of 
the Burgfrieden in the form of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. It is little wonder then why so many 
disaffected voters would turn in support for the Nazi Party. Therefore, despite the duplicity and 
opportunism present in the political actions of the Nazi Party during the Weimar Republic, these 
actions were rooted in and forwarded by entrenched aspects of Nazi ideology that found an 
enthralled audience in various pockets of disaffected German citizens. 
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CHAPTER 4 
VOLKSGEMEINSCHAFT: 1933 TO 1938 
 
 On March 21, 1933, German writer Erich Ebermayer recorded his thoughts on that day’s 
Spring Military Ceremony in Potsdam. Ebermayer effusively relayed his excitement as the 
ceremony featured President Hindenburg, the imperial world, and Hitler, herald of the “newly 
ascendant world” coming together to celebrate a renewal of the German spirit.297 Although the 
ceremony was directly meant to convey the power of the newly formed Reich government, a 
strong symbolic element ran through the entire event. In the same fashion that spring would 
bring Germany out of a cold winter and renew dynamic and beautiful elements of nature long 
dormant, so too would the Nazis bring the German people out of the frigid social democratic 
world that quelled the nationalism of Imperial Germany. 
In his speech at the Potsdam Ceremony, Hitler echoed these sentiments of renewal. 
According to Ebermayer, Hitler’s declarations stood out in their “striking moderation.”298  Hitler 
did not allude to any racial or ideological enemies within or outside of Germany.299 Rather, Hitler 
gave the people what they wanted discussing “preservation of the great tradition of our nation, 
stability of the government instead of constant vacillation, taking into consideration all the 
experiences in the life of the individual and the community.”300 The ceremony was emotional, 
bringing many people to tears, as the German people came to the realization that they were being 
ushered into a new era of German history that also respected Germany's past.301 Ebermayer was 
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so taken aback by the ceremony that he retreated to the woods for some time alone with his 
thoughts, but not everyone was as deeply affected. The writer described a young man, twenty-
one years old, who, unmoved by the ceremony, thought it was “all merely a rigged act” ending 
his comments by warning Ebermayer rather forebodingly, “You’ll see what will happen.”302 
Although dismayed by the comments, Ebermayer took a stance in support of the Third Reich that 
many Germans at the onset of Nazi power shared.303 Germans stood on a precipice, their back to 
the ailing Weimar Republic looking forward onto a vast valley of promise offered by the Third 
Reich. Many German citizens felt the compulsion to step forward and fall into a realm they 
believed would renew the German spirit long dormant, but to the great misery of many that step 
would in all actuality lead somewhere far different than the valley of promise Hitler and the Nazi 
Party offered.   
 Once the Nazis’ seized power and purged the Third Reich of their political rivals, the 
Reich Government turned its attention to the German citizenry.304 During the elections of the 
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1930s, the Nazis led a campaign in which they highlighted the numerous problems of the 
Weimar Republic and advocated that these issues would be solved with the formation of the all-
encompassing national community, known to the Germans as the Volksgemeinschaft. The ideals 
and emotions behind the Volksgemeinschaft certainly correlated with the sentiments of 
unification and camaraderie that coursed through the Spring Potsdam Ceremony. However, the 
two different reactions to the ceremony experienced by Ebermayer and his young friend 
represent to two different views of the Volksgemeinschaft as it was experienced during the 1930s. 
Ebermayer was swept up in the ideological aspects of the Volksgemeinschaft, in which Nazi 
Germany would usher in a resurrection of the Burgfrieden from 1914, under which all Germans 
became united regardless of party and class for the benefit of the German nation. The young man, 
who believed the Nazi ceremony was simply a political stunt, views the Volksgemeinschaft from 
the political-pragmatic viewpoint in which the Nazis simply manipulated the German citizenry 
with ideas of a national community to achieve their own ends. Both of these interpretations 
represent the complicated nature of the Volksgemeinschaft in Nazi Germany that many citizens of 
the time struggled to fully understand, never receiving the full vision in any direct fashion from 
the Nazi government. 
In the same fashion that the citizenry of Germany struggled with the dual nature of the 
Volksgemeinschaft, scholars face equal difficulty coming to a common conclusion on this aspect 
of Nazi ideology from which almost every facet of Third Reich history branches. As the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Volksgemeinschaft along religious lines. The DNVP would similarly divide the Volksgemeinschaft along 
political lines. Therefore, both the Centre and DNVP would have been neutralized in some fashion. Finally, the 
Roehm faction threatened to undo all of Nazism's gains and, as any enemy of the Volksgemeinschaft would be 
treated, felt the wrath of the Third Reich. All of these factions that were eliminated from Germany constituted 
threats to the Nazis' vision of Germany's future and as such would have to have been removed regardless of 
opportunity. Therefore, the purges the Nazis implemented against the Social Democrats, the Communists, the 
Centre Party, rival nationalists, and the Roehm faction should not only be viewed as the opportunistic haphazard 
actions of the sadistic Nazis who would commit the atrocities of the Holocaust, but in keeping with the 
intricacies of Nazism should be also, if not primarily, viewed as the implementation of the long held goals for 
the implementation of the ultimate Nazi ideological goal, the Volksgemeinschaft.  
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Volksgemeinschaft itself was a fragmented concept spread throughout the entirety of the Reich, 
scholarship on this subject is at least equally if not more fragmented in its efforts to ascertain the 
true nature, ideological or political-pragmatic, of the national community. As many scholars of 
the Volksgemeinschaft tend to have a particular, narrow focus on a specific aspect of the national 
community, only an analysis and combination of scholarly work could possibly strive to resolve 
the fragmentation present in this field. This chapter will explore the various arguments scholars 
have made on the ideological foundations and subsequent applications of the Volksgemeinschaft 
in an effort to determine the true nature of the Volksgemeinschaft. 
The previous chapters have sought to marry ideology to Nazi actions, but the connection 
between ideology and action is easier to establish before the Nazis took power. Without having to 
worry about public opinion the Nazi Movement and Party were able to act in unison with their 
ideology without significant hindrance. Once the Nazis formed the Reich government, ideology 
and action became thoroughly mingled to the point where ideology appears to have taken a back 
seat to action. After 1933, ideology features in post-hoc justifications for controversial actions in 
order to keep the citizenry loyal. This work does not dispute the use of ideology to provide lip 
service to the concerns of the German people. While after the fact justifications may be hollow 
throwbacks to ideology, the various actions that necessitated ideological justification themselves 
fit together with significant Nazi ideological goals. Therefore, to assert that Nazi ideology ran 
central to and pushed forward many of the actions of the Third Reich not only must the true 
nature of the Volksgemeinschaft, the central ideological framework for the Reich, be understood, 
but also an overarching understanding that framework's role in the Reich Government efforts to 
establish the Thousand Year Third Reich must be achieved. 
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Citizen Interaction or Pacification? 
 
 The first step towards determining the true nature of the Volksgemeinschaft involves 
solving a chicken and the egg quandary. The Volksgemeinschaft, as experienced in the Third 
Reich, was a blending and balance of both ideological and political-pragmatic aspects. In order 
to define the Volksgemeinschaft, a scholar must determine whether the Volksgemeinschaft 
originated from ideological notions of the national community internalized by the German 
people that subsequently informed the political actions of the Nazi Party, or whether the 
ideological belief system behind the Volksgemeinschaft was updated to match the Nazis’ political 
visions. Historians differ in their assessment of this dilemma, some believing that Nazi policy 
echoed the Volksgemeinschaft while others ardently contend that the Nazis altered the national 
community for their own political ends. If the true nature of the Volksgemeinschaft is to be 
determined, the complex problem of the origins of the national community within Nazi ideology 
and the Third Reich must be addressed.   
The Volksgemeinschaft existed as a national community of people who were inherently 
German and only German. As such, many historians argue that the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft 
originated from already inherent anti-Semitism within the German citizenry that called for a 
racial reordering of Germany. Historian Peter Fritzsche does not stand as the only historian to 
make the fairly obvious argument that the Volksgemeinschaft had a strong racial foundation, but 
Fritzsche is unique in his assessment that the Volksgemeinschaft was never in any form an 
explicitly Nazi idea. The foundation of Fritzsche’s argument contends that the German citizenry 
participated in the national and social reordering of Germany through a willingness to see their 
racially pure version of Volksgemeinschaft implemented. Germans held onto notions of the 
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Volksgemeinschaft from the Burgfrienden of the Spirit of 1914, when, at the onset of World War I, 
the upsurge of German nationalism served to unite Germans “who had long been divided by 
class, region, and religion.”305 The German failures in World War I and the following Weimar 
years would sublimate these notions of unification and divide Germans to an extent entirely 
unknown to most citizens. First, the Treaty of Versailles’s territorial arrangements separated 
many German people territorially from the main German state. Then, the Weimar Republic 
ushered in various economics catastrophes that caused considerable financial disparity and 
outright poverty amongst the citizenry. Worse still Germans were left to fend for themselves in a 
hostile Germany built on entirely alien concepts of social democracy. Thus, Germans looked 
longingly on the days of the Kaiser when Germany was a fortress against the ills of the outside 
world. 
The various impediments to the fortress of the Volksgemeinschaft that Germans citizens 
aspired to eliminate became personified in numerous perceived enemies of the German people. 
Jews featured prominently as the enemies of national community because not only had the 
Jewish people been a typical European scapegoat for centuries, but they received the burden of 
responsibility for allegedly undermining German domestic society, thus forcing the Imperial 
government to agree to a premature peace that led to the ruinous Treaty of Versailles.306 Thus, 
according to Fritzsche, the German people were the originators of the Volksgemeinschaft, not the 
Nazi Movement. By this argument, the Nazis rose to power because they simply “offered a 
comprehensive vision of renewal, which many Germans found appealing.”307 The Nazis 
ultimately appealed to notions that Germans already held ingrained, but the Nazis added to these 
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notions a sense of urgency and fear of German enemies. Therefore, Fritzsche argues that the 
Volksgemeinschaft informed Nazi ideology, a stance which taken to its logical conclusion, 
acknowledges the complicity of the German people for the formation and success of the Nazi 
Party. But, did the political actions of the Third Reich correlate or diverge from the national 
community that the German people conceived? 
 Fritzsche rejects the frequently argued belief that fear-based tacit consent from the 
German people enabled the anti-Jewish purges. Instead, Fritzsche makes a controversial 
argument in which the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft and acts done in its name occurred because the 
Nazis “simply dared to implement preconceived ideas” about the national and social nature of 
Germany.308 In addition, the Nazis would have never been able to accomplish their racial purges 
to the extent that they did without the active help of various German citizens of many different 
walks of life.309 Through the help of various local officials the Nazis were able to expel and, 
when plans changed, exterminate, the Jewish populations of Germany and the rest of Europe. 
Fritzsche furthers his accusations of German citizenry by demonstrating that a great deal of 
opportunism existed for German citizens who chose to manipulate the racial policies of the 
Volksgemeinschaft. Multiple cases exist featuring Germans denouncing Jewish rivals to the 
Gestapo in the hopes of removing an undesirable competitor.310 The Holocaust could not have 
reached such a tragic magnitude without the active participation of the German citizenry. 
Therefore, through his ardent argument that German citizens were not free from blame for 
various atrocities occurring within the Third Reich, Fritzsche contends that the racial activities of 
the Reich Government were in step with the German citizenry’s conceptions of what a national 
community, free of Jewish influence, should become. 
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 Is Fritzsche correct in his assertion that the Volksgemeinschaft was a citizen supported 
national and social reordering of Germany led in a racial direction? Throughout the Third Reich, 
various actions were taken against Jewish people by German citizens including a mass boycott 
against Jewish shops, but often anti-Semitic actions were of a much more inflammatory 
nature.311 One citizen related the events of a mass book burning held in Berlin on 10 May 1933. 
The observer specifies that this book burning was not merely a Nazi Party function because in 
addition to party members, mobs of citizens and students participated throughout the day before 
the master of ceremonies, Joseph Goebbels, arrived.312 Per the observer, upon his arrival 
Goebbels, enthralled by the emotionalism of the moment, stood in front of the crowd and yelled 
“The age of extreme Jewish intellectualism has now ended, and the success of the German 
revolution has again given the right of way to the German spirit.”313 Goebbels used the same 
imagery to justify book burning that Fritzsche uses to prove that the Volksgemeinschaft was 
about the racial renewal of the German citizenry. As such, the Volksgemeinschaft was held 
independently of the Nazi Party and subsequently received a great deal of approval, as evidenced 
in the mass participation of all-day book burning. However, despite the appearance of a citizen 
led formation of the national community, there are aspects of the racial Volksgemeinschaft which 
fail to demonstrate that every action of the Nazi Party directed against the Jewish people 
occurred with the tacit consent of the German citizenry. 
 A 1935 citizenship law dictated that “a Jew cannot be a citizen of the Reich. He has no 
right to vote in political affairs; he cannot occupy a political office.”314 The law went on to define 
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Jews explicitly in a racial context.315 This law and many others that the Nazis put into effect 
prohibited Jewish people from being citizens and holding political office, but the laws against 
Jewish citizenry were far more stringent than what Fritzsche’s racial, citizen driven 
Volksgemeinschaft called for. The Jewish racial qualifications set forth by the Nazi Party were 
severe and allowed for many Germans who were not previously considered Jewish by popular 
standards to be classified as Jewish and summarily ostracized in the name of the national 
community. As far as the Reich Government was concerned someone with three full Jewish 
grandparents, two full Jewish parents, offspring of a marriage with one Jew or an extramarital 
relationship with a Jew, and other relatively minor associations with Jews was labeled Jewish 
and subject to the full extent of the Third Reich’s wrath.316 The 1935 Law for Protection of 
German Blood and Honor extended the purging of the national community by outlawing 
marriage and extra-marital intercourse between German citizens and Jews.317 The Nazis pursued 
the ends of the Volksgemeinschaft to a greater extent than the Germans’ notions of a national 
community allowed for. If renewal of the German Spirit through the exclusion of foreign and 
Jewish elements existed as the prime directive of the German citizens’ Volksgemeinschaft, basic 
laws of exclusion and forced emigration would have sufficed to meet the German citizen’s 
requirements. The Reich Government however went much further than what the Germans 
consented to and followed their own fanatic desire to form a racially pure Volksgemeinschaft. 
Therefore, Fritzsche’s assertion that the Volksgemeinschaft existed as a call for racial renewal by 
the German Citizenry, enacted faithfully by the Nazi Party, although accurate to a certain degree, 
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fails to fully identify the true nature of the Volksgemeinschaft. 
 If Fritzsche’s citizen led reordering argument is deemed an inaccurate interpretation, can 
the Volksgemeinschaft still exist as a largely citizen held ideology that the Reich Government 
endorsed independent of Nazi ideological racial extremes? John Connelly uses his article “The 
Uses of the Volksgemeinschaft” to stipulate that the German citizenry participated actively in 
many aspects of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. Connelly researched a set of letters exchanged 
between the citizenry of the German town of Eisenach and the local Nazi Party offices. Connelly 
believes that within these correspondences he has found a unique interpretation of the formation 
of the Volksgemeinschaft. Connelly argues that the letters he found demonstrate a bottom up 
construction of the Volksgemeinschaft in which the local party took cues from the citizenry in the 
implementation of the national community.318 Thus, the Volksgemeinschaft was formed and 
altered locally every time a citizen evoked “the catchword of Volksgemeinschaft to pursue their 
own agendas.”319 
 Connelly begins his argument by stipulating that the Nazi Party set up “advice centers” in 
which they hoped to receive the personal grievances of local citizens as a way to maintain 
“meaning and power.”320 In theory, the citizenry would bring their problems to the local Nazi 
Party branch at which point the Party would use the complaints to establish a “barometer for 
judging the hopes, inclinations, longings, and distresses of the people and adjust its policies to 
what it finds.”321 Connelly argues that the head of the Eisenach branch of the Nazi Party, Herman 
Kohler, took great efforts to listen to his citizenry and change the social hierarchy within his 
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corner of the Reich.322 Kohler was seemingly obsessed with generating opportunities for the 
“Aryan commoner” and “welcomed opportunities to advance the lot of fellow disgruntled 
plebeians.”323 Connelly uses many of the letters sent to Kohler to demonstrate that the citizenry 
would often contact their local Nazi Party branch to denounce various individuals often in an 
effort to acquire selfish gains. Per Connelly, as the economy rebounded under the Third Reich 
the German citizens setup a zero-sum situation where, “to take advantage of a resource, one had 
to show why someone else should be excluded.”324 Kohler fostered such behavior and slowly 
purged many undesirables from the economy and subsequently from the national community. 
Thus, Connelly would argue that the Nazi Party established a system of grievance that the 
citizenry actively used to purge various individuals from the national community. 
 Connelly contends that there was a truly corrupt nature to the Volksgemeinschaft present 
in the local environment. The Volksgemeinschaft was meant to unite all Germans, irrespective of 
class and politics, into a community where each citizen worked for the benefit of one another. 
However, “in many senses party membership implied greater claims to the services of the 
Volksgemeinschaft.”325 Connelly’s argument allows for such a claim because in a realm where a 
party member wanted a certain position held by a non-party member, all that had to be done was 
write a letter to the local Nazi Party branch and the situation would be resolved, to the benefit of 
the party member. Situations of private denouncements certainly existed as a critical aspect of 
the Volksgemeinschaft. Denunciations proved fatal, however, to the citizen led Volksgemeinschaft 
by, as Connelly contends, “making the political private,” i.e. exploiting the notions of the 
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Volksgemeinschaft for personal gain, the citizenry “had made the private political.”326 In order to 
judge one person’s claim to being a stronger example of the national community, that person’s 
loyalties and actions had to be investigated. However, Denunciations often brought with them 
increased attention from the Reich Government into the activities of the accusers’ daily life. 
Therefore, Connelly argues that the German citizenry, through denunciations, not only actively 
participated in initial purges, but also opened the door to further Party-led purges of the national 
community. Thus, Connelly believes that the Volksgemeinschaft was initially a citizen held 
ideology that the German people manipulated and corrupted to such an extent that the Nazis 
easily replaced it with their own version of the national community.     
 Despite the compelling nature of the bottom-up argument that Connelly makes using very 
valid primary evidence, there are many flaws within his assertions. For instance, the 
Volksgemeinschaft is a national community, not an Eisenach community. To stipulate that every 
city within the Third Reich matched this model stands as quite the logical leap. Eisenach was just 
one city and it stands as unique to many Nazi cities in that its local branch leader, Kohler, made 
himself actively available to the citizenry, holding office hours for six hours every week.327 In a 
Reich Government filled with corrupt Nazi Party officials, Kohler went out of his way in many 
cases to assert the will of his citizens and maintain the national community as he perceived it. 
Connelly on multiple occasions alludes to the excessive zeal of Kohler, specifically calling 
Kohler “exceptional” and “a particularly fanatical political leader.”328 Kohler follows a strict 
code that Connelly even mentions went beyond the notions of responding to public demands and 
operated outside of those demands.329 The examples Connelly subsequently provides, Kohler’s 
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exclusion of Jews, the mentally handicapped, and the formerly imprisoned are ideas that came 
directly from Adolf Hitler and the Nazi upper echelon.330 Thus, the Volksgemeinschaft that 
Connelly argues, consisting of manipulations of local party leaders done initially at the behest of 
the citizenry, does not mesh with actual events because not only is Connelly’s example of 
Eisenach unique to much of the Reich, but also Kohler’s loyalties were very typical of the Third 
Reich that insisted that party leaders duplicate the policies of the main Party. 
To a certain degree, Connelly’s argument asserts the presence of a citizenry that 
expressed contentment with the Volksgemeinschaft because they felt they were actively 
participating in its maintenance. Per Connelly, citizens in Eisenach “knew that district leader 
Kohler-and the system he served-reserved terror for those outside the Volksgemeinschaft.”331  
This assertion begs the question, how did the German citizenry know that they were within the 
Volksgemeinschaft? Fritzsche would argue that the German citizenry knew their position in the 
national community because their notions of German nationalism informed the entire concept. 
However, as demonstrated through racial laws and Connelly’s arguments, the Reich Government 
took considerable efforts to enforce its own definitions of the Volksgemeinschaft while 
attempting to get the citizenry to think and act racially. Therefore, arguing that the citizen’s 
ideological conception of the Volksgemeinschaft informed the actions of the Nazi Party is, if not 
exactly implausible, at least incomplete. 
David Welch stipulates as much in his article “Nazi Propaganda and the 
Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People’s Community.” Welch does concede that the German 
citizenry’s preconceived notions of the Volksgemeinschaft existed before the Nazis ever took 
power because for any of the Nazi propaganda to have been effective, it needed to “preach to 
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those already converted.”332 However, as opposed to being active shapers of the national 
community, Welch, in contradiction to Fritzsche and Connelly, believes the German citizenry 
ultimately were the recipients of the Nazi interpretation of the Volksgemeinschaft. 
Welch asserts that “the political function of propaganda was to co-ordinate the political 
will of the nation (the citizenry) with the aims of the state,” and if this strategy failed propaganda 
needed at the very least to instill “passive acquiescence.”333 Therefore, Welch contends that the 
Nazis used these already instilled notions of the German national community to establish 
approval for their own Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. Welch contends that the Nazi propaganda served 
two purposes in the realm of the Volksgemeinschaft. First, propaganda persuaded “the population 
that short-term sacrifices were necessary” in order for the Volksgemeinschaft to be realized.334 
Second, propaganda publicized, “through the means of compensation, the measures being 
introduced by the regime.”335 Thus, propaganda called for people to put themselves second to the 
greater national community and if they did so great rewards would follow for the loyal members 
of the Volksgemeinschaft. This assertion meshes well with Nazi ideology before 1933 that called 
for sacrifice in unity. Welch acknowledges that discontent and unenthusiastic complacency 
existed within the Third Reich, but propaganda managed to depoliticize much of this resistant 
group and subsequently allowed the German citizenry to buy into the Nazis’ vision of the 
national community.336 As unemployment declined and Germans as a whole benefited from Nazi 
rule, people became willing to accept Nazi propaganda messages and acquiesced to follow the 
measures of the Nazi Party. Welch provides a compelling argument where the Nazis exploited 
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notions of the past and used their various successes to pacify the citizenry and subsequently win 
tacit consent for the Nazi ideology's interpretation of the Volksgemeinschaft. 
The Reich Propaganda Ministry exists as a perfect demonstration for Welch’s 
interpretation of the top down model for the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. Joseph Goebbels used a 
March 1933 speech to specify what he viewed as the role of propaganda in the Third Reich. 
Goebbels plainly stated that “it is the task of State propaganda to simplify complicated ways of 
thinking that even the smallest man in the street may understand.”337 Goebbels intended to use 
propaganda to secure the support of the masses for Nazi policies and the necessary tool for such 
acts was a radicalized, repressed press corp.338  Fritz Sanger, representative of the Frankfurter 
Zeitung, commented on the nature of Nazi press conferences stating, “in these conferences there 
was no discussion, we were simply spoken to somewhat one-sidedly (by the government).”339 
The Reich Government told reporters what the news was and prohibited newspapers from 
covering various topics that portrayed the Party in an ill light. For instance, the Propaganda 
Ministry banned newspapers from publishing photos in which high ranking party members were 
sitting at tables featuring empty alcohol bottles, presumably consumed by said high ranking 
members.340 Subsequently the Nazis were able to edit and shape any news event or Reich action 
to receive approval amongst the citizenry. The Nazis clearly had power over the information the 
public received and subsequently, as Welch argues, the Party could easily spin citizen-held 
notions of a national community for their own benefit; much like the citizens of Eisenach had 
manipulated the Volksgemeinschaft for their own gains. 
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To return to the initial quandary, was the Volksgemeinschaft a German ideal that informed 
Nazi policy or was the national community an ideal incorporated and edited by the Reich 
Government for its own ends? The Volksgemeinschaft generally rose out of notions of German 
camaraderie emerging from World War I. As such, Fritzsche contends that the origins of the 
Volksgemeinschaft resided in the German people and the Nazis simply followed these notions as 
a means to maintain power. However, the stringent nature of the Reich Citizenship Law’s Jewish 
categorization existed to demonstrate that the Nazis operated independent of the will of the 
citizens. Subsequently, the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft was an ideology separate from the notions of 
World War I most Germans had previously internalized. 
Connelly argues that while the citizenry made initial pleas to the notions of the 
Volksgemeinschaft shared between the people and the Nazi Party, these pleas allowed the local 
party to intervene in the private lives of their citizens providing the local party the means to 
implement its own version of the Volksgemeinschaft. However, Connelly uses one town’s 
documents and an ardent party supporter to establish his argument, consequently invalidating 
said argument by demonstrating that, through party fanatic Kohler, the higher party still informed 
the implementation of the Volksgemeinschaft. Therefore, arguments that contend the German 
citizenry’s interpretation of the national community remained dominant throughout the Third 
Reich fail to fully appreciate the Nazi Party elites’ impact on the formations of the Nazi 
Volksgemeinschaft. 
David Welch’s argument represents an accurate appraisal of the formation of the Third 
Reich’s Volksgemeinschaft. Welch argues that the Nazis used propaganda to misappropriate 
notions of the nationally held conceptions of the Volksgemeinschaft so that these conceptions 
would match and justify Nazi policies. By manipulating and actively editing these notions, the 
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Nazis were able to achieve tacit support for many of their initiatives allowing for a steadily 
progressing, aggressive policy implementation towards total state control. The Nazis thus used 
the German Volksgemeinschaft to create a loyal citizenry, but all of the arguments made about 
the origins of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft dance around a particular and pressing difficulty. 
Given the extensive nature of the Third Reich and its pervasive presence in all aspects of 
Germany, simple pacification could not have been the ultimate goal of generating a national 
community. If Welch is correct, as this thesis contends he is, in asserting that the Reich 
Government actively manipulated and edited the German citizenry’s conceptions of the national 
community for political-pragmatic ends, what ends were the Nazis pursuing in the name of their 
own Volksgemeinschaft? 
 
Goals of the National Community 
 
 The origins of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft, as Welch asserted, may have stemmed from 
the Nazi Party’s need to create a complacent citizenry, but if the Volksgemeinschaft existed solely 
as a pacifying measure, why were policies of the national community like the Reich Citizenship 
Law taken to such extreme ends? Even though the origins of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft as a 
political-pragmatic party led ideology have been determined, that effort was just a first step 
towards ascertaining the truly complicated nature of the Volksgemeinschaft. There existed a clear 
intentionality behind the development of the national community that went far beyond 
maintaining a pliant citizenry. Thus, the issue that now must be addressed in order to advance 
knowledge of this complicated topic involves determining what the Reich government intended 
to accomplish with the implementation of their version of the Volksgemeinschaft.    
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The Reich Government forcibly removed many individuals from the Volksgemeinschaft, 
but not all those who received the negative attention of Nazi authorities were targeted on a racial 
basis. Many of the perceived enemies of the Volksgemeinschaft were under attack because they 
embodied political threats to the Nazi establishment of power. Robert Paxton presents an 
interpretation of the Volksgemeinschaft within his work The Anatomy of Fascism that argues in 
favor of a strictly political nature inherent in the Volksgemeinschaft. Paxton’s work analyzes 
fascism in general and as such he views the Volksgemeinschaft as a political tool common within 
many Fascist regimes. Per Paxton, “fascists pull forward toward dynamic, leveling, populist 
dictatorship, prepared to subordinate every private interest to the imperatives of national 
aggrandizement and purification.”341 Aggrandizement and purification of the German race were 
two aspects that featured heavily within policies of the Volksgemeinschaft and as these aspects 
featured in different fascist regimes Paxton is able to operate in direct opposition to many 
scholars who contend the Volksgemeinschaft was a uniquely German ideal. 
 Paxton would contend processes of coordination, the unification of various aspects of life 
into equivalent Nazi Party organizations, brought about the steady progression of Germany 
towards “national aggrandizement and purification.”342 Paxton lays out a political model in 
which “terror, division, minor concessions, and integration devices” all helped to progress the 
formation of the national community as a political tool that would allow the Nazi Party to 
dominate all aspects of a citizen’s life.343 Paxton’s most elaborate explanation of coordination 
comes in the form of the Nazi Labor Front. Terror eliminated direct opposition within the 
German population while purges slowly divided the Social Democratic and Communist 
coalitions within the workforce.  At Hitler’s insistence, the Nazi Party eliminated unions and 
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formed the Nazi Labor Front under which all labor would be integrated fostering a sense of unity 
in workers’ lives.344 However, as workers remained somewhat oppositional to these measures, 
further integration was brought in through the Strength through Joy program, designed to foster 
the Party ideology in combination with German labor’s increased leisure time.345 Slowly, even a 
recalcitrant population such as workers came to be integrated within the national community, but 
only after various efforts were taken by different elements of the political sphere to ensure such 
actions succeeded. 
As Paxton uses the Nazi Labor Front as an example, it would be best to investigate that 
set of events to determine the validity of his contention. After a large and nationalistic May Day 
celebration the Nazi Party swiftly moved against workers unions and replaced them with the 
Nazi Labor Front. In April 21, 1933, Dr. Robert Ley laid out the plan for the coordination of the 
trade unions that demonstrates that this act represented a serious political action as the “SA as 
well as SS (were) to be employed for the occupation of trade-union properties and for taking into 
custody the people concerned.”346 After the Trade Unions were forcibly removed, the Nazi Labor 
Front was established with the expressed Volksgemeinschaft goal of internal social unification 
while simultaneously educating “all Germans who are at work to support the National Socialist 
State and to indoctrinate them in the National Socialist mentality.”347 The Nazi Labor Front 
would strive to indoctrinate the remaining workers and thus induct them into the political, and 
perceivably brainwashed, national community thus demonstrating Paxton’s strictly political 
outlook on the Volksgemeinschaft 
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Paxton’s interpretation of the Volksgemeinschaft, despite a strong political-pragmatic 
outlook, is incomplete as his interpretation of the Fascist state contends that Fascism can never 
settle into a state of order, eventually destroying all aspects of government in a constant need for 
conflict.348 Per Paxton, “Fascist regimes had to produce an impression of driving momentum-
permanent revolution.”349 Under this assumption of fascism the Volksgemeinschaft, as a political 
tool was just that, a short-term political tool used to gain totality in all aspects of the state as just 
one step of the Nazis’ power addiction. The Nazis used the notions of forming a national 
community to maintain the idea that oppositional forces existed within the Third Reich that the 
German citizens needed the Nazi Party to fulfill. However, asserting a strictly opportunistic 
outlook on the Volksgemeinschaft ignores the ample evidence that demonstrates multiple 
ideological goals of the Volksgemeinschaft the Reich Government professed. Although Paxton’s 
interpretation does accommodate the Nazi Party’s aggressive hand in the political aspects of the 
national community, his nihilistic portrayal of fascism in general fails to appropriately define the 
goals of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft which evoked some fashion of long-term plan. 
The Reich Government clearly intended to construct some fashion of national community 
loyal to the perpetuation of the Third Reich, but the ultimate goal Paxton put forward does not 
take into consideration the ways the Nazis were revising and shaping the roles of its citizens, in 
particular women, on a micro level. Jill Stephenson’s work The Nazi Organization of Women 
explores the various roles conceived for women in Germany from the Weimar through the Third 
Reich, in particular focusing on how those roles were implemented and in what ways they were 
not. Stephenson's arguments about the perceived position of women in the Nazi 
Volksgemeinschaft add insight into the exploration of the goal of the national community. 
                                                 
348Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, 148. 
349Ibid, 148. 
 127 
 
Stephenson contends that the women who initially supported the Nazi Party were not 
virulent, zealous followers of the Nazi ideology.350 Per Stephenson, the women voters of the 
NSDAP “had been drawn from women who disliked female political activists and women 
rightists.”351 The backlash from the allegedly immoral Weimar Republic had mobilized women 
to vote for a Nazi Party that wished to make women “wives, mothers, and homemakers.”352 After 
the Nazis came to power and purges removed many of the feminist political activists, the Nazi 
women voters subsided into political obscurity.353 The Nazis had differing perspectives on the 
inclusion of women in the national community and subsequently female involvement in the Nazi 
Party machinery. Robert Ley contended that “the organization of persons of one sex can 
therefore not be termed a community.”354 Ley was in a stark minority however as most members 
of the Nazi upper echelon, in particular Adolf Hitler, were virulently against allowing women to 
have a political role in the Volksgemeinschaft.355 
As anti-feminist as such stances are, Stephenson contends that the Nazi women, who 
were rather politically inactive, did not often oppose such opinions. Rather, Stephenson contends 
that most women who joined women’s organizations in the Third Reich did so not because of 
any particular political desire, but rather they wished to elicit the benefits that came from being 
such a member.356 Most damning to feminist assertions during the Third Reich were the 
following statements Stephenson includes from Nazi-supporting women like Lore Bauer: “we 
claim no rights for our sex such as that women politician [Rosa Luxemburg] demanded…rather 
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we want to fulfill the tasks which the nations sets us as women.”357 Many women thus did not 
want to assert themselves in the political realm, but rather wished to be dutiful citizens of the 
Reich helping to build the all-important Volksgemeinschaft. Stephenson echoes Welch’s 
pacification argument in her postscript claiming that “Once everyone believed that class and 
denominational differences were irrelevant…then there would be no more class conflict” which 
would inevitably “persuade the working class that they were too well off to be able to afford a 
class war.”358 Stephenson argues that the Nazis took a stance that alienated women not only 
because that was the Party’s ideological belief, but also Nazi propaganda and actions tried to 
create a national community that guided women to believe that Volksgemeinschaft did not need 
women to be involved in politics. 
Evidence exists to corroborate Stephenson’s contention that women were exiled from the 
Reich’s political process while the government simultaneously portrayed such exclusions as 
having value to the national community. In April 1934, Hitler banned women from becoming 
lawyers and judges because he and the Nazi hierarchy did not wish women to attain any power 
or influence in the legal system of the Third Reich.359 Such exclusions inconvenienced numerous 
women who had already, at great personal expense, gone through various legal training only to 
have their personal investments ruined.360 Exclusions of this nature led to discontent, not 
necessarily from women but men who protested the resulting practical difficulties from losing 
well trained barristers.361 In 1933, Reich Minister of the Interior Frick furthered Hitler’s 
argument for the exclusion of women claiming that, despite his insistence that no direct laws 
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existed prohibiting the hiring of women, “in the event of males and females being equally 
qualified for employment in the public service” the man should receive the position.362 In order 
to justify such actions, the Nazi government needed to correlate these exclusions with the 
existing efforts to improve the economic status of the national community. By Nazi arguments, 
every woman exiled from a position freed that position for a male breadwinner.363 According to 
Hitler, such actions stood to benefit the Reich as “the man’s world is said to be the state” and 
anything that benefited the state was necessary for the national community.364 Going even further 
Hitler argued that women engaged in a smaller world in which husband, family, children, and 
home were of the greatest importance.365 However, Hitler contended that the “greater world” that 
men inhabited would fail without the smaller world that women maintained.366 Subsequently, at 
the Fuhrer’s behest the Nazis went to great efforts to justify their female exclusion policy as a 
way to lessen the discontent arising from women’s exile from political and professional life. 
Stephenson’s argument echoes Welch’s and in that manner it also fails to determine the 
full extent of the Volksgemeinschaft. Admittedly, defining the goal of the Volksgemeinschaft is 
not Stephenson’s main purpose for her work, but in spite of this she does provide a very 
interesting assessment that provides considerable insight into how the exclusion of women in the 
Reich helps to define the further goals of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. In her conclusion, 
Stephenson asserts “the entire Nazi system was based on diversion and disguise, temporary 
expedients to control the people until they-or, more likely, a new generation-were sufficiently re-
                                                 
362Wilhelm Frick, “Frick’s Guidelines on the Employment of Women Civil Servants and Teachers,” in Documents on 
Nazism, 1919-1945, ed. Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), 367. 
363Ibid, 367. 
364Adolf Hitler, “Hitler’s Views on the Role of Women, September, 1934,” in Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, ed. 
Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), 365. 
365Ibid, 364. 
366Ibid, 364. 
 130 
 
educated for the myth to assume the proportions of reality.”367 Stephenson implies that the Nazis 
were simply buying time until a new generation of Nazi supporters could be brought into the fold 
and rendered the previous generation obsolete. For a new Nazi generation to arise the Reich 
Government needed new citizens and the only group capable of meeting this demand was 
women, as child bearers of the future Reich. 
The Nazis made prevalent use of the ideal that women, excluded from the political and 
economic realms, should take on the pivotal role of the bearers and caretakers of the youth of the 
Third Reich. Jost Hermand argues in his article, “All Power to the Women: Nazi Concepts of 
Matriarchy” that the Nazis’ emphasis on a patriarchal society allowed room for “the concept of 
matriarchy and sought to place it in the service of a biologized view of history.”368 The Nazis 
emphasized on numerous occasions the organic notion that the Volksgemeinschaft was tied to 
nature and subsequently this natural aspect would be represented in a very maternal fashion. The 
Volk came from the wellspring, or womb, of nature which recognized, as Hermand asserts, “the 
primordial maternal womb and simultaneously a maternalization of the national concept.”369 In 
the same fashion that a womb gestates a child, the Nazi Party intended for its vision of the 
Volksgemeinschaft to gestate a citizenry capable of carrying on its vision. In strictly ideological 
terms therefore, Hermand asserts that the Volksgemeinschaft’s intention was to generate a 
citizenry that perfectly fit the Nazi vision. 
 Hermand does not operate entirely in the ideological realm, however, as he spends parts 
of his article dealing in the very practical world of women in Nazi Germany. Per Hermand, the 
Nazis had no interest in making women equal citizens to men, but did strive to incorporate 
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women into the Volksgemeinschaft.370 Hermand demonstrates that beyond chauvinistic 
condescension, the Reich Government went about various methods to demonstrate a respect for 
the women of Nazi Germany, but that respect was directed to those amongst women who decided 
to be mothers.371 Hermand uses a quote from eugenic gynecologist August Mayer’s 1938 work 
German Mothers and the Rise of Germany to demonstrate the important role women held in the 
notions of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft stipulating that “the worth of a nation is shown in the 
preparedness of its women to become valuable mothers.”372 Mayer went on to contend that the 
Third Reich needed “a sublime mothers’ throne, before which men stand in respect (because) the 
existence or non-existence of our people is decided solely by the mother.”373 Mayer clearly 
expressed as backed by Hermand, that the Nazi hierarchy intended for women to become 
mothers of the future Reich citizens. These women would produce the children necessary for the 
future of the proposed Thousand Year Reich. 
Stephenson contends, as backed up in the events, that women were exiled from the 
professional aspects of the community, at which point Hermand argues the Nazis placed an 
emphasis on women’s role as mother of the Reich. Hermand’s contention that women had an 
important ideological role as matriarch is demonstrated in a 1934 Hitler speech that expressed 
the Nazi belief in women as the womb of the Third Reich.374 Hitler asserted that in order for the 
Reich to exhibit “strength of vision, of toughness, of decision, and of the willingness to act,” the 
woman must be willing “to risk her life to preserve this important cell (the Reich) and to 
multiply it.”375 Women would risk their lives for the Reich in childbirth as Hitler claimed that 
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every birth was a battle a mother “waged for the existence of her people.”376 Therefore, coming 
from the Führer one can see that Hitler had a general ideological plan for the women of the Third 
Reich, a sentiment that found support in the public. One woman of the Third Reich, Emilie 
Muller-Zadow, claimed that “the place that Adolf Hitler assigns to women in the Third Reich 
corresponds to her natural and divine destiny.”377 Using language of the Volksgemeinschaft, 
Emilie goes on to claim that as all mothers care for their young, a national community would be 
formed where “old barriers and prejudices fall away, and the gulf of class differences is bridged 
over.”378 However, as Hitler’s speech and Emilie’s words were spoken after the previously 
mentioned exclusion of women from the legal profession and other acts carried against women, 
the question becomes, was the matriarchal role of women brought on as an afterthought to keep 
women loyal to the Reich or genuine Nazi policy? 
The Nazi ideological emphasis on women as the wombs of the Third Reich was not an 
afterthought argument meant to appease dissenters. Rather, the Reich Government actively 
sought to encourage births within Germany going so far as introducing an incentive system 
designed to encourage couples to produce future citizenry. In June 1933, the Nazi Government 
passed the Law for the Reduction of Unemployment in which section 5 called for the 
implementation of marriage loans.379 Under this law, “people of German nationality” who get 
married can apply for a loan of 1,000 Reich marks.380 However, as the law is intended for the 
reduction of unemployment, the loan could only be granted if a wife gave up her job and 
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intended to remain outside of the workforce for the term of the loan.381 This qualification 
presumably freed up women to stay at home and give birth to the future members of the Third 
Reich. An added incentive of the marriage loans, directed towards childbirth, stipulated that upon 
the birth of a child a quarter of the loan was forgiven.382 State secretary of the Reich Finance 
Ministry, Fritz Reinhart, stipulated in 1935 that the loans saw an increase in marriage and 
childbirths, citing a 27.3 percent increase in marriage and 86,503 more births in the first six 
months of the loan program.383 Thus, the Nazi Party’s program of marriage loans fulfilled both 
the exclusion of women from the workforce that Stephenson argues and the matriarch role that 
Hermand argues. 
To return to Stephenson’s assertion about the Volksgemeinschaft, the Nazis were trying to 
generate an increase in children, but not children who would be solely raised by these matriarchs. 
Rather, as Stephenson argues, the Nazis desperately desired from the revision of women’s roles 
“a new generation” of Nazi supporters.384 The Nazis made no secret that they desired to mold a 
future generation of ardent Nazi supporters out of the children of the current Reich citizenry. In a 
1934 speech to the National Socialist Women’s Organization, Hitler stated clearly that the youth 
“will become Germany when we no longer exist! They will preserve everything we have created 
and built. We are working for them.”385 This quote does not particularly appear to be 
demonstrative of a plan to convert the youth as any speech directed towards a matriarchal 
audience will emphasize sacrifice for the future generation. However, Hitler did not say mothers 
would work towards fostering the future German generations, but rather we, the Reich 
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Government included, would take a hand in raising the German youth. Hitler romanticized the 
future plans of the youth by appealing to notions of the national community, an example being 
his statement that “the only thing that enables us to overcome all...is the view from the present 
into the future, from ourselves to the generation coming after us.”386 However, despite Nazi 
language stressing the importance of parental influence in fostering the unifying notions of the 
Volksgemeinschaft within their children, in action the Nazis had a far different vision for the 
German youth’s role in the Third Reich. 
Although official Nazi inculcation of children had existed under the Reich Minister of the 
Interior, the Hitler Youth was not recognized as the official organization for conversion of the 
youth until December 1936. 387 In the law making the Hitler Youth official the Nazis declared 
that “the future of the German nation depends upon its youth, and German youth shall have to be 
prepared for its future duties.”388 The Nazis intended to use the Hitler Youth to impress upon 
children their responsibilities in the future of the Third Reich, but this education would be 
accomplished in a manner separate from parents and educators as, according to the law, “The 
German Youth besides being reared within the family and school, shall be educated physically, 
intellectually, and morally in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the people and community, 
through the Hitler Youth.”389 The Reich Government intended to indoctrinate children in the 
methods of National Socialism so as to generate a citizenship loyal to the Nazi vision of the 
national community, thereby generating their own enduring Volksgemeinschaft. If the Third 
Reich had lasted for multiple generations this vision would have been realized as the Nazis, 
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through the Hitler Youth, were already creating die hard, ideologically driven supporters by 1936.   
At the very beginning of a child’s Hitler Youth career, the Nazi Party ensured that the 
member would be taken aback by the splendor of the Third Reich. According to one memo 
discussing how Hitler Youth inductions were to be carried out, “the cub and the young lass must 
regard this hour of their first vow to the Fuhrer as the holiest of their whole life.”390  The 
ceremony of induction into the Hitler Youth itself was steeped in Nazi ideology. In the speech 
given by all Hitler Youth leaders, the youth were welcomed into “the community of all German 
boys and girls.”391 The leaders go on to say that “the Führer demands of you and of us all that we 
train ourselves to a life of service and duty, of loyalty and comradeship.”392 Subsequently, these 
recruits would represent a “proud picture of German youth.”393 The ceremony heavily 
emphasized the national community’s unifying nature, culminating in a demonstration of 
subjugation to the will of Adolf Hitler as each member swore: “I promise always to do my duty 
in the Hitler Youth in love and loyalty to the Fuhrer and our flag.”394 Thus from the beginning, 
the Hitler Youth used established aspects of Nazi ideology, in particular emphasis on the notions 
of the Volksgemeinschaft, to create a small force of citizens who were intended to become the 
most ardent supporters of Hitler to ever walk the earth. 
Robert Paxton argued that the Nazis' goal with the national community was an explicitly 
pragmatic undertaking in which the Volksgemeinschaft existed solely as a political tool to gain 
total power over the citizenry. However, Paxton’s argument contending a nihilistic aspect of 
fascism is rather short sighted because the Nazis expressed clear visions of the future 
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independent of the need for never ending conflict. Jill Stephenson’s work on the exclusion of 
women in the Reich echoes Welch’s pacification theory but also provides the caveat that the 
Nazis were actually appeasing the active citizenry in an attempt to buy time for another 
generation of even more ardent supporters to materialize. As Hermand asserts, women were 
given a matriarchal role in the Reich, but pacification was a secondary concern as the true 
intentions of exclusions were to act on the matriarchal role for women. The Reich Government 
sincerely believed women were of great significance to the Third Reich in exclusion from 
Hitler’s “greater sphere” because they would give birth to the future generation of Nazi citizens. 
The goal of the Volksgemeinschaft therefore was to convert the German citizenry across multiple 
generations into pliable members of the Nazi’s vision of the Thousand Year Reich. The Reich 
Government used notions of the national community already held dear by German citizenry, 
unity, sacrifice, and loyalty, to pacify the existing citizens into a state in which they would 
acquiesce to the creation of a truly Nazi citizenry. Nazi citizenship would not be tainted by social 
democracy nor raised in an environment of doubt. Thus, dating back to the first Nazi meetings in 
Munich, every action of the Nazi Movement, Nazi Party, and Reich Government slowly built 
towards a primary ideological goal, the conversion of a citizenship that fully matched the Nazi 
conception of the Volksgemeinschaft; a citizenry totally loyal to the will of the Führer and 
Germany's future within the Third Reich 
 
The Stark Implications of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft 
 
The Nazis used the Volksgemeinschaft ideology to appease the existing citizenry until a 
future Nazi citizenship could be developed thus forming the true Nazi national community. As 
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succinct as this definition seems, this description does not fully define the entire nature of the 
Volksgemeinschaft. This explanation simply provides an origin, methodology, and an 
intermediate goal of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. All of Nazi history may have been building 
towards a conversion of German people into a Nazi Citizenship, but this was merely a step on the 
path to the creation of a truly pure Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. Converting German people to the 
Nazi vision existed as a powerful and ambitious goal, but as long as foreign influences existed 
the Nazi Citizen would never be entirely pure. Thus, any attempt to determine the true nature of 
the Volksgemeinschaft would be woefully inadequate without investigating the ways that Hitler’s 
plans for war, the sole means to eliminate foreign influences from the German citizenry, 
informed the Nazi conception of the Volksgemeinschaft.   
Historian Richard Evans uses his vast narrative, The Third Reich in Power, to 
demonstrate that the Nazi conception of the Volksgemeinschaft slowly dominated every aspect of 
a German citizen’s life with the ultimate purpose of slowly cultivating a citizenry prepared to 
devote themselves entirely to the Third Reich in the prosecution of war. Per Evans, “war had 
been the objective of the Third Reich and its leaders from the moment they came into power in 
1933.”395 One aspect of citizens’ lives that needed the aggressive attention of the Reich 
Government was the perceived presence of Jewish, corruptive influences. In order to mobilize 
the population for the impending war, a racial reordering would be necessary, but unlike 
Fritzsche, Evans contends that this racial reordering did not come from the citizenry, but from 
the top of the Nazi hierarchy, Adolf Hitler. Hitler believed the Jews were a “subversive, 
parasitical element” who needed to be removed from the Reich before the Germans could be 
strong enough to wage a war against those who tried to keep Germany down.396 Thus, the 
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Volksgemeinschaft, according to Evans was a top down effort designed to eliminate Jewish and 
other foreign influences thereby preparing the German citizenry for war. 
Evans argues that the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft generated a “cultural revolution, in which 
alien cultural influences-notably the Jews but also modernist culture generally-were eliminated 
and the German spirit reborn.”397 Only if the Nazis took over all aspects of Germans’ lives while 
they simultaneously purged foreign influences would the Reich Government be able to cultivate 
a population capable of dominating the world in the name of Germany. Thus, Evans offers a 
much more encompassing and flexible narrative for the Volksgemeinschaft than the scholars 
previously mentioned. As opposed to focusing on a specific aspect of the Volksgemeinschaft, like 
the citizen, race, gender, and so on, Evans uses his vast narrative work to demonstrate that the 
Nazis very actively and persistently went after every aspect of a citizen's life that they felt stood 
in the way of the ultimate prosecution of war. 
Ample evidence exists to corroborate Evans’s argument for the nature of the 
Volksgemeinschaft. In September 1933 the Nazis setup the Reich Chamber of Culture which 
operated under the Reich Minister for People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels 
who was empowered to “decree laws and general administrative regulations as well as 
amendments for the purpose of enforcing this law.”398 This September law set up smaller 
chambers operating under this Chamber of Culture which would supervise archives, the press, 
radio, theater, music, and the creative arts.399 Thus, Goebbels received ultimate control over 
various aspects of German culture and slowly proceeded to convert these institutions to the will 
of the Nazi Party. If an artist, journalist, actor, musician, and so on refused to join their respective 
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chamber, there could be costly consequences for the outsider. For example, the Reich Editorial 
Law of October 1933 explicitly mandated that “editors are legally combined in the Reich 
Association of German Press. Every editor belongs to it by virtue of his registration on the 
professional roster.”400 Thus, if you worked as an editor, you were a member of the Press 
Chamber. If you were not a member you were not allowed legally to be an editor. The Nazis 
implemented these procedures across the board in the Reich Chamber of Culture. In addition to 
mandating membership in the organization, one could only be a member if you “possessed 
German citizenship” and were “of Aryan descent, and not married to a person of non-Aryan 
descent.”401 Thus, all cultural institutions would consist of racially qualified German citizens 
putting forth Nazi approved works in a process that steadily removed corrupting influences from 
the German citizenry, 
Coordination of German culture involved more than bringing cultural institutions under 
the Reich because to fully ensure corrupting influences were removed from the 
Volksgemeinschaft those who refused to join Nazi backed institutions had to be disposed of. 
Early in the Third Reich those who would oppose the Reich Government’s power often 
emigrated in order to escape the attention and persecution of Hitler’s flunkies. According to 
Evans, “2,000 people active in the arts emigrated from Germany in 1933 and the following 
years.”402 Those who did not wish to have their creative vision stymied, or quite frankly feared 
for their lives, chose to leave Germany. In some cases these individuals did not wish to leave 
Germany, but the financial situation that resulted from being excluded and denigrated by the 
Reich Government made it impossible to maintain a living within the Third Reich. Numerous 
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examples, two thousand at least, exist that tell this tale, but those stories are well known. Perhaps 
less renowned is Wilhelm Furtwängler's quiet inquiry into why the Nazis were waging a war 
with German culture. 
A correspondence between Wilhelm Furtwängler, a prominent symphonic conductor who 
chose to stay within the Reich’s good graces, and Joseph Goebbels demonstrates the impact of 
cultural coordination and the arguments used to justify such actions. In a letter directed to 
Goebbels, Furtwängler politely objected to the exile of his many esteemed peers, but he prefaced 
said objection with a statement in line with the Nazi ideology of the pure, unified 
Volksgemeinschaft.  Furtwängler  stated “let our fight be directed against the rootless, subversive, 
leveling, destructive spirit, but not against the real artist who is always creative and therefore 
constructive, however one may judge his art.”403 Despite the fact that this letter condemned Nazi 
coordination and forced exile, Furtwängler still claimed that the fight against subversive 
influences existed as “our fight.”404 As early as April 1933 the Reich Government was already 
able to force subtle resistive elements into a position of basic agreement with their policies. 
Goebbels’s reply to this letter demonstrated the extent to which Nazi Germany was willing to go 
to rid German culture of any subversive elements. Per Goebbels, “art must not only be good, it 
must also appear to be connected with the people, or rather, only an art which draws on the 
people itself can in the final analysis be good and mean something to the people for whom it is 
created.”405 In addition, “there must be no art in the absolute sense as known by liberal 
democracy.”406 Goebbels invoked the exclusion of artists who experienced success thanks to 
notions of corruptive liberalism, but he only went this far after arguing that art needed to match 
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the notions of the Volksgemeinschaft. Cultural coordination demonstrates, unlike previous 
arguments, a truly adversarial, party led foundation of the Volksgemeinschaft that strove for a 
purification of the community that would eventually be free of the parasitic Jewish influence 
Hitler despised. 
Evans’s argument for the Volksgemeinschaft is two-fold because once corruptive 
influences were removed from the Reich, the population needed to be prepared for a war that 
would return Germany to international prominence. Per Evans, “Hitler personally drove 
Germany towards war from the moment he became Reich Chancellor, subordinating every other 
aspect of policy to this overriding aim.”407 Ample evidence exists to prove that Hitler’s main goal 
in the Third Reich was to launch what eventually became the Second World War. In a February 
1933 meeting of the Reich Cabinet, Hitler insisted that rearmament of Germany begin 
immediately. Hitler stressed on multiple occasions that “for the next four to five years the main 
principle must be: everything for the armed forces.”408 Subsequently, “every publicly sponsored 
measure to create employment had to be considered from the point of view of whether it was 
necessary with respect to rendering the German people again capable of bearing arms.”409 The 
German people were to be made ready for a war and as such every manipulation and 
implementation of the Volksgemeinschaft ideology carried this element of military preparedness, 
not in the sense of being economically prepared, but rather being prepared ideologically to be 
loyal to the Reich beyond infringement. 
Military preparedness of the German people predated and heavily influenced the other 
measures of the Volksgemeinschaft previously discussed. According to an official statement 
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following the nationalization of the labor unions, the conversion of the unions was in step with 
“the struggle against Marxism which has been proclaimed by the Führer.”410 In Hitler’s speech to 
the National Socialist Women’s Organization, the Führer stated, “You must complement man in 
this struggle that we are leading for our people’s freedom, equality, honor, and peace, so that we 
can look to the future as fighters of our people!”411 The speech given at the Hitler Youth 
induction read, “you too now march in step with the youngest soldiers.”412 In addition Hitler 
Youth members motto was “Führer command-we follow!”413 a statement furthered by a Hitler 
Youth poem which ends with “You, Führer, are our commander! We stand in your name. The 
Reich is the object of our struggle, it is the beginning and the Amen.”414 Evans provides a very 
accurate argument for the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft because the national community ideology that 
permeated the German citizenry was itself thoroughly permeated by the idea of struggle in the 
form of Hitler’s desire to prepare the Third Reich for war.    
Evans assertion that the Volksgemeinschaft was primarily an initiative to cultivate an 
entirely loyal German population for the purpose of waging war is obscured within his vast 
cultural-political narrative constructed in an effort to explain all Nazi history from 1933 to 1938. 
As such, Evans's narrative lacks a direct purpose for Hitler’s war beyond megalomania. Historian 
Stephen Fritz puts together a much more succinct argument for the Nazis’ use of the 
Volksgemeinschaft as a preparatory agent for war. Combining Fritz’s argument with Evans's 
narrative provides a compelling and sound analysis of the military and ideological nature of the 
Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. 
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Fritz begins his book Ostkrieg, an in-depth military history of the Eastern Front of World 
War II, in a fashion fairly unique to works of military history. Fritz devotes considerable 
attention early to the ways in which the ideology of Adolf Hitler, and subsequently the Nazi Party, 
led to the formation of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft and ultimately the Second World War. Similar 
to Evans’s point, Fritz contends that the Nazis were pushed by “a radical anti-Semitism that 
viewed Jews as a conspiratorial, destructive force in world history.”415 However, whereas Evans 
takes a somewhat distended stance on the Nazis’ use of the Volksgemeinschaft to foster a war 
population, Fritz takes a much more direct approach. 
Fritz contends that almost all of the actions in the Third Reich stem back to Hitler’s fears 
of repeating the mistakes of the First World War. Hitler fully succumbed to the Stab in the Back 
Legend, believing that a betrayal of Germany had come at the hands of the Jews consequently 
leading to the loss of the First World War.416 Hitler argued before coming into power that if as 
many as twelve thousand Jews had been killed at the outset of the war, many German lives could 
have been saved and the war would have taken a much different turn.417 This rabid anti-Semitism 
explains the initial exclusion measures carried out against various Jews and other perceived 
enemies of the Reich. Hitler did not want any corrupting influences within his Volksgemeinschaft, 
but more importantly, as Fritz contends, the national community was meant to bind all “racially 
valuable Germans and prepare them for the struggle ahead.”418 Thus, Fritz provides a military 
justification for Evans’s focus on coordination as the Volksgemeinschaft was manipulated and 
crafted in order to prevent a future Stab in the Back by generating a national community that was 
explicitly created to not betray the Third Reich and revisit the shame brought about by the end of 
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the First World War. 
Prevention of the Stab in the Back is not the sole justification Fritz provides for the 
establishment of a Volksgemeinschaft. According to Fritz, Hitler was also driven by “the 
necessity of securing Lebensraum (living space) for the German nation as a means of ensuring its 
survival.”419 The Volksgemeinschaft existed as a cornerstone of the Nazis’ plans to create a 
German citizenry capable of seizing Lebensraum for the future perpetuation of the German Race. 
Fritz lays out a model for the development of the Volksgemeinschaft that relies heavily on the 
Nazis’ interpretation of Social Darwinism. Fritz claims that Nazis strove to create a national 
community that could compete with the United States for international dominance, but in order 
to do that the Germans needed to seize critical Lebensraum.420 In World War I, the hunger 
blockade implemented by the British starved nearly 750,000 Germans and Hitler believed that 
the German people were subsequently weakened to such an extent that they were unable to 
oppose the Stab in the Back.421 Given their borders in 1938, the Germans could easily be 
blockaded again and Hitler recognized that Germany had serious deficiencies in “food, 
capitalism, and raw materials.”422 Thus, if the Nazis were to have any success on the 
international stage, land would be needed to in order for the German race to exist independently 
for the duration of the Thousand Year Reich. 
Fritz would assert that Hitler believed the purpose of the Nazi state was to “secure the 
existence of the Volk.”423 Coordination removed the enemies of the Reich and brought all 
German citizens under the Nazi banner of German unity. Through the various methods of 
coordination the German people were crafted into a loyal population and, as evidenced by the 
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drastic state of affairs at the end of the Second World War, no betrayal of internal enemies would 
occur as long as the Nazi government was in power. A national community was formed capable 
of carrying on the military goals of the war, but, as far as the Nazis were concerned, the war 
itself was fundamental to the formation of the Volksgemeinschaft. “Either the German Volk 
struggled for Lebensraum and assured its existence, or its racial enemies would deny it the means 
to life and, thus, assure its extinction.”424 Therefore, Fritz asserts that the Nazis would eventually 
urge this carefully crafted national community to test itself against the world in a contest in 
which the strongest would be fit for survival. 
Coordination as a tool against removing the possibility of another Stab in the Back is 
explicitly demonstrated Dr. Robert Ley’s proclamation following the May 1933 seizure of trade 
unions. In justifying the actions taken against the trade unions, Ley claims that “above all we 
must prevent your enemy, Marxism and its satellites, from stabbing you again in the back.”425 
Although the intention of using such a statement in this proclamation was meant to stir 
nationalist hatred for the end of World War I, the truth behind the statement should not be 
disregarded. A high ranking member of the Nazi Party used the Stab in the Back Legend as 
justification for removing the supposed corrupting influence of Marxism fostered by the trade 
unions. Thus, as Fritz asserts, the prevention of the mistakes of World War I featured throughout 
the coordination actions of the Third Reich. 
Fear of repeating World War I certainly finds a basis within the events of the Third Reich, 
but does the risky notion of waging a war for the perpetuation of the German race in a social 
Darwinist conflict find solid foundations in the events? In the previously mentioned 1933 Reich 
Cabinet meeting, Hitler directly claimed that “Germany’s position in the world depended 
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decisively upon the position of German armed forces.”426 Hitler in 1933 substantiated, shortly 
after calling for major rearmament in four to five years, that war would be a necessary 
determinant of Germany’s power in the world. In addition, a September 1933 Hitler speech 
iterated Fritz’s Social Darwinist conclusion fairly decisively. Hitler contended that while it 
seemed that National Socialism at that time had taken over, “only those who have not fully 
comprehended the character of this tremendous struggle can believe that the struggle between 
ideologies has thereby come to an end.”427 Hitler clearly geared up for a conflict with those he 
believed fostered the Jewish conspiracy. Thus, Fritz’s assertion that the Volksgemeinschaft 
existed as an item of the Nazis plan to wage a social Darwinistic war for the future of the 
German race is well founded. 
Fritz and Evans have come to the heart of the contradictory nature within the 
Volksgemeinschaft. These two historians contend that the Reich Government used the notions of 
the Volksgemeinschaft to prepare a strong and unified German citizenry capable of waging a total, 
racial, and ideological war. However, as Fritz asserts, this total war itself was necessary to the 
perpetuation of the national community. Without the catalyst of war, the German race would not 
be able to seize much needed materials or prove the dominance of the German race capable of 
earning international respect. However, the war had the potential destroy the national community, 
as eventually occurred with the fall of the Third Reich in 1945. Despite this risk, war was 
necessary because given the fact that German land was small and resource deprived, the 
Volksgemeinschaft could never truly be independent of corrupting international influence until 
sizable lebensraum had been achieved between the Reich and those corruptive elements. 
Therefore, according to these two scholars, the Volksgemeinschaft is best understood as the 
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desire to create a powerful and independent community of “true” Germans that could not be fully 
realized until the Third Reich opened itself up to the risk of war.     
 
Closing Thoughts 
  
In a September 1935 Party Rally in Nuremberg, Hitler made a speech in which he took 
time to address the youth of Germany. Hitler claimed that the German people were becoming 
“more sturdy and disciplined” and the youth were beginning to follow suit.428 Hitler went on to 
assert that the value of a German was no longer bound in their ability to drink copious amounts 
of beer.429 Rather, “in our eyes the youth of the future must be slim and slender, swift as the 
greyhound, tough as leather, and hard as Krupp Steel.” The Fuhrer then claimed that it was the 
obligation of the Volksgemeinschaft to “educate a new type of man so that our people is not 
ruined by the symptoms of degeneracy of our day.”430 It would only be a few more months 
before the Hitler Youth became the officially recognized mechanism for such an education.  
Therefore, the ultimate goal behind the Nazi ideology was the establishment of a truly 
pure Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. In order for this to be realized, the Nazis called for the German 
citizenry to be crafted into a population capable of accomplishing all of the Reich Government's 
ambitious goals. However, the process towards establishing an entirely pliable and yet hardened 
society was not an overnight occurrence. The Nazis began to use notions of the German 
Volksgemeinschaft to attain approval for various Nazi policies while simultaneously crafting 
these notions into a Nazi interpretation of the national community that exceeded the standards 
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held by most Germans. After achieving outward loyalty amongst the citizenry, the Nazi 
government began shaping spheres within the Reich; the masculine sphere strengthened the 
existing community while the feminine prepared the future community. As children were born 
into the Third Reich, they would be entered into Nazi youth organizations and begin an 
education steeped in Nazi ideology and myth. These children would eventually become the 
citizens of a Germany who would wage aggressive and all-encompassing war to determine that 
the Nazi citizen was truly superior and fit to dominate the world.
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CHAPTER 5 
 CONCLUSION  
Antrieb431 
 
At 11:30 on the night of April 28th 1945, a bewildered Traudl Junge, Adolf Hitler’s 
youngest secretary, followed her boss to the military conference room of Hitler’s Berlin 
Bunker.432Junge was confused as to why she was being summoned at such a late hour for 
dictation, a request made more puzzling given the environment surrounding Berlin. The Red 
Army had been firing artillery into the city of Berlin for the past four days as they prepared for 
their assault on the Reich capital.433Over the past few days various upper echelon Nazi officials, 
most notably Herman Goering and Albert Speer, had fled Hitler’s bunker in the hopes of saving 
themselves and as much of their property as possible.434Certain members went beyond simply 
fleeing and blatantly forsook Hitler and the Third Reich, most notably Reichsführer-SS Heinrich 
Himmler who, just a few days earlier, made surrender overtures to the Swedish Prime 
Minister.435All of these circumstances combined with the impending fall of the Third Reich and 
the end of the Second World War seemed far more important than simple dictation, but what 
Junge did not realize was that Hitler intended to dictate his final political testament. 
            Hitler’s mind had been failing him over the previous weeks burdened as he was by the 
failed total war and the looming end to his personal rule. During his stay in the bunker, the 
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Fuhrer launched into acerbic bouts of rage that were more severe than any of his previous 
demagogic rants. Just six days earlier Hitler lashed out at four of his commanders for allowing 
the Red Army into the northern suburbs of Berlin.436 For a half hour he screamed at these 
commanders to such an extent that even those used to Hitler’s momentary bursts of anger were 
utterly stunned.437 Beyond rage, Hitler dwelled in his own world, barely registering the severity 
of the situation or the input of those around him.438 Thus, when Hitler set about making his final 
political testament, the Fuhrer was hardly of sound mind.439 
            After relaying matters of his personal affairs and estate, Adolf Hitler set about dictating 
his final political testament, knowing that he would take his own life shortly after its completion. 
The Führer began by arguing that he had never wanted to pursue a World War. According to 
Hitler, the war “was desired and instigated exclusively by those international statesmen who 
were either of Jewish descent or worked for Jewish interests.”440 Hitler had always blamed the 
Jewish people for everything wrong in the world and the fact that he held on to this belief system, 
including it in his final testimony calls the entirety of his already condemnable worldview into 
question. If Hitler staunchly believed Jews were truly responsible for a war clearly perpetrated 
by himself, a belief bed rocked in irrational denial, who is to say all of Hitler’s beliefs were not 
based on similar denials? Who is to say that Nazi ideology, influenced to a considerable extent 
by Hitler’s own weltanschauung, was not the expressions and manifest will of a psychopath 
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completely out of touch with his surrounding reality? 
 The Third Reich was supposed to last for a thousand years, but when Hitler committed 
suicide in 1945 the Reich crashed into oblivion after only twelve years. By 1945 Nazi Germany 
was losing across multiple fronts in Europe, suffering defeat at the hand of a coalition of nations 
evoking tenets stretching from welfare capitalism to Marxism. The drastic differences between 
1938, when the Reich Government had guided Germany to unprecedented levels of political 
power, and 1945 are often used to demonstrate the failure of Nazism as a political philosophy. As 
Hitler tightened his grasp and began implementing the Final Solution he provided historians with 
all of the evidence they would need to assert the Nazis were simply power-hungry bullies with a 
racial agenda. As established throughout this work, very few historians actually credit Nazi 
ideology as being of any value against what many historians consider a largely opportunistic 
Nazi Party.   
 This work has not totally dissolved notions of opportunistic Nazis, but nonetheless has 
demonstrated that ideology was central to numerous pivotal actions throughout Nazi history. The 
Beer Hall Putsch exists not as a drunken rabble of nationalists attempting to take control of 
Germany; Hitler did not even have designs on the Nazis leading the new government. Rather, the 
Putsch existed as a band of Germans, aware of their subjugation and suffering under the Weimar 
Republic, joining together and, similar to the 1914 volunteers, taking action against the enemies 
of a united Germany. The switch to the path of Legality appeared to compromise of the violent 
aspects of Nazi ideology, but not only did violence continue, but such a path by accepting 
previously excluded elements of Germany into the Nazi fold, reaffirmed the primacy of a unified 
national community. The countless political, utopian, and opportunistic promises made during 
the Reichstag elections were motivated by Nazi ideology's insistence that the German people 
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recognize that their ills could be tracked to the Social Democracy and Marxism prevalent within 
the Weimar Republic. Finally, the Nazis intended to build a Volksgemeinschaft with the dual 
purpose of appeasing the present citizenry while that citizenry produced the future Nazi 
citizenship. In theory, the new Nazi citizenship would then be prepared for the struggle of 
existence to secure the lebensraum necessary for Germans to become the dominant race. Thus, 
this work has demonstrated that despite the historical profession's exclusion of ideology, treating 
it as an afterthought justification for action, Nazi actions cannot be separated from ideology. 
 Throughout this work ideology has been argued as not only tied to Nazi actions but has 
also been asserted as an impetus for such actions. The specific actions analyzed in the previous 
three chapters demonstrate Nazi ideology's influence and ties to Nazi action, but to argue 
ideology as the impetus stands as a truly bold assertion; an assertion rooted in the assumption 
that Nazi ideology was compelling enough to motivate action. Certainly this work has 
demonstrated the attractiveness of Nazi ideology. In the early stages of the Nazi Movement, the 
initial Nazi followers internalized various notions of German identity amplified by the intensity 
of the First World War. These first Nazis certainly found calls for a restoration of the masculine 
activism of the 1914 volunteers fascinating and inspirational, but to argue that these aspects of 
ideology motivated the followers of the Nazi Movement to conduct a Putsch certainly appears to 
ignore other fundamental motivations like peer-pressure, economic strife, and hunger, that most 
certainly had an impact on the decision to act. These differing motivations can be perceived 
throughout every stage of Nazi history. After 1933, the threat of violence, arrest, and murder 
certainly stand as strong evidence in favor of the argument that numerous motivations existed to 
compel action outside the parameters of Nazi ideology. Thus, if Nazi Ideology was not only tied 
to Nazi actions, but, as this work asserts, acted as a motivating impetus for such actions, said 
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ideology must be evaluated in terms of its ability to compel action. 
 In tying ideology to action, this work has sought to lessen the determinism of the view 
that Nazism was strictly opportunistic in nature. However, such a task is difficult because the 
Nazis often committed actions in stark contrast to their ideology. Such actions have spawned a 
considerable amount of historical work that has cemented the idea of an opportunistic Nazi 
organization in professional, public, and amateur interpretations. Much of this historiography has 
been explored throughout this work, but as much as such work has been analyzed countless more 
works exist. One such counter argument unexplored in this work resides in the life of Germans 
during 1937-1938. The most critical argument to be made against Nazi ideology as an impetus 
for action makes the claim that the true motivation for support of Nazism was not the compelling 
nature of its ideology, but the compelling nature of Nazism’s results. Between 1933 and 1938 the 
German economy rebounded to a staggering effect restoring employment across Germany 
simultaneously restoring the German people's faith in the German economy. Thus, many 
historians have argued that the stability the Nazis provided, as opposed to the ideology they 
espoused, was what compelled the citizenry to support the Nazis. If Nazi ideology is to be 
demonstrated as compelling, it will be necessary to deconstruct the idea that citizens were 
motivated solely by the stability the Nazis offered. 
 The idea that economic stability fostered support of the Third Reich is far from a recent 
argument. Notably, Tim Mason argued in his 1977 work Social Policy in the Third Reich that the 
Nazis launched Blitzkrieg wars to increase their resources and military expansion without 
implementing unpopular economic measures.441 More recently, Eric Johnson and Karl-Heinz 
Reuband came together in 2005 to present their work What We Knew, a compilation of their 
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research analyzing over three thousand written surveys and two hundred in depth interviews, 
taken from 1991 through 2001, of former citizens of the Third Reich.442 The surveys were 
conducted amongst a strong number of both Jews and non-Jews in order to get a full picture of 
those living in Nazi society. What We Knew is of value to the present discussion in that many of 
the questions asked focused on determining the motivations for supporting the Third Reich. 
Admittedly there are problems with their survey work that are inescapable, many of which they 
acknowledge. For instance, the most problematic aspect of oral histories on Nazi Germany is that 
not many former citizens are willing to be forthcoming with their support of the Nazi agenda out 
of shame and fear. The inclusion of Jewish former citizens in the survey certainly precludes any 
support of Nazi ideology. Therefore, some responses may present false and biased data, a risk 
somewhat minimized by What We Knew's large sample. Next, assuming they were looking for a 
twenty-five year old during 1938, the age range of such respondents during the survey would be 
seventy-eight to eighty-eight years old depending on when Johnson and Reuband made contact. 
Additionally, such a distance of time between the survey and the events places a cap on the age 
of the respondents when they lived in the Third Reich. Thus, mostly youth during the Third 
Reich would be able to respond in numbers somewhat representative of their former populations. 
However, this last flaw works in favor of this work's analysis as the young were arguably the 
most indoctrinated by Nazi ideology offering a valuable comparison. Therefore, if ideology is to 
be asserted as comparable or surpassing pragmatic, economic concerns' ability to inspire action, 
analysis of What We Knew'sfindings will be of fundamental importance. 
 Breaking briefly from economic motivations, fear of Nazi terror stands as an often argued 
motivation for Nazi support. Johnson and Reuband asked respondents to mark whether they 
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feared either their own arrest or a family member's arrest “constantly,” “occasionally,” or not at 
all.443 Contrary to popular arguments, between sixty-two to seventy-one percent of respondents, 
depending on certain cities' results, expressed no fear of being arrested by the Gestapo. Less than 
ten percent felt constant fear, thus fear as a motivator, one of the main foundations of the 
argument for opportunistic Nazism, was fairly weak amongst the younger Reich public. 
Returning to economic versus ideological motivations, What We Knew asked respondents to pick 
what they liked “best about National Socialism.”444 Respondents picked three of eight different 
choices and these results were charted. The “fight against unemployment” featured on sixty-two 
to sixty-nine percent of respondents’ choices. The next three highest motivation aspects were 
“Less crime,” “Construction of highways,” and “support of families,” all parts of the practical 
benefits of Nazism, not the ideological. Ideological motivators such as “Community feeling,” 
“idealism,” “overcoming of powerlessness,” and “Jews less powerful” paled in comparison never 
combining in any city to exceed the “fight against unemployment.”445 Therefore, putting aside 
the potential false representations of support, according to these surveys a large population of 
ideologically susceptible youth were most motivated to support the Nazis because of various 
pragmatic concerns, which has led historians to question ideology's role as a motivator and 
impetus for action. 
 What We Knew's results are certainly troubling to this work's argument of ideology's 
impetus role, but it is easy to assert the popularity of economic and practical aspects amongst 
citizenry. Beyond bias and fear, support tends to float towards those political organizations that 
better the economy and infrastructure, especially when times are prosperous.  Along these lines, 
historian Shelley Baranowski agrees in full with the idea that economic, pragmatic motivations 
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pushed those who supported the Nazis to act. Baranowski argues the centrality of consumerism 
to Nazism, going as far as asserting an implicit consumerist foundation to the 
Volksgemeinschaft.446 More importantly to the present discussion, Baranowski contends that even 
soldiers who lived outside of the material benefits of the Third Reich were nonetheless motivated 
by economic, pragmatic ends. Per Baranowski, “for the military, entertainment, tourism, and 
consumption became not merely ancillary to combat, but the very ends of warfare.”447 However, 
Baranowski's conclusions, like many other historians who advocate economic primacy, suffer 
from the same two fundamental flaws. First, many historians gloss over the importance of 
pragmatic concerns to Nazi ideology not only as pacification measures, but as the desire to 
provide the German citizenry with proof that their lives should and would be demonstratively 
better than other competeing races. Therefore, restoring unemployment, rebuilding infrastructure, 
and numerous other Nazi endorsed rebuilding actions correlated with the Nazi ideological need 
to strengthen Germany for the conflict of nations. Second, while economic and pragmatic 
concerns are often pointed to as reasons people supported and worked for the Third Reich, these 
arguments are easily established for the time period of 1933 to 1938, but what about 1942 to 
1944?  
With the Allied bombing campaign, fully underway by 1943, the German people were 
hardly able to enjoy some of the finer elements of the Third Reich. Additionally, the total 
mobilization for war hindered the economy leading to limits on foodstuffs, aesthetics, and other 
resources that previously fostered Nazi support. Yet, despite the loss of these economic and 
pragmatic resources, the German citizenry continued to fight, struggle, and work for the Third 
Reich until its utter collapse in 1945. Many would point to fear as a motivator for such support, 
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but as Johnson and Reuband demonstrated, fear was not as strong, or at least as memorable, a 
motivator within Germany. So, as the German economy and Third Reich collapsed around them, 
what motivated Germans to act? 
 Stephen Fritz's work Frontsoldaten analyzes the mindset of the German soldier during the 
Second World War. Fritz asserts that ideology's importance to the soldier had been under-
analyzed within the historiography claiming that “the average German soldier, perhaps to a 
surprising degree, exhibited and embraced various forms of ideological commitment to 
Nazism.”448 Fritz asserts the primacy of the value of community and camaraderie amongst the 
landser as evidenced by one such soldier's claim that “we believed in a new community, free 
from class conflict, united in brotherhood under the self-chosen Führer.”449 This same soldier 
wrote in 1937, “we're putting our conception of National Socialism into action: we are all the 
same in our service for our people, no one is asked his origins or class.”450 Certainly the landsers 
can be considered a different creature from the average citizen as their experience is noticeably 
isolated in comparison with other citizens. One such soldier acknowledged as much claiming “at 
home things are different, people walk straight past each other and only take notice at marches or 
rallies.”451 Therefore, one can consider the impact of the Second World War's combat on the 
landsers as comparable to the First World War's impact on the Nazi Movement; the war and 
combat amplified senses of ideology and identity not held as ardently by those separated from 
the front lines. Nonetheless, the average landser certainly had economic, pragmatic concerns to 
motivate action, such as wages for relatives back home, pensions, and the military-industrial 
complex. However, Fritz, in his copious analysis of these soldiers’ wartime writings, 
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demonstrates that despite these motivations the landsers still placed a primacy on ideology as 
their impetus for action even as defeat became inevitable. 
 Fritz asserts that for the Landsers as the war worsened “ideological instruction served as a 
welcome prop in sustaining morale and motivation.”452 As the possibility for victory declined 
soldiers turned to ideology for motivation. Specifically, soldiers relied on the miniature national 
community of the front and the camaraderie it inspired to push them through those trying times. 
For the rest of Germany, ideology's impact is difficult to gauge. Fritz's second substantial work, 
Endkampf, analyzed the mindset of the German people as the Second World War came to a 
devastating close. Fritz splits the end of the war into three phases, the first of which is most 
important to this work. This phase featured the last relevant days of Nazi authority, after this 
phase Nazi rule by terror and enemy advances became muddled into a terrifyingly brutal 
existence for all parts of Germany. Per Fritz, before these collapses and “despite a general war 
weariness and desire to end the war, the majority of Germans nonetheless continued to follow the 
Nazi regime's orders and to do their duty.”453 During this phase Fritz points out that ideas like 
“loyalty, courage, discipline, patriotism, and camaraderie” motivated the people to continue in 
the hopes of some kind of reversal of fortune.454 Similar to the soldiers who relied on the national 
community to motivate them to persevere, the Reich citizenry fell back on the unifying rhetoric 
of the Volksgemeinschaft to keep working for a Nazi agenda that was quickly disintegrating. 
Therefore, when the economic and pragmatic benefits of the Third Reich were stripped away 
during the final phases of the war, ideology as an impetus for action was firmly demonstrated. 
The primacy of ideology as a motivator is debatable as a great deal of individual variation 
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troubles such assertiveness. However, 1942 to 1944 Germany demonstrated that Nazi ideology 
could indeed motivate action within people, especially those who strongly adhered to such 
ideology before the war. Therefore, ideology not only informed actions but also could compel 
people to take action, validating the assertion of Nazi ideology as an impetus for action. 
 Returning to the question of “what was Nazism,” has this work helped the general 
historical effort to answer this question? Numerous historians covered throughout this work have 
asserted the opportunistic nature of Nazi adherents as the primary aspect of Nazism. This 
opportunism becomes more pronounced when the Nazis began their program of mass-
extermination and totalitarian control of the German citizenry after starting the invasion of the 
Soviet Union. However, this work has sought to diminish the idea that Nazism was solely an 
opportunistic organization of power hungry sociopathic anti-Semites. While those descriptions 
are certainly apt in many cases, such portrayals simplify the nature of Nazi action. Under the 
opportunistic arguments, Nazism was simply the belief system of broken demagogues who 
gained a voice during uniquely stressful economic times. As such, Nazism can be trivialized as 
an entirely unique situation in history and summarily treated in exclusion to the rest of history. 
However, Nazism was far from simple. 
If Nazism was strictly opportunistic racism then it would have remained on the outskirts 
of political and national relevance much like the American Klu Klux Klan. However, this work 
has demonstrated that Nazi ideology was very attractive to various sections of Germany. Nazi 
ideology preached more than anti-Semitism and anti-Marxist rhetoric. In all actuality, Nazi 
ideology was built on a foundation of inclusion and recognition. From its inception, Nazi 
ideology sought to duplicate the Burgfrieden and activism of the 1914 volunteers through the 
formation of a Volksgemeinschaft. The Nazi Volksgemeinschaft would not only restore valued 
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aspects of German identity but recognize the problems face by both the present and past 
Germans. In solving these problems the Nazis would create a stronger, more durable Thousand 
Year Reich that would propel Germany to unprecedented heights. Belief in this future resided at 
the center of and compelled Nazism’s followers to commit various high profile actions, even 
when the benefit of such actions were negligible or by 1944 non-existent. Therefore, Nazism is 
vastly more complicated than many historians believe, which mandates more in-depth analysis of 
ideology's importance to Nazism. 
Despite demonstrating that ideology and action were tied together in pivotal ways, much 
more work needs to be done to determine the exact nature of Nazism. As asserted in the 
introduction any work that seeks to focus on one aspect of Nazism and determine the exact 
nature of Nazism from that aspect is doomed to fail before it ever begins. This work has no 
intention of establishing a catchall definition of Nazism but rather has simply chipped away at 
the vast scholarship supporting interpretations that too often focus on the condemned leadership 
and their opportunistic, eventually nihilistic, behavior. Hopefully, this work increases awareness 
of the historical relevance of Nazi ideology leading to further scholarship on the topic. Such 
scholarship will hopefully help demolish such simplistic understandings of Nazism. Only once 
such an identity is done away with can historians come to a fundamental and encompassing 
understanding of the belief system and actions that led to atrocity and terror. In a claim 
mentioned in the introduction, William Sheridan Allen stated that Nazism was a “problem of 
perception,” an assertion that rings true for the historiography of Nazi Germany as such 
scholarship cannot seem to avoid looking at Nazism through the lens of the Holocaust.455 Until 
more efforts are taken to avoid portraying Nazism in terms of the terrible crimes committed in its 
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names, the true nature of this entity will forever be obscured and the Holocaust and the suffering 
it caused will still be misunderstood. The continuing scholarship that fosters arguments of 
Nazism as the expression of megalomaniacal mass-murders must yield to the reality that Nazi 
ideology not only informed and motivated many of the pivotal actions of Nazi history, but that 
this ideology surpassed its adherents finding commonality and expression in mass-society 
making Nazism a problem relevant to human nature, not simply an unbalanced and localized 
minority. 
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